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his is Old Dominion University’s 15th annual State of the Region report. While it represents the work of many people connected in various ways to the university, 
the report does not constitute an official viewpoint of Old Dominion, or its president, John R. Broderick. The State of the Region report maintains the goal of 
stimulating thought and discussion that ultimately will make Hampton Roads an even better place to live. We are proud of our region’s many successes, but realize 
it is possible to improve our performance. In order to do so, we must have accurate information about “where we are” and a sound understanding of the policy 
options available to us.
The 2014 report has a strong economic development flavor and is divided into seven parts:
Rebounding, Albeit Slowly: In a nutshell, our regional economy continues to 
recover, but still has not regained the jobs lost in the 2008 recession.   
Mixed Signals: Migration Data and Regional Economic Vitality: 
Between 2010 and 2013, our region experienced net out-migration, after taking 
account of births and deaths. We are, however, attracting many new immigrants 
from abroad. 
Megachurches in Hampton Roads: There are 14 “megachurches” in 
Hampton Roads and each enjoys an average attendance in excess of 2,000 
weekly. They are redefining organized religion in our region.  
Homeless Children in Hampton Roads: Estimating the Costs to 
Society: More than 22 percent of homeless people are children under age 18. 
We focus on the work of the organization ForKids Inc. as a way to estimate these 
costs and benefits of homelessness to society. 
The Impact of Vehicle Tolls on Hampton Roads: Job Mobility, 
Residential Living Choices and Regional Cohesion: This was one of 
the hottest topics in Hampton Roads this past year and we analyze the probable 
effects of those tolls on our region.
Economic Development Incentives: Competing Against Ourselves? 
Is the time-honored strategy of providing financial incentives to attract new firms 
the most productive way for our region to proceed, or instead should we be 
looking at alternatives such as “gardening” existing firms and creating “innovation 
districts”?
The Answer Is Always “Yes”: In a related chapter, we point out that our 
cities persistently ignore available evidence and choose to provide large financial 
subsidies for arenas, stadiums, convention centers and hotels.
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Old Dominion University continues to provide support for this report. However, it would not appear without the vital backing of the private donors whose names appear 
below. They believe in Hampton Roads and the power of rational discussion to improve our circumstances, but are not responsible for the views expressed in the report.
The Aimee and Frank Batten Jr. Foundation Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce 
R. Bruce Bradley Kaufman and Canoles 
Ramon W. Breeden Jr. Thomas Lyons 
Arthur A. Diamonstein Patricia W. and J. Douglas Perry 
George Dragas Jr. Anne B. Shumadine 
Edward L. Hamm Jr.
The following individuals were instrumental in the writing, editing, design and dissemination of the report:
Vinod Agarwal Elizabeth Janik Janet Molinaro Luke Watson
Chris Colburn Feng Lian Ken Plum Gilbert Yochum
Vicky Curtis Sharon Lomax Ayush Toolsidass 
Steve Daniel Alice McAdory Shara Weber 
Special recognition is due Vinod Agarwal, director of the Economic Forecasting Project for his help and assistance.  
Our hope is that you, the reader, will be stimulated by the report and will use it as a vehicle to promote productive discussions about our future. Please contact us at jkoch@
odu.edu (757-683-3458) or gwagner@odu.edu (757-683-3500) should you have any questions.
All 15 of the State of the Region reports may be found at www.odu.edu/forecasting and www.jamesvkoch.com. Single paper copies may be purchased for $25.
Sincerely,
James V. Koch Gary A. Wagner
Board of Visitors Professor of Economics Professor of Economics  
and President Emeritus
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REBOUNDING, ALBEIT SLOWLY
T
he Great Recession inflicted significant damage upon the citizenry of Hampton Roads. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that our regional rate of 
unemployment more than doubled from 3.4 percent in April 2008 to 8.2 percent in January 2010. Meanwhile, between 2007 and 2010, we lost almost 
40,000 jobs in Hampton Roads (see Graph 1).    
Even so, cushioned by Department of Defense (DOD) spending, our regional 
recession turned out to be milder than that of the nation. When the U.S. rate of 
unemployment topped out at 9.9 percent in March and April of 2010, this was 
considerably higher than our regional 8.2 percent peak.
DOD spending in Hampton Roads was indeed the key to our more sedate 
economic decline; it increased in our region by an average of 6.1 percent 
annually between 2000 and 2011. Unfortunately, this powerful growth engine 
began to sputter in 2012 and as Graph 2 indicates, absolute DOD spending in 
Hampton Roads in 2014 likely will barely exceed our 2011 level and actually 
be below our 2012 level.   
DOD expenditures on military personnel have been a significant driving force in 
our regional economy for at least the last decade. One can observe in Table 1 
that the average compensation of an active-duty military member in our region 
increased by more than 95 percent between 2001 and 2011, while average 
federal civilian employees’ compensation increased a bit more than 54 percent, 
average state and local government employees’ compensation by 39 percent, 
and average private non-farm employees’ compensation by almost 31 percent. 
However, the political/economic energy for these DOD compensation increases 
is dissipating; it appears that the next wage increase will be 1 percent.   
Note that the compensation data reported in Table 1 include the value of all 
fringe benefits received by active-duty personnel. Thus, an economic value is 
placed on all food, uniform and housing allowances, etc. Active-duty military 
wages did not increase by 95 percent between 2001 and 2011.    
Ironically, the deceleration of defense spending has enabled us to achieve a 
long-sought regional goal – the diversification of our regional economy. As 
Graph 3 reveals, in 2014, we expect that only 42.2 percent of our regional 
economic activity will be directly and indirectly attributable to DOD spending; 
this would be down from our recent peak of 46.6 percent in 2011. Alas, we 
have achieved our economic diversification for the wrong reason – a decline in 
DOD spending rather than a spirited increase in our private-sector activity.  
In any case, while we have been experiencing economic growth in Hampton 
Roads (roughly 1.54 percent over the past year after removing inflation), this has 
not translated to significant job growth. A review of Graph 1 demonstrates that 
we have yet to recover all the jobs we lost in the Great Recession. Our regional 
economic recovery has trailed that of both the Commonwealth and the United 
States. As Graph 4 illustrates, the country finally recovered all of the jobs it lost 
in the recession in May of this year and Virginia is less than 1 percent away 
from doing so. We, however, are sputtering along at almost 4 percent below 
our 2007 peak of 776,600 regional jobs.  
There are, however, some bright spots in our regional economic picture. In the 
next few sections we will examine them and our prospects for the future.
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GRAPH 1
TOTAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1999-2013 (THOUSANDS OF JOBS)
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GRAPH 2
ESTIMATED DIRECT DOD SPENDING IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2014
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Spending increased from 2000 to 2011 by 6.1% 
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TABLE 1
ESTIMATED AVERAGE COMPENSATION (WAGES, SALARIES AND FRINGE BENEFITS) FOR SELECTED CATEGORIES 
IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2001, 2011 AND 2012





Military $47,077 $92,054 $93,346 95.5% 1.4%
Federal Civilian 
Government Employees
$63,631 $98,296 $98,166 54.5% -0.1%
State and Local 
Government Employees
$40,251 $55,931 $56,334 39.0% 0.7%
Private Non-farm $29,155 $38,166 $39,499 30.9% 3.5%
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GRAPH 4
RECESSION RECOVERY IN THE U.S., VIRGINIA AND HAMPTON ROADS 
MEASURED BY THE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL JOBS RESTORED, 2007-2014*
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. *Data for 2014 are through May.
GRAPH 4
 Recession Recovery in the U.S., Virginia and Hampton Roads 
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Defense Spending
In light of the data just presented, is it possible to pose DOD 
spending as a positive factor in our economic future? Yes, 
but primarily because over the next few years we will not 
experience the much more substantial reductions in defense 
spending that might have occurred.  
In order to decipher what DOD spending is likely to be in the future, it is 
necessary to distinguish between “discretionary” DOD spending and “overseas 
contingency” DOD spending. Discretionary defense spending is best viewed as 
constituting the DOD’s base budget. Overseas contingency defense spending 
relates to wars and conflicts that are thought to be temporary, for example, U.S. 
activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. In FY 2015, $85 billion is designated for 
such purposes.  
There is, however, a third category worthy of note: “support” spending related 
to U.S. defense needs that includes certain expenditures in the Department 
of State, cyber security in the Department of Justice, nuclear security in the 
Department of Energy and the now famous Department of Veterans Affairs. Table 
2 summarizes what has been happening to these three classes of defense or 
defense-related expenditures since FY 2009. With the exception of FY 2012 
and FY 2013, support expenditures have been growing steadily over time and 
their growth is not likely to abate. This reflects both the continued growth of 
fringe benefit expenditures (including health) for active-duty and retired personnel 
and an increased emphasis on nonconventional warfare.
The three lines in Graph 5 illustrate the impact of DOD budget cuts in recent 
years. The blue line depicts discretionary DOD spending caps between FY 
2012 and FY 2021 approved under the Budget Control Act of 2011. The 
red line illustrates the additional spending cap reductions – also known as 
sequestration – that were also set in place in the Budget Control Act of 2011. 
The green line reflects sequestration relief (increased DOD spending caps) that 
was approved in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013. The area of the green 
trapezoid is equal to $31.5 billion and represents DOD spending caps that 
have been restored for FY 2013 and FY 2014.    
TABLE 2
TOTAL DEFENSE-RELATED SPENDING (IN BILLIONS OF $) 








FY 2008 $686.0 $197.5 N.A. N.A.
FY 2009 $513.5 $145.9 $149.2 $808.7 
FY 2010 $530.1 $167.3 $159.5 $852.2 
FY 2011 $528.1 $159.4 $165.0 $862.7 
FY 2012 $530.4 $126.5 $159.3 $816.2 
FY 2013 $495.5 $  93.0 $163.8 $752.3 
FY 2014 $496.0 $  91.9 $168.6 $756.5 
FY 2015 $495.6 $  85.4 $175.4 $756.4 
Source: http://useconomy.about.com/od/usfederalbudget/p/military_budget.htm
The salient point is that we were spared many of the 
sequestration cuts that had been scheduled for FY 2013 and 
FY 2014. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 also provided a 
1 percent pay increase for active-duty personnel and a 4.2 
percent hike in housing allowances.  
What does all this mean for Hampton Roads? In a nutshell, it’s 
not going to be as bad as it might have been. Graph 6, which 
shows the region’s median household income, demonstrates 
this. We’ve averted the largest DOD cuts, but smaller cuts 
remain. Further, Congress has blocked any consideration of 
closing military bases, so that potential problem is off the 
table, if only for a few years.  
Of greater concern to us should be four potentially adverse 
trends relating to DOD spending. First, the total number of 
active-duty military personnel in our region continues to 
decline and is now about 20,000 below our numbers at the 
beginning of this century. The decline between FY 2010 and FY 2012 
was relatively modest where the U.S. Navy was concerned – 1,133 fewer 
REBOUNDING, ALBEIT SLOWLY 11
active-duty individuals, or about 1.6 percent of its regional complement. 
However, we should not forget that active-duty personnel and their dependents 
buy homes, purchase automobiles, attend colleges, patronize restaurants, etc. 
We will feel the economic effects.  
Second, the U.S. Navy continues to grow smaller in terms 
of the number of active ships in the fleet. In FY 2010, 72 ships 
were homeported in Hampton Roads, but this had fallen to 68 by FY 2012, 
continuing a long-term trend. Smaller ship numbers eventually translate into 
diminished ship repair and maintenance activity, which is a multibillion-dollar 
industry in our region. More than the Norfolk Naval Shipyard will be affected. 
Firms such as BAE Systems and Colonna’s Shipyard will experience reduced 
business and subsequently find it challenging to refocus their attention toward 
non-DOD activities.   
Third, the escalating costs of building and producing major 
defense assets, such as aircraft carriers and state-of-the-
art fighter airplanes, mean that the DOD will not be able to 
purchase as many in the future. They’re simply too expensive. This will 
result in lower levels of activity at firms such as Newport News Shipbuilding. In 
the long term, if fewer such assets are being produced, this also will accelerate 
the decline in the number of active-duty personnel and civilian counterparts 
employed by the DOD.  
Fourth, the military challenges and conflicts the United States 
has confronted in the 21st century have not always matched 
up well with the powerful traditional military assets the 
country has the ability to deploy. We clearly have the most powerful 
military force on earth and any and all opponents shrink from entering any 
battlefield where the U.S. is able to deploy its traditional military assets, such 
as aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and advanced fighter aircraft. However, 
growing in importance are anti-partisan and anti-terrorist operations, the use 
of Special Forces, cyber warfare and a variety of policing and prevention 
activities. If this trend away from the use of traditional military assets continues, 
it is likely to be disadvantageous for Hampton Roads, because we are 
substantially (though not totally) a traditional, conventional forces bastion.       
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GRAPH 5
CAPS ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY SPENDING, FY 2012 TO FY 2021


















BCA 2011 Sequestration BBA 2013 
Discretionary defense spending cap increases by about $19 billion in FY 2014 
compared to FY 2013, but is about $32 billion below the levels imposed under BCA.       
GRAPH 5 
Caps on Department of Defense Discretionary Spending, FY 2012 to FY 2021 
- - -
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GRAPH 6
COMPARISON OF MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME, HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S., 1998-2014









































































U.S. Hampton Roads 
     Comparison of Median Household Income, 
   Hampton Roads and the U.S., 1998-2014 
           GRAPH 6
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Employment And Job 
Markets In Hampton Roads
Even though we have yet to recover all of the jobs we lost in the Great 
Recession, some sectors of our economy have done rather well. Graph 7 
reports sectoral winners and losers in Hampton Roads in 2013 in terms of jobs 
gained and lost. Continuing a long-term trend that was not altered by recession 
(see Graph 8), the health care and social assistance sector exhibited a strong 
increase in employment. Reflecting economic recovery, professional and 
business services, retail and wholesale trade, and even manufacturing, recorded 
significant increases in jobs.  
At the other end of the spectrum, government jobs declined across the board 
– federal, state and local – within Hampton Roads. This is indicative both of 
disappointing tax collections and citizen resistance to expanded governmental 
activity. Governments collectively shed approximately 1,600 jobs in our region 
in 2013.
Hampton Roads, however, is not a high-wage oasis. Table 3 reports average 
weekly wages in various economic sectors at the end of 2003 and at the end 
of 2013. Our largest growth in jobs has been occurring in health care and 
social assistance, but average weekly wages in this sector grew only 27.4 
percent in Hampton Roads over the 2003-2013 period. Unfortunately, during 
the same years, the CPI-U (consumer price index for all urban consumers) grew 
26.5 percent. Thus, these workers experienced only a scant 1 percent increase 
in their real incomes. Following national trends, the big winners regionally in 
terms of increased real incomes over this decade were finance and insurance 
workers, whose real incomes increased by almost 16 percent. The big losers 
were retail trade workers (many of whom are salespeople) – their real incomes 
fell by 13.6 percent during this decade.
TABLE 3
AVERAGE PRIVATE-SECTOR WEEKLY WAGES IN SELECTED 







Construction $709 $938 $246 (34.7%)
Manufacturing $908 $1,120 $212 (23.3%)
Wholesale Trade $947 $1,176 $229 (24.2%)
Retail Trade $405 $457 $52 (12.8%)
Transportation 
and Warehousing
$790* $1,066 $276 (34.9%)
Information $795* $1,044 $249 (31.3%)
Finance and 
Insurance
$867 $1,234 $367 (42.3%)
Professional and 
Business Services
$1,075 $1,430 $355 (33.0%)
Health Care and 
Social Assistance




$242 $303 $61 (27.4%)
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages in Private Sector and the Old 
Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. *Wage data shown for Transportation and Warehousing 
and Information industry are for second quarter 2005. Data for Health Care and Social Assistance are for first 
quarter 2007.
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Hence, in Hampton Roads, we find ourselves in a good news/bad news 
situation with respect to jobs and labor markets.  
The good:
•  Our regional rate of unemployment (5.8 percent in July 2014) continues to 
hover well below the U.S. unemployment rate (6.5 percent in July 2014). 
•  As Graph 9 reveals, the number of people seeking unemployment insurance 
in Hampton Roads continues to decline.
•  All things considered, the private-sector economy in our region has not 
performed too badly. There is private-sector economic growth and there has 
been some job creation.
The bad:
•  We simply aren’t creating enough new jobs; we have yet to replace all of the 
jobs we lost in the Great Recession.
•  Labor force participation in Hampton Roads (and in the U.S.) continues to 
decline, reflecting the reality that an increasing number of people of working 
age are not seeking work. Hence, they are not counted as unemployed.
•  Growth in real, inflation-adjusted incomes has been minimal overall and in 
many job sectors income growth has not kept up with the rise in the Consumer 
Price Index over the past decade.
•  While we are doing better than the U.S., our July 2014 unemployment rate 
(5.8 percent) was higher than Virginia’s (5.4 percent) and Richmond’s (5.7 
percent).
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GRAPH 7
JOBS GAINS AND LOSSES IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2013
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GRAPH 8
JOB GAINS AND LOSSES IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2007-2013 (IN THOUSANDS)
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GRAPH 9
TOTAL MONTHLY UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS FOR HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 2004 THROUGH MAY 2014 
(12-MONTH MOVING AVERAGE)





















































































































High: 18,257 (January 2010) 
Low: 8,699 (June 2006) 
GRAPH 9 
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The Port
“If you want to know who the players are, you’d better buy a program.” This 
baseball park bromide also applies to the Port of Virginia, where both the Port’s 
management and the membership of the Virginia Port Authority board have 
changed several times in recent years.  
Politically, governors Bob McDonnell and Terry McAuliffe are far apart, but both 
have gone on the record expressing dissatisfaction with various aspects of the 
operation of the Port. During his term, McDonnell considered privatizing the 
management of the Port, but this proposal succumbed to a flurry of objections. 
More recently, McAuliffe has been vocal in his criticisms of financial losses 
sustained by the Port and his administration also appears to be dissatisfied with 
the Port’s lease arrangements with APM Maersk in Portsmouth.  
Meanwhile, the Port is more active than ever. It recorded an 
all-time high in cargo tonnage handled in 2013 and is on track 
to set another record in 2014 (see Graph 10). The Port also set a 
record in handling the ubiquitous 20-foot equivalent (TEU) containers in 2013 
and likely also will exceed that number in 2014 (see Graph 11). Further, 
the Port has been grabbing market share away from its major East Coast 
competitors – New York/New Jersey, Savannah and Charleston. Graph 12 
demonstrates that the Port has decisively reversed the decline in East Coast 
market share that it suffered 2007 through 2011 and, counting 2014, will 
have increased its market share three years in a row.
One indicator of the Port’s recent success is the increase in the 
proportion of containers that have been moving out of the Port 
by means of rail rather than trucks (see Graph 13). A significant 
proportion of truck cargo leaving the Port is “captive,” that is, it is cargo that 
is most likely to be carried by truck from the Port because we are closest to the 
customers and have a cost advantage in this method of delivery. One can draw 
a radius around the Port of Virginia extending as much as 250 miles in some 
directions, and high proportions of the cargo delivered within that radius are 
captive because we enjoy a delivery cost advantage compared to more distant 
ports such as New York/New Jersey or Savannah.  
The same cannot be said for prospective customers located in metropolitan 
areas such as Columbus, Detroit, St. Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati and Cleveland. 
Multiple ports can and do compete for this cargo, which typically is delivered 
via rail. It is a good sign that the Port of Virginia’s market share is increasing in 
this highly competitive arena. We are competing and winning in a very tough 
environment for “discretionary” cargo.  
The good news does not stop there. Because the Port of Virginia is the largest 
deepwater port on the East Coast (and will remain so for several years), we can 
handle larger ships than most of our competitors. Graph 14 reports that 
there has been a general upward trend in the average number 
of TEUs handled by the Port of Virginia per single vessel 
call. Not only is this good for business, but also it enables the Port to realize 
economies of scale and potentially to exert control on its costs and prices as we 
continue to invest in Port infrastructure.   
In addition, the Port of Virginia is realizing dividends from Norfolk Southern 
Corp.’s Heartland Rail Corridor, which, among other things, allows double 
stacking of TEUs headed to the Midwest; from CSX Corp.’s on-dock rail services 
at Portsmouth’s APM Terminals; and from more “first-in, last-out” service by ships 
coming and going to and from Hampton Roads.
Why, then, the current angst over the Port’s performance? Why did The 
Virginian-Pilot’s editorial board choose to label the recent past a “legacy 
of chaos?” (June 1, 2014). First, the Port (as outlined in previous State of 
the Region reports) has been losing money, if one accepts the precepts 
of accountants and economists. Indeed, the Port recently has been in the 
unenviable position of losing money on some of the record number of TEUs that 
it has been handling, in some cases because it sometimes has offered “sale” 
prices for its services. Second, there is growing recognition that there was some 
validity to the assertions of those who were competing to manage the Port 
privately that they could in fact manage it more efficiently by reorganizing its 
operations and instituting new cost controls. Third, and related to reason No. 
2, there is agreement that the previous management structure of the Virginia Port 
Authority (VPA) and its operating arm, the Virginia International Terminals (VIT), 
resulted in overlapping responsibilities, excessive managerial expenditures and 
sometimes-laggard reactions to changing circumstances. Fourth, the Port has 
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suffered from instability; its operational and board leadership has turned over 
several times in just a few years. 
Since late February 2014, the Port has been led by an 
experienced and respected hand, John Reinhart, who knows 
the industry well and understands the range of tasks in front 
of him. Visible changes have occurred in cargo handling, and 
various efficiency-oriented, cost-containing activities are in 
process. The basic outlook for the Port of Virginia is favorable. 
Port activity likely will grow much more rapidly than gross 
regional product; our Port is well situated geographically; 
we are a deepwater port; we benefit from excellent rail 
connections; we have the ability to expand; and our labor 
relations have generally been good.  
The Port of Virginia has been a bright spot, economically speaking, over the 
past few years despite the challenges noted above. At a time when defense 
spending and tourism are stagnant, we have a special need for the Port to 
surmount the challenges facing it and augment its regional leadership role.   
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GRAPH 10
GENERAL CARGO TONNAGE AT THE PORT OF HAMPTON ROADS, 1991-2014
Sources: Virginia Port Authority and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project


























































































General cargo tonnage increased by 7.5 percent in 2013  
and we forecast a 5.6 percent increase in 2014. 
GRAPH 10 
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GRAPH 11
TWENTY-FOOT EQUIVALENT CONTAINER UNITS (TEUS) IN THE PORT OF HAMPTON ROADS, 1991-2014
Source: Virginia Port Authority and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
Twenty-Foot Equivalent Container Units (TEUs)  





























































































TEUs increased by 5.6 percent in 2013 and we forecast a 
4.3 percent increase in 2014. 
GRAPH 11 
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GRAPH 12
SHARES OF TOTAL LOADED TEU CONTAINERS FOR SELECTED PORTS ON THE EAST COAST, 2006-2014*
Sources: American Association of Port Authorities and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Market shares exclude TEUs for Philadelphia, Miami, Palm Beach and Port Everglades. *Data for 2014 are through April.
16.75%












2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* 
Savannah Hampton Roads Charleston New York/New Jersey 
After declining four years in a row, the market share of the Port of Hampton Roads reversed course and 
began to increase in 2012. It has continued to increase and is now above its peak in 2007.  
GRAPH 12 
Shares of Total Loaded TEU Containers for Selected Ports  
on the East Coast, 2006-2014*  
• • II 
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GRAPH 13
MOVEMENT OF CONTAINERS AT THE PORT OF HAMPTON ROADS BY TYPE OF TRANSPORTATION, 2011-2013
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Rail Barge & Truck Total 
Percentage of containers moved by rail has steadily increased from 30.0% in 2011 to 31.9% in 2012 
and to 33.8% in 2013. Through July 2014, 33.67% of containers have moved by rail.  
GRAPH 13 
Movement of Containers at the Port of Hampton Roads by Type of Transportation, 2011- 3 
• 
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GRAPH 14
AVERAGE TEUs PER CONTAINER VESSEL CALL, 2011-2014*
Sources: Virginia Port Authority and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. *Data for 2013 and 2014 are through April. 






















2011 2012 2013 YTD April 2013 YTD April 2014 
Average TEUs per container vessel call increased by 3.7 percent in 2012; increased by 
another 8.9 percent in 2013; and increased further by 9.6 percent through April 2014 
compared to TEUs per vessel call through April 2013. 
GRAPH 14 
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Tourism
The sluggish recovery of our tourism industry epitomizes the slow recovery of our 
regional economy. As one can see in Graph 15, total hotel revenues peaked in 
Hampton Roads in 2007 and by 2013 were still $48.6 million (or 6.8 percent) 
below the record 2007 level. In real, inflation-adjusted terms, 2013 revenues 
were 18.6 percent below those of 2007.
Much the same story holds true for REVPAR – revenue received per available 
room. This is the single best indicator of how well a hotel or motel operator is 
doing because it is a measure that takes into account both supply and demand 
(see Table 4). REVPAR in Hampton Roads fell by 10.7 percent between 2007 
and 2013 – and almost 25 percent in inflation-adjusted terms. Virginia Beach, 
which performed the best in our region, suffered a 0.1 percent decline in 
REVPAR in nominal terms over this period, but a more than 14 percent decline 
once price inflation is taken into account.
The long-term shift in tourists away from the Historic Triangle 
(Williamsburg, Jamestown, Yorktown) moderated in 2013, 
but the continuing reality is that the Historic Triangle’s share 
of regional tourism revenues declined from 31.5 percent in 
1999 to 18.3 percent in 2013 (see Graph 16). The winner in 
the market share derby was Virginia Beach, whose share 
increased from 33.2 percent in 1999 to 40.8 percent in 2013. 
While the Historic Triangle has been reducing its supply of rooms (see Graph 
17, which shows a decline in available room nights from 3.45 million in 2005 
to 3.11 million in 2013), this also has been accompanied by a slow attrition in 
the number of actual hotel nights it has sold. Counteracting this long-term trend 
– which appears to reflect a change in the tastes of the public – represents a 
major challenge for the Historic Triangle, which is one of our region’s treasures.  
We will give considerable additional attention to the evolution of the hotel/
motel market in a succeeding chapter, titled “The Answer Is Always Yes,” which 
considers the hotel/motel market in conjunction with the construction of new 
convention centers and arenas. 
TABLE 4




U.S. $65.58 $68.69 +4.7%




Myrtle Beach $54.03 $56.40 +  4.4%
Coastal Carolina $55.83 $56.26 + 0.8%
Ocean City $71.74 $68.81 -  4.1%
Virginia 
Beach
$64.73 $64.64 -  0.1%
Hampton $41.71 $37.45 -10.2%




Norfolk $54.14 $45.95 -15.1%
Williamsburg $47.48 $39.08 -17.7%
Chesapeake/
Suffolk
$52.90 $41.11 - 22.3%
Chesapeake $53.60 $41.18 - 23.2%
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, Feb. 17, 2014, and the Old Dominion University Economic 
Forecasting Project  
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GRAPH 15
HOTEL REVENUE IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1996-2014














































































Hotel revenues in 2013 were 6.8 percent below the peak observed in 2007 and are 
expected to increase by only 2.8 percent in 2014. 
GRAPH 15 
Hotel Revenue in Hampton Roads, 1996-2014 
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GRAPH 16
ESTIMATED CITY HOTEL MARKET SHARES IN HAMPTON ROADS AS INDICATED BY INDUSTRY REVENUES, 1999 AND 2013





























Estimated City Hotel Market Shares in Hampton Roads   
as Indicated by Industry Revenues, 1999 and 2013  
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GRAPH 17
HOTEL ROOM NIGHTS IN THE HISTORIC TRIANGLE (WILLIAMSBURG) MARKET, 1999-2013






























































Available Occupied Linear (Occupied) 
           GRAPH 17 
Hotel Room Nights in the Historic Triangle (Williamsburg) Market, 
1999-2013 
-
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Housing
From the standpoint of sellers, the market for existing residential homes in 
Hampton Roads continued to improve. As Graph 18 confirms, the average 
number of days that an existing home was on the market before selling 
declined for the second year in a row and the total number of existing homes 
sold increased for the third consecutive year. While the inventory of such 
homes increased slightly, it remains very close to our historical average level 
(see Graph 19). Meanwhile, as Table 5 suggests, 2014 should be the third 
consecutive year that the median sale price of existing residential homes has 
increased, albeit modestly. 
An important reason why the market for existing homes has changed is that 
the number of distressed homes on the market has declined. Graph 20 shows 
that the absolute number of residential foreclosure filings in Hampton Roads is 
continuing to move toward pre-recession levels, while Graph 21 tells us that 
the number of active listings of distressed homes (REO bank-owned homes and 
properties up for bid in a short sale) has fallen almost continuously since peaking 
at 3,224 in November 2010. In 2014, such sales are expected to account 
for roughly one-quarter of all homes sold. This is vitally important to sellers 
because, as Table 6 notes, in 2014 sales prices of REO bank-owned 
properties have been only 55.7 percent of non-distressed sales 
prices, while short sale prices have been only 72.3 percent 
of non-distressed sales prices. Plainly put, sales of distressed 
homes depress sales prices, and not just by a little bit.  
More stringent loan requirements imposed by lenders and our plodding 
economic recovery have made it difficult for many prospective homeowners 
to obtain financing and actually make a home purchase. At the same time, 
the Great Recession put a crimp in the construction of new apartments and 
condominiums. The combination of these factors has driven up rents within 
Hampton Roads. Relatively speaking, it now is much more attractive for 
individuals to purchase a home (instead of renting) than it was five years ago. 
Table 7 underlines this point by comparing the median monthly rent for a three-
bedroom house to the average monthly principal, interest and taxes required to 
purchase a home in our region. The ratio of that rent-to-house payment increased 
from 0.73 in 2007 to 1.45 in 2013.  
At the same time, the average monthly mortgage principal, interest and tax 
payment just mentioned now is only 19.4 percent of median household monthly 
income (see Graph 22). Thus, if you are employed and can obtain mortgage 
financing, this is a splendid time for you to purchase a home.  
TABLE 5
MEDIAN SALE PRICE OF EXISTING RESIDENTIAL HOMES IN 
HAMPTON ROADS, 2001-2014*















Sources: Real Estate Information Network Inc. and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project.  
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GRAPH 18
EXISTING RESIDENTIAL HOMES SOLD AND AVERAGE DAYS ON THE MARKET IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2013
Sources: Real Estate Information Network Inc. and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Information deemed reliable but not guaranteed. Days on market is calculated from the date listed to the date under contract for 
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GRAPH 19
ESTIMATED INVENTORY OF EXISTING RESIDENTIAL HOMES AS MEASURED BY ACTIVE LISTINGS ON MAY 31 OF EACH YEAR
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Currently: 10,281 
High: 13,070 (2010) 
Low: 2,616 (2004) 
GRAPH 19 
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GRAPH 20
HAMPTON ROADS RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURE FILINGS, 2006-2013
Sources: RealtyTrac and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Foreclosure filings in Hampton Roads declined 
by only 7.9 percent in 2013, compared to a 
decline of 22.8 percent for Virginia. 
GRAPH 20 
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GRAPH 21
NUMBER OF ACTIVE LISTINGS OF DISTRESSED HOMES (REO AND SHORT SALES) IN HAMPTON ROADS, JUNE 2008 – MAY 2014









May 2014: 1,876 
Peak: 3,224 (November 2010) 
      GRAPH 21 
Number of Active Listings of Distressed Homes (REO and Short Sales) in Hampton Roads, June 
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TABLE 6
AVERAGE PRICE OF EXISTING SHORT SALE, REOS AND NON-
DISTRESSED RESIDENTIAL HOMES SOLD IN HAMPTON ROADS, 
































































2006 $250,254 $241,666 96.6 $120,817 48.3
2007 $261,723 $237,897 90.9 $163,421 62.4
2008 $255,852 $239,110 93.5 $184,462 72.1
2009 $243,902 $239,913 98.4 $164,229 67.3
2010 $251,572 $231,211 91.9 $151,612 60.3
2011 $236,358 $212,967 90.1 $135,304 57.3
2012 $237,215 $187,527 79.1 $134,535 56.7
2013 $245,344 $180,001 73.4 $131,644 53.7
2014* $235,755 $170,504 72.3 $131,361 55.7
Sources: Real Estate Information Network Inc. and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. 
Information deemed reliable but not guaranteed. REOs represent bank-owned homes. 
*Data for 2014 are through May 2014. 
TABLE 7
ESTIMATED HOUSE RENTAL AND 
PRINCIPAL, INTEREST AND TAXES FOR A HOUSE PAYMENT 

















2001 $882 $836 1.19
2002 $911 $861 1.20
2003 $1,037 $890 1.33
2004 $1,044 $1,073 1.11
2005 $1,087 $1,315 0.83
2006 $1,118 $1,533 0.73
2007 $1,164 $1,598 0.73
2008 $1,247 $1,507 0.83
2009 $1,236 $1,307 0.95
2010 $1,277 $1,233 1.04
2011 $1,319 $1,071 1.23
2012 $1,454 $1,015 1.43
2013 $1,570 $1,080 1.45
Sources: HUD and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Monthly payments are calculated 
assuming that the buyer has a 30-year mortgage. It is assumed that real estate tax rate is 1 percent and 
the tax reduction received by homeowners would compensate for homeowners insurance and maintenance 
expenditures.
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GRAPH 22
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: MONTHLY PAYMENT FOR A MEDIAN PRICE RESALE HOUSE AS A PERCENTAGE OF MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD 
MONTHLY INCOME IN HAMPTON ROADS AND THE U.S., 1979-2013































U.S. Hampton Roads 
GRAPH 22 
Housing Affordability: Monthly Payment for a Median Price Resale House as a Percentage of Median Household 
Monthly Income in Hampton Roads and the U.S., 1979-2013 
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Summing It Up And A Quick 
Look At The Future
We have reasons to be pleased that our regional economy 
is growing modestly despite DOD spending within Hampton 
Roads remaining slightly below its 2012 peak. Overall, our tourism 
industry has grown at a modest pace since the end of the Great Recession. 
Continued growth in the national economy will help accelerate the recovery of 
our hotels and motels, but experience demonstrates that their prosperity is rather 
sensitive to federal spending levels, including DOD spending. Until federal 
spending recovers, our hotels and motels, as a group, are not likely to prosper 
as they did pre-recession.
Despite some turmoil and issues, the Port has been expanding both in size and 
market share and has become an increasingly important economic engine for 
Hampton Roads.    
Our regional housing market turned the corner at least a year ago, but it is not 
likely to do extremely well until federal spending in general and DOD spending 
in particular turn upward.  
All of this adds up to an outlook of modest growth that is below our recent 
historical norms. Table 8 documents that Hampton Roads grew 
at the rate of 1.89 percent in 2013 (after removing price 
inflation), but we estimate only a 1.54 percent real rate of 
growth in 2014. The 2015 outlook is for more of the same, but international 
crises that push DOD spending upward and/or inflate oil prices could easily 
alter this projection.
Graph 23 illustrates where we’ve been and where we believe we are going 
in terms of real, inflation-adjusted economic growth. Our predicted 1.54 
percent regional economic growth rate for 2014 will find us 
trailing both Virginia (predicted 1.76 percent) and the U.S. 
(predicted 1.94 percent). Unfortunately, the Commonwealth now faces 
its own economic challenges, as slumping state tax collections reveal. Three 
Northern Virginia counties rank among the top 10 in the U.S. in terms of their 
total loss of jobs in 2014. At the same time, the coal industry in Southwest 
Virginia is under environmental siege. Hence, we cannot anticipate much 
economic stimulus (for example, that coming from tourists) from the rest of the 
Commonwealth.
In the 2013 State of the Region report, we observed that “It could have been 
worse.” While hardly satisfying, this assessment remains on target.
TABLE 8
ESTIMATED HAMPTON ROADS GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT 










2000 50.35 61.49 4.64
2001 52.34 62.49 1.62
2002 55.72 65.51 4.84
2003 59.58 68.67 4.83
2004 63.31 71.02 3.42
2005 67.93 73.84 3.97
2006 72.29 76.25 3.26
2007 75.99 78.07 2.40
2008 77.50 78.10 0.03
2009 78.46 78.46 0.47
2010 80.03 79.07 0.77
2011 81.64 79.11 0.05
2012 84.84 80.79 2.13
2013 87.71 82.31 1.89
2014 90.27 83.58 1.54
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Data incorporate U.S. Department of 
Commerce personal income revisions through November 2013. Base year is 2009.
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GRAPH 23
RATE OF GROWTH OF GDP (U.S.), GSP (VIRGINIA) AND GRP (HAMPTON ROADS)
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Data on GDP incorporate latest BEA revisions through June 11, 2014. 
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Migration Data And 
Regional Economic Vitality
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MIXED SIGNALS: MIGRATION DATA AND REGIONAL 
ECONOMIC VITALITY 
T
he logic is simple. If more people are leaving a region than are coming into it, this suggests the possibility of economic problems in that region – in essence, 
a lack of economic vitality that is causing individuals to vacate. Once one controls for births and deaths, what happens to a region’s population? Is a region a 
magnet that attracts others, or does it lack magnetism and watch as individuals depart for other locales?
Hampton Roads receives mixed grades on its report card when viewed in the 
light of migration. Between 2010 and 2013, after taking account of 
births and deaths, our region experienced net out-migration. 
Virtually all of the other comparable mid-Atlantic regions 
recorded net in-migration. This is troubling information, though 
somewhat less disturbing if one separates domestic migration 
(inside the U.S.) from international migration (in and out of the 
U.S.). Hampton Roads has proven to be an attractive location 
for immigrants to settle and fares better than many of its peer 
regions in this regard.
Let’s take a look at the data, which have been extracted from U.S. Census data 




Migration occurs for many reasons, not simply because of the availability of 
jobs. Quality of life also looms large. Amenities matter. Our oceanfront, the 
Chrysler Museum of Art, the Historic Triangle, quality health care, and our 
colleges and universities are among the many things that make our region 
a great place to live. Publications such as David Savageau’s “Places Rated 
Almanac” and Bert Sperling’s “Cities Ranked and Rated” attempt to quantify 
such things. 
Still other factors matter as well. The quality of our K-12 schools, the viability 
of our transportation system, the vitality of our churches, the presence of family 
and friends, the nature and quality of our entertainment, and our tax levels all 
help determine whether people decide to live here, or somewhere else. Another 
factor of obvious importance in Hampton Roads is the presence of the military 
and military-related businesses and services. Migration data include the comings 
and goings of military personnel and the absolute number of military personnel 
located in Hampton Roads has trended downward over the past several 
decades.
Clearly, noneconomic factors influence migration. Even so, economic factors 
such as the availability of jobs and tax rates are major influences upon 
migration. Witness the tens of thousands of people who have left California 
in recent years and headed to other states, notably Texas (see the work of the 




Governing.com, an Internet site that focuses on state and local government 
issues, recently published Census data that focus on migration in and out of 
cities and regions between 2010 and 2013. We rely upon governing.com’s 
data in this chapter.
Migration is only one source of population growth or decline. Population 
growth is a broader concept that takes into account not only migration, but also 
includes births and deaths. Consider the population of Hampton Roads, which 
rose by 30,549, or 1.53 percent, between 2010 and 2013. However, as 
we will see, positive population growth that results from the number of births 
exceeding the number of deaths can disguise the migration of individuals to and 
from a region.  
Table 1 demonstrates this point. It reveals that in net terms, 18,879 people 
departed from Hampton Roads for other locations in the U.S. between 2010 
and 2013. Yes, also during this period some people migrated into our region 
from other parts of the country, but the -18,879 number means that even more 
left our region for other U.S. locations.  
On the other hand, our adverse domestic migration pattern was counteracted 
substantially by a net in-migration of 17,179 people from outside the U.S. 
This flow of immigrants into Hampton Roads is good economic news because 
immigrants as a group tend to comprise highly productive individuals who 
are more likely to start businesses and create jobs than other Americans. A 
significant segment of today’s immigrants bring with them human and financial 
capital that can be productively utilized in the U.S.  
TABLE 1
POPULATION CHANGES AND MIGRATION: 








30,540 32,240 74,029 41,789 -18,879 +17,179 -1,700
30,540  =  74,029  -  41,789  -  18,879  +  17,179
Source: www.governing.com/gov-data/census/metro-area-population-migration-estimates-2013-data.html
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Analysis By City And County
Setting aside new births and deaths, Hampton Roads lost population between 
2010 and 2013 – meaning that more people migrated out of our region 
than migrated into our region. Graph 1 illustrates the 1,700 individual net out-
migration experienced by Hampton Roads during those years.
Table 2 records the net migration flows for our 16 cities and counties and further 
subdivides those flows into domestic (inside the U.S.) and international (to and 
from the U.S.). In fact, eight of our 16 cities and counties experienced net out-
migration from all sources between 2010 and 2013 – led by Newport News 
with a net outflow of 4,017, followed by Hampton with 2,939. Chesapeake 
recorded the largest net inflow, 4,444, followed by James City County with 
3,069.   
DOMESTIC VERSUS INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
The results reported in Table 2 are nuanced, however. One can divide 
migration into two parts – domestic migration (existing U.S. residents changing 
their locations) and international migration (immigrants coming into the U.S. 
or emigrants leaving the U.S.). Ten of our 16 cities and counties experienced 
negative domestic migration, though only two (both of our North Carolina 
counties) experienced negative international migration. Graph 1 illustrates the 
overall international versus negative domestic migration for Hampton Roads 
between 2010 and 2013.
It is the negative domestic migration numbers that should be 
of the greatest concern to us as citizens, elected officials and 
regional policymakers. Negative domestic migration numbers 
represent people who have left our region, presumably 
because our peculiar combination of employment and 
amenities was not sufficiently attractive to retain them. The view 
of most people is that this is due to inferior employment prospects, though we do 
not have any data to confirm this. In essence, this view asserts that these people 
could not find a suitable job in Hampton Roads and left to pursue hopefully 
better prospects elsewhere.  
TABLE 2
NET MIGRATION NUMBERS, NOT CONSIDERING 
BIRTHS AND DEATHS, FOR 16 CITIES AND COUNTIES 






















Mathews County 63 6 69
York County -418 692 274
Poquoson -56 33 -23
Chesapeake 3,067 1,377 4,444
Hampton -3,828 889 -2,939
Newport News -6,597 2,580 -4,017
Norfolk -6,709 4,097 -2,612
Portsmouth -1,603 598 -1,005    
Suffolk -338 284 -54
Virginia Beach -6,248 5,703 -545
Williamsburg 790 228 1,018
Totals -18,879 17,179 -1,700
Source: www.governing.com/gov-data/census/metro-area-population-migration-estimates-2013-data.html
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GRAPH 1 
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However, as pointed out in Graph 1, there are major differences between 
domestic and international migration flows. Graphs 2 and 3 separately depict 
the domestic and international migration numbers for each of the 16 cities and 
counties. It is here one can see that three of our largest cities – Newport News, 
Norfolk and Virginia Beach – suffered a net out-migration of people to other 
locations inside the United States between 2010 and 2013 (Graph 2). These 
are not good-news numbers for these cities, for they appear to reflect torpid 
job creation. True, all three cities have won a variety of awards in recent years 
for their livability and even for their entrepreneurial climates. Nevertheless, the 
bottom line is that these cities lost residents to the rest of the country.
Counteracting these problematic numbers, however, are the impressively positive 
international in-migration numbers for all three cities (and for that matter, for our 
entire region save our two North Carolina counties) that one can see in Graph 
3. Virginia Beach, Norfolk and Newport News (in that order) were magnets 
for international immigrants and this has highly positive implications for them 
because of the entrepreneurial and job-creating tendencies of immigrants as a 
group.1 
The contrasts between the domestic and international migration data for 
Hampton Roads illustrate the “good news/bad news” character of the 
phenomenon of migration for our region. It certainly appears that we are not 
creating sufficient new jobs to retain our most mobile workers. Graph 4 confirms 
this; one can see that we have yet to recover all of the jobs we lost in the 
Great Recession that began in 2008. On the other hand, we have become a 
relatively attractive landing spot for immigrants and this bodes well for future job 
creation and economic dynamism.   
1  See, for example, “Immigration and the Revival of American Cities: From Preserving Manufacturing 
Jobs to Strengthening the Housing Market,” (September 2013) www.as-coa.org/sites/default/files/
ImmigrationUSRevivalReport.pdf. The primary author, Jacob L. Vigdor, is a Duke University economist.
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GRAPH 2
NET INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS OF INDIVIDUALS (NOT INCLUDING BIRTHS) BECAUSE OF DOMESTIC MIGRATION, 
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GRAPH 3
NET INFLOWS AND OUTFLOWS OF INDIVIDUALS (NOT INCLUDING BIRTHS) BECAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, 









6 33 73 81 
228 284 






































































































































MIXED SIGNALS: MIGRATION DATA AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC VITALITY 49
GRAPH 4
TOTAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1999-2013 (THOUSANDS OF JOBS)
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        GRAPH 1  
Total Civilian Employment in Hampton Roads,  
1999-2013 (Thousands of Jobs) 
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Comparing Hampton Roads 
To Other Metropolitan 
Regions
The data presented thus far are interesting, but immediately lead to questions 
relating to how Hampton Roads compares to other metropolitan regions that 
we often view as peers and/or competitors. The best way to compare is to 
transform our migration data into migration rates per 1,000 citizens. Having 
done so, we can compare metropolitan areas of different population sizes in a 
more meaningful fashion.
Graph 5 presents domestic migration rates for Hampton Roads 
and eight other mid-Atlantic metropolitan areas. This is another 
“bad news” rendition of our data; all eight of our peer and/
or competitor regions posted positive net domestic migration 
rates between 2010 and 2013; only Hampton Roads recorded 
a negative rate. Why? These other regions recovered much 
more vigorously from the Great Recession than we did. Put 
simply, they have created more new jobs than we have and 
hence have attracted migrants from other U.S. locations.  
The “good news” portion of our data is contained in Graph 
6, which provides international migration rates for Hampton 
Roads and the eight peer/competitor regions. We enjoyed the 
third highest international migration rate among this sample of 
metropolitan regions. Because immigrants as a group generate 
disproportionately large numbers of new entrepreneurial 
ventures and are especially productive sources of job creation,2 
our leadership position in the area of international migration 
bodes well for our future.    
2  Another reputable study supporting these conclusions is “National and State-by-State Economic Benefits of 
Immigration Reform,” http://americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/report/2013/05/17/63295/
national-and-state-by-state-economic-benefits-of-immigration-reform/. The study concluded that immigrants create 
2,400 new jobs each year in Virginia and pay $670 million in annual taxes.
Manan Shah, a principal partner of Plaza Resort Management, LLC, in Virginia Beach.
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GRAPH 5
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GRAPH 6





















 ~o~ }..~0 ~ ~c, .~0 .if ~b ~ 
~0' ~ oc:5 ~" ~0~ ~o ~(;:-CJ'<§- ~ ~ (5:-(j ~oq_ ~o~ 
>¢0 ~(j -~ ~(j 
0 '>oa ~ <-::,0 
0~ ~o~ 
<:i~ 
MIXED SIGNALS: MIGRATION DATA AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC VITALITY 53
The Influence Of The Military
The total number of active-duty military stationed in Hampton Roads has been 
on a downward trend for well more than a decade. Between FY 2010 and FY 
2013, that decline continued, but for U.S. Navy personnel was only 1,133, or 
about 1.6 percent of that service’s active-duty force in Hampton Roads.3 Data 
for the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Coast Guard were not available. 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that even the inclusion of data from those services 
would still cause the total decline in active-duty military to be less than 2,000 
over this time period. Taking such a number into consideration might wipe 
out the 1,700 negative overall migration number for our region, but it would 
not cure our last-place migration finish relative to comparable mid-Atlantic 
metropolitan areas. Further, several of the other regions (Charleston, Jacksonville, 
Savannah and Washington, D.C.) also are military-intensive and their numbers 
would have to be adjusted for military personnel movements as well. 
Policy Implications
The good news is that our region continues to be attractive 
to immigrants from other countries. Virginia Beach, Norfolk 
and Newport News (in that order) lead the region in terms 
of attracting new immigrants. As noted above, there is abundant 
evidence that immigrants as a group tend to be ambitious and entrepreneurial. 
Somewhat more often than natives, they start their own businesses and end up 
generating new jobs. Some immigrants also bring substantial capital with them 
to our region. Farsighted, growth-oriented regional policy should build upon this 
strength.  
A variety of ways exist to make our region even more attractive to immigrants, 
including the provision of short-term social services and financial support, 
supportive counseling (including financial counseling and connecting immigrants 
with those with investment capital), the provision of mentors and second-
language instruction in schools, etc. The problem is not that such programs don’t 
work. Assisting immigrants not only is good for the economy, supported by the 
3 CNRMA Hampton Roads Personnel & Homeported Operating Units, FY 10-13 (July 2, 2014)
evidence, but it also is much less expensive than providing large subsidies to 
developers.    
Instead, the hitch is that these initiatives may not immediately generate the same 
flash and media excitement as an announcement of a new hotel complex or 
arena. Such announcements usually are accompanied by promises of new jobs 
and augmented tax collections. Unfortunately, these job and tax extrapolations 
are dubious because they fail to take into account displaced expenditures – the 
new developments often reduce the sales, jobs and tax collections of existing 
businesses almost dollar for dollar. Further, any subsidies the developers receive 
must eventually be funded by taxpayers.
Immigrants, however, bring with them new human and 
financial capital along with drive and motivation. As a group, 
they represent new injections of capital and energy into our 
economy. The problem is that the payoffs from assisting them 
do not come immediately and hence a degree of patience 
is required, especially from voters and elected officials who 
may bridle at subsidizing noncitizens. Nevertheless, our 
highly favorable international migration numbers suggest 
that immigration-friendly policies would generate even 
larger benefits for our region. Further, compared to the 
large subsidies often provided to developers, it would not be 
expensive for us to assemble a package of incentives that 
would enable us to attract more immigrants.
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GRAPH 7
CUMULATIVE CHANGE IN NONFARM PAYROLLS SINCE THE PEAK IN JANUARY 2008, IN MILLIONS
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The Bottom Line
There is an understandable tendency for our cities and our region to 
tout rankings that appear in the media – we’re on the list of the top 10 
entrepreneurial cities, or we’re in the top 20 most desirable vacation spots or 
we’re a hip place for millennials to live, etc. We probably should puff out our 
chests a bit when we receive such rankings.  
Even so, the ultimate long-term payoff is jobs and our ability to attract and retain 
highly mobile citizens and their valuable human capital. Our regional migration 
rate is one of the most important thermometers of the actual “state of our region.” 
It tells us more than almost any other variable about how well we are doing, 
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hurch attendance is on the decline. The Pew Research Center’s longstanding Religion & Public Life Project indicates that the ranks of the religiously unaffiliated 
rose “from just over 15 percent to just under 20 percent of all U.S. adults” between 2007 and 2012. Fully one-third of adults under the age of 30 do not 
identify with a particular religion. The decrease in religious participation has been most evident among Protestants, both evangelical and mainline, whose 
share of the U.S. population fell from 53 percent to 48 percent in the same five-year period. The Pew Research Center suggests that these trends may 
be informed by younger Americans’ distaste for the perceived associations between organized religion and conservative politics, and by their tendency to postpone 
marriage and parenthood until later in life. Secularization and a decrease in social engagement of all kinds in the United States today also might play a role.1
There is, however, a standout exception to Americans’ move 
away from organized religion – a simultaneous increase 
in both the number and size of the largest Protestant 
congregations, also known as “megachurches.” To be considered 
a megachurch, a church must have an average weekly attendance of at least 
2,000 participants, although the attendance at the very largest churches 
actually is far greater. Lakewood Church in Houston, led by Pastor Joel Osteen, 
is the largest church in the country, with an average weekly attendance of 
around 44,000. According to the Hartford Institute for Religion Research, there 
are 1,546 megachurches in the U.S. today, including 14 in Hampton Roads 
(see Table 1). This represents a nearly five-fold increase in the number of U.S. 
megachurches within a generation. In 1990, there were approximately two 
megachurches for every 1 million U.S. inhabitants. Today, the ratio is about five 
per 1 million people (see Table 2). 1
In this chapter, we’ll take a close look at some of the defining characteristics 
of U.S. megachurches. We’ll see how the largest churches in Hampton Roads 
reflect these characteristics as well as how our region has provided fertile 
ground for very large churches to thrive. Hampton Roads’ megachurches are as 
diverse as the region itself, and they have successfully appealed to congregants 
of many racial and ethnic backgrounds.
1  “‘Nones’ on the Rise,” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project (Oct. 9, 2012) at: 
http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones-on-the-rise/#who-are-the-unaffiliated.
Bethel Church, 1705 Todds Lane, Hampton
TABLE 1





Denomination Website Established Location(s) Senior Pastor
1 Atlantic Shores Baptist Church 2,000 Southern Baptist http://www.asbc.net/ 1981 1861 Kempsville Road, Virginia Beach, 23464 Kyle Wall
2 Bethel Temple 2,613 Assemblies of God http://www.betheltemple.com/ 1705 Todds Lane, Hampton, 23666 Glenn Reynolds
3 Calvary Revival Church - Norfolk 8,000 None http://www.crcglobal.org/ 1990 5833 Poplar Hall Drive, Norfolk, 23502 Courtney McBath
CRC-Chesapeake 740 Great Bridge Blvd., Chesapeake, 23320 Carlton McLeod
CRC-Peninsula (South) 119 29th St., Newport News, 23607 Ray Johnson
CRC-Peninsula (East) 324 Newport News Ave., Hampton, 23669
4 Faith Deliverance Christian Center 2,000 None https://www.faithdeliverance.org/ 1986 1010 E. 26th St., Norfolk, 23504 Sharon Riley
5 First Baptist Church of Norfolk 2,462 Southern Baptist http://www.firstnorfolk.org/ 1805 312 Kempsville Road, Norfolk, 23502 Eric Thomas
6 Grove Church 2,363 Baptist http://www.grovechurchva.com/ 1840 5910 W. Norfolk Road, Portsmouth, 23703 Melvin Marriner
7 Kempsville Presbyterian Church 2,200
Evangelical 
Presbyterian Church
http://www.kpc.org/ 805 Kempsville Road, Virginia Beach, 23464 Steve Keller (interim)
8 Liberty Baptist Church 3,023 Southern Baptist http://www.libertylive.com/ 1021 Big Bethel Road, Hampton, 23666 Grant Ethridge
Liberty at Harbour View 7025 Harbour View Blvd., Suffolk, 23435
9 Mount Lebanon Missionary Baptist Church 2,300 Baptist http://themountleads.org/ 1902 Kim Brown
The Mount - Cathedral 215 Las Gaviotas Blvd., Chesapeake, 23322
The Mount - Elizabeth City 1021 US Highway 17 S, Elizabeth City, NC, 27909
The Mount - Peninsula 100 Regal Way, Newport News, 23602
The Mount - Chapel 884 Bells Mill Road, Chesapeake, 23322
10 New Life Providence Church 2,500 None http://newlifeprovidencechurch.com/ 2000 Dan Backens
Deep Creek Campus 423 Shell Road, Chesapeake, 23323
Ghent Campus 1420 Colonial Ave., Norfolk, 23517
Kempsville Campus 1244 Thompkins Lane, Virginia Beach, 23464
11 Rock Church International 2,225 None http://rockchurchinternational.org/ 1968 640 Kempsville Road, Virginia Beach, 23464 Robin and John Blanchard
Sources: Hartford Institute for Religion Research, Database of Megachurches in the U.S., available at: http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/database.html, 
church websites and interviews
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TABLE 1





Denomination Website Established Location(s) Senior Pastor
12 Waters Edge Church 3,594 Southern Baptist http://www.watersedgechurch.net/ 2003 Stu Hodges
Waters Edge Hampton 2011 Cunningham Drive, Hampton, 23666
Waters Edge Newport News 836 J. Clyde Morris Blvd., Newport News, 23601
Waters Edge Williamsburg 4615 Opportunity Way, Williamsburg, 23188
Waters Edge Yorktown
6830 George Washington Memorial Highway, 
Yorktown, 23692
13 Wave Church 4,000 None http://www.wavechurch.com/ 1999 Steve Kelly
Great Neck Location 1000 North Great Neck Road, Virginia Beach, 23454
Richmond Location 4036 Cox Road, Glen Allen, 23059
Seaboard Location 2655 Seaboard Road, Virginia Beach, 23456
Norfolk Location 421 Granby St., Norfolk, 23510
Wave Church NC - Wilson Campus 5334 Lamm Road, Wilson, NC, 27893
Wave Church NC - Greenville Campus 4052 Old Tar Road, Winterville, NC, 28590
14 Willliamsburg Community Chapel 2,400 None http://www.wcchapel.org/ 3899 John Tyler Highway, Williamsburg, 23185 Travis Simone (interim)
Sources: Hartford Institute for Religion Research, Database of Megachurches in the U.S., available at: http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/database.html, 
church websites and interviews
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What Is A Megachurch?
In the book “Beyond Megachurch Myths: What We Can Learn from America’s 
Largest Churches,” Hartford Institute professor Scott Thumma and his co-author, 
Dave Travis, emphasize that “the megachurch is more than just an ordinary 
church grown large. The size and approach of a megachurch alters its social 
dynamics and organizational characteristics, making it bear little resemblance 
to smaller, more traditional congregations.”2 In “Beyond Megachurch Myths” 
and on the Hartford Institute website, Thumma identifies common features that 
tend to distinguish U.S. megachurches, beyond their large size, from “regular” 
churches. Many of these features characterize Hampton Roads’ largest churches 
as well, although we echo Thumma’s further observation that “there is no 
‘typical’ megachurch model.”3 Each of Hampton Roads’ very large churches has 
a unique mission and type of organization; not all of the characteristics outlined 
below apply to every congregation.
DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP
It would be incorrect to state that all megachurches are personality-driven 
enterprises. However, nearly all megachurch pastors are 
charismatic individuals who possess broad, impressive skill 
sets. They are dynamic preachers, creative and inspirational 
leaders, and savvy entrepreneurs. Most megachurches reached their 
very large size under the tenure of a single pastor. First Baptist Church of Norfolk 
and Portsmouth’s Grove Church have held worship services since the early 19th 
century, but their rise to “megachurch” status occurred much more recently. Their 
weekly attendance numbers rose from a few hundred to a few thousand per 
week under the leadership of Ken Hemphill (1981-1991) at First Baptist, and 
Melvin Marriner (1989- present) at Grove Church.  
Elsewhere in Hampton Roads, pastors such as Courtney McBath (Calvary Revival 
Church, 1990) and Stu Hodges (Waters Edge Church, 2003) established new 
churches that quickly took off in size. Rock Church International possesses the 
largest sanctuary in Hampton Roads, with a seating capacity of 5,200.  
2  Scott Thumma and Dave Travis, Beyond Megachurch Myths: What We Can Learn from America’s Largest 
Churches (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007), p. 2.
3 Thumma and Travis, Beyond Megachurch Myths, xvi.
TABLE 2










1900 76 10 0.13
1970 205 50 0.24
1980 227 150 0.70
1990 250 310 1.20
2000 275 600 2.19
2005 300 1,210 4.00
2012 313 1,546 4.94
Sources: Scott Thumma and Dave Travis, “Beyond Megachurch Myths” (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 
2007), p. 7, for 1900-2005 and for 2012, the Hartford Institute for Religion Research, at: 
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/megastoday_profile.html
Calvary Revival Church, 5833 Poplar Hall Drive, Norfolk
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Most, though not all, megachurch pastors are men. Norfolk’s 
Faith Deliverance Christian Center was founded by Barbara 
Amos in 1986, and is currently led by Pastor Sharon Riley. 
Anne and John Gimenez founded Rock Church, our region’s 
first megachurch, in 1968. Today the Gimenezes’ daughter 
and son-in-law, Robin and John Blanchard, are co-pastors of 
Rock Church International, and Anne Gimenez serves as bishop 
of the Rock Ministerial Fellowship. Megachurches are often 
a family affair, with pastors’ spouses and extended family 
members assuming prominent leadership roles within their 
congregations. 
The pastors of some of the largest megachurches maintain a public presence 
that extends well beyond their church leadership. Nationally, Joel Osteen, T.D. 
Jakes and Rick Warren are among the best-known megachurch pastors who 
have become successful authors and celebrities in their own right. They are 
familiar sights to anyone surfing Sunday morning television.  
In our region, Courtney McBath, Anne Gimenez and Steve Kelly (Wave Church) 
all preside over self-named ministries in addition to their Hampton Roads church 
affiliations. They appear regularly on television, travel widely for missions and 
other speaking engagements, and have authored numerous books. They are 
entrepreneurs and celebrities in addition to being religious leaders.
MANY HAVE AN INDEPENDENT, DENOMINATION-FREE IDENTITY
The Hartford Institute indicates that 40 percent of all U.S. megachurches are 
not affiliated with a particular denomination. Table 3 reveals that Southern 
Baptist and other Baptist congregations make up the next 23 percent of U.S. 
megachurches; no other denomination accounts for more than 6 percent of the 
megachurch population. These patterns are consistent in our region as well. 
Among the 14 Hampton Roads megachurches named by the Hartford Institute 
in Table 1, six are unaffiliated, and an additional six identify as Baptist or 
Southern Baptist. Broadly speaking, megachurches tend toward a conservative/
evangelical interpretation of Christianity, but there is a great deal of diversity in 
the theologies and styles of worship that they promote.  
Thumma and Travis point out that megachurches tend to be “quite self-sufficient; 
they don’t need the resources, guidance, or identity that a national body 
can provide.”4 More often, they provide these kinds of benefits to smaller 
churches that opt to affiliate with them. Wave Church, for example, provides 
leadership to a “Wave Network” of around 55 different churches; Rock Church 
International presides over a worldwide fellowship of more than 500 churches. 
Megachurches that do belong to a familiar denomination may not necessarily 
emphasize this identity. Thus, Mount Lebanon Missionary Baptist Church in 
Chesapeake is more commonly called “The Mount,” while Liberty Baptist Church 
in Hampton and Suffolk identifies as “Liberty.”  
These and other Hampton Roads megachurches have highly developed brand 
identities. Many have adopted eye-catching logos and equally distinctive 
names. When Pastor Steve Kelly came to our region from Australia in 1999, his 
4  Thumma and Travis, Beyond Megachurch Myths, p. 27.
TABLE 3











Evangelical Lutheran Church 1
Vineyard Christian Fellowship 1
Other 18
100
Source: Hartford Institute for Religion Research, at: 
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/megastoday_profile.html 
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church was initially called the Virginia Beach Christian Life Center. He and other 
church leaders soon sought a less “parochial,” more broadly appealing name; 
they ultimately decided upon Wave Church.
WORSHIP SERVICES ALSO ARE CHOREOGRAPHED PERFORMANCES
Nontraditional names often go hand in hand with nontraditional worship styles. 
Beginning with the need to accommodate very large audiences, the physical 
appearances of megachurches usually are quite different from their smaller 
counterparts. Many megachurches cultivate a self-consciously 
contemporary style, without pews, hymnals, a cross-bedecked 
altar or other familiar trappings of Christian churches. Hartford 
Institute surveys indicate that “the vast majority of megachurch worship 
is characterized by contemporary praise music, led by a worship team, 
accompanied by orchestra, drums, and electric guitars and augmented by state-
of-the-art sound systems and huge projection screens.”5  
Megachurch services usually are impressive, high-quality productions. “If 
you’re bored, then we’re doing something wrong” is a sentiment that we heard 
from several pastors in our region. Indeed, a tour of Hampton Roads’ largest 
churches reveals an array of innovative worship styles that are not bound by 
convention. At these churches one may encounter an eclectic range of popular 
music (from the Beatles to large gospel choirs to Latin swing), baton twirlers and 
impassioned sermons that are accompanied by sophisticated video imagery.  
RELIANCE UPON NEW MEDIA
Megachurches have not hesitated to embrace new technologies. They maintain 
well-designed websites and mobile apps, and they connect with their members 
through multiple social media channels. They accept donations online, by text 
message and at on-site credit and debit card kiosks. Sermons or entire church 
services are available for prospective members (and anyone else) to watch 
or listen to online. Live-stream technology has encouraged the expansion of 
megachurches to multiple sites, or “campuses,” throughout our region. New Life 
Providence Church, Waters Edge Church, Wave Church and Liberty Baptist 
5  Thumma and Travis, Beyond Megachurch Myths, p. 27.
Church regularly live-stream part or all of their services to worshippers gathered 
at different church locations.
These technologies have allowed a few churches to extend their reach well 
beyond Hampton Roads. Waters Edge Church Online and The Mount Global 
encourage visitors from all over the world to live-stream services and interact 
with other users in real time. Bishop Kim Brown has a tablet computer nearby 
when he preaches at The Mount in Chesapeake, so that he can immediately 
incorporate long-distance prayer requests. The Mount Global holds online 
classes for its virtual members and even sends them communion by mail.
MEETING EVERYONE’S NEEDS
Americans are used to shopping at malls and big-box stores like Walmart and 
Target. In a sense, megachurches aspire to be a similar kind of one-stop shop 
for their members’ spiritual needs. A typical megachurch has dedicated groups 
for children, teens, college students, young adults, retirees and more. Other 
ministries might address the specific needs of single parents, recovering addicts, 
adults studying for their GEDs or military service personnel and their spouses. 
Some megachurches host schools and day care centers; others have counseling 
and wellness centers. There are bookstores, coffee shops and even a bowling 
alley associated with the largest churches in our region. The offerings can seem 
overwhelming; for this reason, megachurches encourage and provide their 
members with many opportunities to connect with others in smaller groups.   
LARGE-SCALE COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Most churches in Hampton Roads engage in different kinds of community 
service – preparing meals for the hungry, sheltering the homeless and providing 
other kinds of support to at-risk children and adults. Megachurches are no 
different, although their initiatives take place on a significantly greater scale. 
Some of the largest churches in our region support independent nonprofit 
organizations that promote service to the community. Wave City Care and the 
Life Enrichment Center of Norfolk (associated with New Life Providence Church) 
are two prominent examples. Our region benefits from the kinds of service that 
very large churches can coordinate and provide.
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Why Megachurches In 
Hampton Roads?
The proliferation of megachurches has not occurred evenly throughout the 
United States. The Hartford Institute’s numbers indicate that the majority of North 
American megachurches are located in the U.S. South. Maryland, Delaware, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Florida together 
account for nearly one-quarter of all U.S. megachurches (see Table 4). Texas 
and California are the states with the most megachurches. Virginia is home to 
42 megachurches; 18 of these are located in Northern Virginia and 14 are in 
Hampton Roads.
Only two Virginia churches – McLean Bible Church (Vienna) and Thomas 
Road Baptist Church (Lynchburg), with weekly attendance of 16,500 and 
8,350, respectively – rank among the 100 largest U.S. churches, according 
to Outreach Magazine.6 Table 1 reports Hartford Institute data indicating that 
Hampton Roads’ best-attended churches are Calvary Revival Church, Liberty 
Baptist Church, Waters Edge Church and Wave Church, all with average 
weekly attendance of more than 3,000.7 Table 5 reports that just over 
half (52 percent) of all U.S. megachurches welcome 2,000 
to 2,999 congregants each week, compared to 10 of 14 (71 
percent) of all Hampton Roads megachurches. Thus, Hampton 
Roads’ megachurches are somewhat smaller than the national 
average.
Outreach Magazine counts Waters Edge Church, located in Yorktown and 
other sites on the Peninsula, among the 100 fastest-growing churches in the 
U.S. Waters Edge Church gained 616 new weekly attendees in 2013, a 
growth rate of around 21 percent. River Oak Church (Chesapeake) and World 
Outreach Worship Center (Newport News) also made the magazine’s list of 
fastest-growing churches, suggesting that the ranks of our region’s megachurches 
may soon be expanding.8
6  http://www.outreachmagazine.com/2013-outreach-100-largest-churches-america.html.
7  The weekly attendance figure of 8,000 for Calvary Revival Church appears to include CRC-Norfolk, CRC-
Chesapeake and CRC-Peninsula, all of which operate autonomously.  
8 http://www.outreachmagazine.com/2013-outreach-100-fastest-growing-churches-america.html.
TABLE 4
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MEGACHURCHES 
IN NORTH AMERICA (2012)
Regional Division Percent
New England 1.1 ME, VT, NH, MA, CT, RI
Mid Atlantic 6.0 NY, PA, NJ
South Atlantic 23.6 MD, DE, VA, NC, SC, GA, FL 
East South Central 8.2 WV, KY, TN, MS, AL
West South Central 16.8 AR, LA, OK, TX
East North Central 12.7 WI, IL, IN, MI, OH
West North Central 5.7 ND, SD, NE, KS, MO, IA, MN
Mountain 6.7 MT, ID, WY, CO, UT, NV, AZ, NM
Pacific 17.9 WA, OR, CA, AK, HI
Canada 1.3
100.0
Source: Hartford Institute for Religion Research, at: 
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/megastoday_profile.html 
The Roman Catholic Church in the Diocese of Richmond 
(of which Hampton Roads is a part) does not distribute 
attendance numbers. By common agreement, however, the 
three largest Roman Catholic parishes in Hampton Roads 
are St. Gregory the Great and St. John the Apostle (both 
in Virginia Beach) and St. Bede in Williamsburg. It is not 
clear if these parishes ever approach the large attendances 
recorded at services held at the region’s megachurches, such 
as Wave Church.
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TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF MEGACHURCHES IN NORTH AMERICA 
BY SIZE (2012)
Size Grouping Percent
2,000 to 2,999 52.3
3,000 to 3,999 17.6
4,000 to 4,999 9.7
5,000 to 9,999 14.6
10,000 or more 5.8
100.0
Source: Hartford Institute for Religion Research, at: 
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/megastoday_profile.html 
In Hampton Roads and elsewhere, the growth of megachurches has mirrored 
the growth of the U.S. population since the 1960s and 1970s. Megachurches 
emerged alongside the shopping malls, big-box stores and multiplex theaters 
that came to characterize American suburbia in the late 20th century. 
Megachurches tend to thrive in fast-growing suburban and exurban locations, 
where new churches accommodate the needs of booming populations. 
Young cities like Virginia Beach have offered large plots of land with 
comparatively few zoning restrictions, ideal for the construction of new 
churches (as well as for the auxiliary buildings and generous parking lots that 
typically accompany them). In some cases, megachurches have expanded by 
repurposing older suburban commercial buildings. Calvary Revival Church’s 
current location in Norfolk was once a Brand Distributors store that sold jewelry 
and electronics; The Mount’s Cathedral was a former Winn-Dixie supermarket. 
Repurposed buildings often are a constituent part of the spirit of renewal that 
exists within megachurches.  
As a growing metropolitan area generally considered within the country’s Bible 
Belt, Hampton Roads has provided fertile ground for very large churches to 
thrive. According to Thumma and Travis, suburbanites “are exactly the type of 
people most attracted to megachurches: consumer-oriented, willing to commute 
great distances, highly mobile and often displaced, middle-class, in middle-
level management positions, well-educated and with a traditional nuclear family 
structure.”9 The average age of those attending megachurches is several years 
younger than that of the churchgoing population as a whole. Thus, it seems 
likely that our region’s large population of military families has contributed to the 
success of Hampton Roads megachurches. These churches’ online offerings may 
be particularly appealing to servicemen and women stationed abroad.
Regent University, whose website describes the university as “one of the 
nation’s leading academic centers for Christian thought and action,”10 has 
had a symbiotic relationship with the region’s megachurches. Founded by Pat 
Robertson in 1978, the university now enrolls nearly 6,000 students in a wide 
array of undergraduate and graduate programs. Regent students and alumni 
have played an active role in Hampton Roads’ largest churches as congregants, 
worship leaders, ministers and in a variety of other staff positions. The university 
provides a forum for pastors of some of the region’s largest churches to gather 
together on a regular basis. It has also invited nationally prominent megachurch 
pastors to speak on campus; in the past year, T.D. Jakes and Greg Surratt have 
participated in Regent’s weekly chapel service.
Megachurches are not entirely a suburban phenomenon. A 
smaller subset of very large churches has prospered within 
older urban centers such as Portsmouth and Norfolk. In 
our region, these churches (including Grove Church, Faith 
Deliverance Christian Center and Calvary Revival Church) most 
often serve chiefly African American populations. Intriguingly, 
two of our region’s fastest-growing suburban megachurches have recently 
established new locations in older Norfolk neighborhoods. Wave Church holds 
Sunday morning services at the downtown Granby Theater, and New Life 
Providence Church purchased a century-old building from a dissolved Methodist 
congregation on Colonial Avenue in Ghent. Calvary Revival Church started 
in Norfolk and has since expanded throughout Hampton Roads, aligning with 
sister churches in suburban Chesapeake, as well as in older neighborhoods of 
Hampton and Newport News.
9  Thumma and Davis, Beyond Megachurch Myths, p. 12.
10  http://www.regent.edu/about_us
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FIGURE 1
LOCATION OF MEGACHURCHES IN HAMPTON ROADS
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MEGACHURCHES IN HAMPTON ROADS 67
Figure 1 locates our region’s megachurches within Hampton Roads. It is 
apparent that their presence extends throughout our region, from Williamsburg 
to Elizabeth City, N.C. Several of these institutions maintain campuses in 
multiple Hampton Roads localities, both Southside and on the Peninsula. Waters 
Edge Church has pursued a decentralized, “multisite” strategy of expansion; no 
one of its four well-attended locations accommodates more than around 1,000 
congregants. New Life Providence Church seeks to grow by one new campus 
per year, with the goal of establishing a presence in every Hampton Roads 
locality. Even those megachurches that operate from a single large location 
draw their members from a wide geographical area, well beyond the borders 
of their city. Megachurches must be counted among Hampton Roads’ most 
distinctively regional institutions.
Racial And Ethnic Diversity
In a 1953 sermon on “Communism’s Challenge to Christianity,” the Rev. Martin 
Luther King Jr. famously expressed his shame that “Eleven o’clock on Sunday 
morning is the most segregated hour in Christian America.”11 Sixty years later, 
communism has withered on the vine and the U.S. has elected its first African 
American president, but U.S. churches remain overwhelmingly segregated. 
Survey data indicate that 85 percent of all U.S. congregations are composed of 
at least 90 percent of one racial group.12
Megachurches, too, tend to reflect a significant degree of racial segregation, 
although less than in the U.S. church population as a whole. Hartford Institute 
research from 2005 “found that 31 percent of megachurches claimed to have 
a 20 percent or more minority presence in their congregations,” and that “the 
average megachurch had 14 percent of the congregation not representing the 
majority race.”13 Megachurches’ enthusiasm for new styles of worship and forms 
of church organization may well encourage this kind of diversity. The very notion 
of a megachurch is grounded upon broad popular appeal. 
11  Martin Luther King Jr., “Communism’s Challenge to Christianity,” The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr., vol. 6 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), p. 149.
12  Michael O. Emerson, “A New Day for Multiracial Congregations,” Reflections, spring 2013, available at: 
http://reflections.yale.edu/article/future-race/new-day-multiracial-congregations.
13  Thumma and Davis, Beyond Megachurch Myths, p. 140.
Although all of the Hampton Roads pastors with whom we 
spoke emphasized their churches’ openness to worshippers 
of all races and backgrounds, most very large churches in our 
region tend to have a staff and congregation that are either 
mostly white or mostly African American. A brief look at these 
churches’ self-presentation on their websites seems to confirm this observation. 
There are, however, some noteworthy exceptions. Rock Church International’s 
distinctive, charismatic style of worship has long attracted a highly diverse group 
of followers; Bishop John Gimenez was of Puerto Rican descent and his son-
in-law, Pastor John Blanchard, is Korean American. Pastors Dan Backens 
and Kevin Turpin founded New Life Providence Church in 1999 
with the explicit intent of fostering a multi-ethnic congregation. 
According to Backens, New Life Providence’s membership 
is now almost evenly represented by whites and blacks (in 
addition to a smaller contingent of congregants of other 
ethnicities and national backgrounds), a status that has been 
carefully cultivated through the integration of diverse worship 
styles and traditions. Bethel Temple in Hampton likewise 
represents itself as multi-ethnic. Both Bethel Temple and First 
Baptist Church of Norfolk sponsor Spanish-language ministries 
to serve Hampton Roads’ growing Hispanic population.
Final Observations
The term “megachurch” first entered into widespread usage 
in the 1980s, just as both the number and size of very 
large U.S. churches had begun to take off. However, not 
all pastors of large congregations embrace the term, for a 
variety of reasons. Some of the pastors with whom we spoke 
cited a media-driven image of the “megachurch” that has 
become associated with corruption or scandal, as well as the 
implication that megachurches are superior, or pose a threat, 
to smaller churches in their communities. Other pastors saw 
the label more benignly, as a neutral shorthand for referencing 
churches with especially large congregations.
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It does seem clear that the term – like the phenomenon that it describes – has 
great staying power, in Hampton Roads and elsewhere around the U.S. The 
ongoing consolidation of Christian religious communities into fewer, but larger, 
houses of worship has important implications for all residents of our region, 
regardless of religious affiliation.  
We can make the following generalizations and observations:
1)  Scott Thumma estimates that the average U.S. megachurch has an income 
of around $6.5 million per year.14 Megachurches in Hampton Roads are 
thriving, million-dollar businesses, each with dozens of employees. They have 
a substantial and growing economic impact in our region – in most cases, 
much larger than conventional, denominational churches.
2)  Megachurches in Hampton Roads are expanding their regional presence. 
A generation ago, fast-growing churches typically constructed ever-greater 
sanctuaries. Today, live-streaming and other Internet technologies allow these 
churches to adopt a more flexible, multisite approach. “Instead of, ‘How 
do we get people to come to the mountain?’ it’s, ‘Let’s bring the mountain to 
the people,’” multisite church consultant Jim Tomberlin recently told Outreach 
Magazine, further predicting that soon “megachurches will become giga-
churches.”15 Multisite expansion seems particularly suited to Hampton Roads, 
given the region’s decentralized population and geographic sprawl. A 
few successful megachurches may eventually become well-known regional 
“brands,” not unlike commercial businesses such as YNot Pizza or Taste 
Unlimited.
3)  Hampton Roads megachurches draw a large proportion of their members 
from new arrivals to the area, as well as from the “unchurched.” Nonetheless, 
the growth of megachurches has consequences for smaller congregations that 
cannot offer an expansive menu of ministries or other high-profile attractions. 
Smaller churches may struggle to survive and may need to clarify or redefine 
their missions in order to maintain their appeal. In this, they are not unlike 
many small, local businesses that have been confronted by competition from 
Amazon or Walmart.
14  “Mega churches mean big business,” CNN.com, Jan. 21, 2010, available at: http://www.cnn.com/2010/
WORLD/americas/01/21/religion.mega.church.christian
15  Jennifer Kabbany, “Reshaping the American Megachurch,” Outreach Magazine, Nov. 25, 2012, available at: 
http://www.outreachmagazine.com/features/5065-reshaping-the-american-megachurch.html
4)  Hampton Roads charities and other nonprofit organizations should recognize 
the potential value of partnering with area megachurches. Megachurches’ 
considerable human and financial resources, when paired with a passion for 
innovation and community engagement, will permit the undertaking of service 
projects on an ambitious scale and increase impact. 
5)  Megachurches fulfill spiritual needs that attendees feel are not being met 
by conventional, denominational churches. Megachurches buck the more 
general societal trend toward lower church attendance.   
6)  While megachurches are explicitly religious organizations, they also are 
businesses whose leaders simultaneously are businessmen and women who 
instinctively appear to have mastered the principles of marketing, advertising, 
brand management and vertical integration. Some megachurch leaders 
receive criticism for their businesslike approaches to religious life and a 
few for their lifestyles. Those who deliver such barbs often point out that 
Jesus overturned the tables of the moneychangers in the ancient temple in 
Jerusalem (Matthew 21:12-13) and imply that much the same thing should 
occur today. Most observers acknowledge that tensions could exist between 
the spreading of the Gospel and the focus of megachurches on effective, 
businesslike operations. However, megachurch leaders note that they must 
be good stewards of the resources with which they have been entrusted 
and at least one cited the Parable of the Talents (Matthew 25:14-30) as 
support for his ministry. Hence, it would be unbiblical for church leaders not 
to utilize the resources entrusted to them in the most effective ways possible. 
Following this logic, it also would be foolish for megachurches not to rely 
upon modern technologies and presentation techniques to spread the Word. 
It is well beyond the scope of The State of the Region report to weigh in on 
such matters. It is sufficient to note that on occasion such questions do arise 
concerning one of the most fascinating and important religious trends of our 
time. 
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HOMELESS CHILDREN IN SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS: 
ESTIMATING THE COSTS TO SOCIETY1
T
he proportion of homeless Americans may have declined in recent years, but homelessness remains an acute problem in Hampton Roads. We know this from 
data published by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which is required by law to conduct an annual census of homeless people 
in the United States. HUD’s census is done at a particular point in time (PIT), that is, on a particular day, and the PIT day typically is in the month of January.  
Relying primarily on this data, HUD publishes its Annual Homeless Assessment1 
Report,2 which goes to the Congress. The 2013 report revealed that 610,042 
people in the United States in January 2013 were homeless on a given night in 
that month. Most (65 percent) “were living in emergency shelters or transitional 
housing,” while 35 percent were unsheltered.3
Of these homeless individuals, 138,149 (or 23 percent) were children under 
age 18. Another 10 percent were age 18 to 24. Nearly 41,000 (40,727) 
of the homeless children were “unaccompanied” – on their own – and 23,461 
were unsheltered at all.4 These data are depicted in Graph 1, which reveals 
that more than 22 percent of homeless people in the United States are children 
under age 18.5
Problems of homelessness are especially challenging when they involve children. 
Not only are the needs of children different from those of adults, but also a 
failure to deal with those problems comes back to haunt society for decades to 
come. Ill-housed, ill-fed children typically lag in school academic achievement, 
and they are more likely to miss school days. Ultimately, this often leads to 
higher dropout levels, lower rates of graduation and sharply diminished job 
prospects. In turn, these conditions are highly correlated with increased use of 
1  This chapter is based upon work performed by James V. Koch for the ForKids Inc. organization in Hampton 
Roads, which is dedicated to breaking the cycle of homelessness and poverty for families and children. 
http://forkidsva.org/Main/nivo-slider2.5.1/nivo-slider/index/index.html
2  The 2013 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress, Part 1. www.onecpd.info/resources/documents/
AHAR-2013-Part1.pdf
3 2013 Annual Homeless Assessment Report, p. 1.
4 2013 Annual Homeless Assessment Report, p. 1.
5  One CPD Resource Exchange, 2013 AHAR: Part 1 - PIT Estimates of Homelessness (January 2014), 
www.onecpd.info/resource/3300/2013-ahar-part-1-pit-estimates-of-homelessness
social services, higher rates of criminal activity and incarceration, increased 
rates of teenage pregnancy, deteriorating health conditions and a variety of 
other antisocial behaviors.6 
Of course, none of these phenomena is inevitable; they simply represent 
increased likelihoods. Nevertheless, left untended, such possibilities often mature 
into very expensive outcomes.    
6  Numerous studies exist that have documented some or all of these effects. Especially useful studies within the 
past five years include Dennis P. Culhane, “The Cost of Homelessness: A Perspective from the United States,” 
2008, http://works.bepress.com/dennis_culhane/82; Gerard Barber et al., “Cost of Homeless in Metropolitan 
Louisville,” Kent School of Social Work, University of Louisville, 2008, http://www.louhomeless.org/coal%20
files/cost-study.pdf; D. Flaming et al., “Where We Sleep: The Costs of Housing and Homelessness in Los 
Angeles,” Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority, www.economicrtorg; Abt Associates, “Costs Associated 
with First-Time Homelessness for Families and Individuals,” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, 2010; J. Spangler and A.L. Niblett, 
“Cost of Homelessness in Oklahoma City, April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010,” Report to the Oklahoma City 
Planning Department, 2010, www.okc.gov/planning/homelessness/homelesscosts.pdf; Stephen Gaetz, “The 
Real Cost of Homelessness: Can We Save Money by Doing the Right Thing?” The Homeless Hub, 2010, 
www.homelesshub.ca; “Estimated Annual Cost of Child Homelessness in Pennsylvania,” Institute for Children, 
Poverty and Homelessness, American Almanac, Pennsylvania, 2012, www.icphusa.org/Publications/
AmericanAlmanac/Almanac_state_PA.pdf; D.R. Poulin et al., “Service Use and Costs for Persons Experiencing 
Chronic Homelessness in Philadelphia: A Population-Based Study,” Psychiatric Services, November 2010, 
61(11): 1093-8; http://works.bepress.com/dennis/culhane_culhane/99; D. Flaming et al., “Getting 
Home: Outcomes from Housing High Cost Homeless Hospital Patients,” 2013, www.economicrt.org; and The 
Economic Roundtable, “Getting Home: Outcomes from Housing High Cost Homeless Hospital Patients,” 2013, 
http://bit.ly/19YEWPR
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Homelessness In South 
Hampton Roads
The PIT data provide us with a window on homelessness in South Hampton 
Roads, but appear to undercount the actual number of homeless children. More 
useful are the homeless data collected by the U.S. Department of Education 
(DOE). DOE collects its homeless data from individual school districts and these 
figures are both more reliable and more useful because school districts are on 
the front line and know firsthand the number of homeless children.
Table 1 contrasts the PIT data from HUD with the DOE data provided by the 
school districts in South Hampton Roads. It is evident that the school districts 
report serving far more homeless children than the PIT data identify for the same 
cities. For example, while the 2013 PIT number of homeless children for Virginia 
Beach was 122, the Virginia Beach school district reported serving 771 
homeless children in the 2012-13 school year – a 532 percent difference.   
How can we explain these disparities?
•  The PIT data represent a count of homeless children on a single day – a point 
in time – while the school district data reflect an entire school year. Because 
students come and go, the school districts serve a much larger number of 
students than might be present on a single day. Thus, the two measures apply 
different standards and essentially are non-comparable views of the same 
general phenomenon.7
•  Cities in South Hampton Roads are not uniform in the ways they count 
homeless children in their schools.
•  The PIT homeless counts miss some homeless adults and homeless children – 
though this is an argument that the National Alliance to End Homelessness 
(NAEH) and HUD believe has limited validity. However, the NAEH does 
agree that “the PIT counts do miss people, as do most censuses.”8 In fact, if 
one is interested in annualized numbers of homeless children, then PIT data 
7  National Alliance to End Homelessness, Media Resource: 5 Myths about PIT Counts (February 2014) 
www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/5-myths-about-pit-counts
8  National Alliance to End Homelessness, Media Resource: 5 Myths about PIT Counts (February 2014) 
www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/5-myths-about-pit-counts
are much less useful because they represent only a single-snapshot look at the 
number of homeless.     
There is strong reason to conclude that the school district homeless children 
counts are closer to the mark than the PIT homeless children numbers, which may 
miss highly mobile homeless families whose location may change multiple times 
during a single year.
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF HOMELESS PEOPLE AND STUDENTS IN 
SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS ACCORDING TO 2013 PIT DATA 
AND THE SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 2012-2013
Chesapeake Homeless PIT All Ages 64
   Homeless Children PIT 27
   School District Reported Homeless Children  89
Norfolk Homeless PIT All Ages 580
   Homeless Children PIT 105
   School District Reported Homeless Children   499
Portsmouth Homeless PIT All Ages 154
   Homeless Children PIT NA
   School District Reported Homeless Children 211
W. Tidewater, incl. Suffolk Homeless PIT All Ages 93
   Homeless Children PIT 31
   School District Reported Homeless Children 35
Virginia Beach Homeless PIT All Ages 389
   Homeless Children PIT 122
   School District Reported Homeless Children   771
South Hampton Roads Totals 1,280
PIT Totals 285
School District Totals 1,605
Note: Western Tidewater includes Franklin, Suffolk, Isle of Wight County and Southampton County, but data 
typically are available only for Suffolk.
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Direct School District 
Costs Associated With 
Homeless Children
South Hampton Roads school districts incur two primary costs serving homeless 
children: (1) administrative costs, including the expense of a coordinator 
responsible for meeting the requirements of the McKinney-Vento Act, and (2) 
transportation costs.  
With respect to administrative costs, McKinney-Vento requires that every school 
district designate a liaison for homeless children. The Act requires the liaisons to 
ensure that homeless children actually are identified so that they can be offered 
appropriate services and it further charges the liaisons with ensuring that this 
occurs. Liaisons refer homeless children to other community support services, 
such as medical and dental care and mental health support. School districts 
are required to train school personnel on requirements of the McKinney-Vento 
Act, and this must be done on a yearly basis. Typically, school district liaisons 
meet with the families and some even make visits in order to make accurate 
determinations about McKinney-Vento eligibility.  
With respect to transportation costs, McKinney-Vento requires that school districts 
provide transportation for homeless students to their school of origin, if a parent 
or guardian requests them to do so, or in the case of an unaccompanied 
child, upon the request of the liaison. That school of origin may be in the same 
school district, but it might also be located in another school district in another 
city or state. This holds true regardless of any other transportation the school 
district provides for any other class of student. Transportation provided homeless 
students must be comparable to that provided to housed students. There cannot 
be any barriers to the enrollment of homeless students, including those that might 
be undocumented immigrants. 
McKinney-Vento does not specify any mileage limitation with respect to how far 
away a student must be transported to his/her school of origin. Only if the length 
or duration of the trip would be harmful to the student’s educational progress may 
a school district opt not to supply the requested transportation and the school 
Who is homeless? Section 725 of the McKinney-Vento 
Act says:
The term “homeless children and youth” refers to individuals 
that lack a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence, 
and this includes:
(1)   Children sharing the housing of other persons due to 
loss of housing, economic hardship, or a similar reason; 
are living in motels, hotels, trailer parks, or camping 
grounds due to the lack of alternative accommodations; 
are living in emergency or transitional shelters; are 
abandoned in hospitals; or, are awaiting foster care 
placement.
(2)   Children with a primary nighttime residence in a public 
or private place not designed for or ordinarily used as 
regular sleeping accommodations for human beings.
(3)   Children living in cars, parks, public spaces, abandoned 
buildings, substandard housing, bus or train stations, or 
similar settings.
(4)   Migratory children qualifying as homeless for the 
purposes of this subtitle because the children are living 
in the circumstances described above.  
Note: The number of homeless children identified by McKinney-Vento nearly 
always will be larger than those identified by the PIT audit because McKinney-
Vento takes a yearlong view as opposed to the PIT snapshot view. Many homeless 
families live in multiple locations over a year – McKinney-Vento counts them, but 
PIT may not.       
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district’s judgment can be appealed. Thus, McKinney-Vento students in Maryland 
are transported into Virginia, and vice versa, and at least 669 students were 
transported from their Hampton Roads neighborhood school to another school 
inside the same city in Hampton Roads, while 172 students were transported 
from their neighborhood school to another school outside of their neighborhood 
school city. For example, Virginia Beach indicated that in 2012-13, it 
transported 165 McKinney-Vento students to schools inside Virginia Beach and 
another 60 to schools outside Virginia Beach (see Table 3). The average cost of 
transporting a student in South Hampton Roads was $1,434 in 2012-13.  
When students leave one school district and are transported to another, 
McKinney-Vento specifies that the two districts should share the transportation 
costs. In the absence of any agreement, they share those costs equally. It’s not 
clear how these matters are settled within South Hampton Roads. Grumbling 
from some cities suggests that not all agree with the current division of costs.
Table 3 summarizes the transportation of McKinney-Vento students within 
Hampton Roads in terms of numbers and costs. 
TABLE 2





Chesapeake  $  7,900   $2,000
Norfolk $19,929 $108,792
Portsmouth $61,206    $8,147
Suffolk  $   0 $2,000
Virginia Beach NA $274,6069
9
9  This includes $50,000 of in-kind gifts and donations from the public. It also includes funds expended for 
coordination.
TABLE 3
NUMBER AND COST OF TRANSPORTING MCKINNEY-VENTO 






Chesapeake   39/50 $252,113
Norfolk 416/26 $280,000
Portsmouth 49/18 $247,035
Suffolk  22/18 $135,000
Virginia Beach 165/60 $458,138
Totals 691/172 $1,237,286
Average Cost Per Transported Student = $1,434
Homeless Children And 
Academic Performance
The ultimate societal costs of homelessness go far beyond the direct, easily 
quantifiable costs that school districts expend when they serve homeless 
students. Let’s delve into these spinoff costs that individual cities and counties 
must bear, or that require expenditures and action by the states and the federal 
government. Several South Hampton Roads cities generously provided extensive 
data concerning the academic performance of a variety of their students, 
including those that are homeless.
CHESAPEAKE
Chesapeake provided useful anonymous attendance and achievement data for 
90 homeless students and 9,272 other students. Table 4 summarizes several 
important student performance variables within these two samples.
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TABLE 4
ATTENDANCE, SOL PERFORMANCE AND GRADE POINT 
AVERAGES FOR 90 HOMELESS AND 9,272 OTHER STUDENTS 
IN CHESAPEAKE
(N = 90) 
Homeless Students
(N = 9,272) 
Other Students
Average Days in 
Attendance
150.8    (N = 90) 166.2   (N = 9,272)
SOL Performance
   Passed All 36.7%  (N = 24) 41.1% (N = 3,599)
   Failed Some 48.5%  (N = 32) 42.6%  (N = 3,722)
   Failed All 15.2%  (N = 10) 16.2%  (N = 1,418)
Grade Point Average 2.18     (N = 24) 2.40    (N = 3,340)
Source: City of Chesapeake Public Schools
The data in Table 4 are simultaneously discouraging and encouraging. The 
typical homeless student attended school about 10 percent fewer days than the 
typical other student. He/she also earned a lower grade point average, and 
a smaller percentage of homeless students passed all parts of the Standards of 
Learning (SOL) tests. However, a slightly smaller percentage of homeless students 
than other students failed all of the SOL tests. Further, the grade point average of 
homeless students in Chesapeake (2.18), if maintained, was sufficient for them 
to graduate from high school. The small sample of 24 homeless students for 
whom grade point averages were available contained one student with a 3.8 
GPA and another with a 3.5 GPA.  
NORFOLK
Norfolk provided a detailed anonymous sample of 502 students consisting of 
161 homeless students, 173 “low socioeconomic status” students and 168 
“high socioeconomic status” students. A student was considered to come from a 
lower-income family if he/she was eligible for a free or reduced-price meal at 
school. Children from households receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
(food stamps) or from families receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) are automatically eligible and hence were considered to come 
from housed, but lower-income families in Norfolk.
The Norfolk sample enables us to infer some of the impact of homelessness on 
student performance because it roughly takes account of household income. 
Both students in the homeless student group and in the low socioeconomic 
status group come from lower-income households, but the first group of students 
is homeless, while the second is not. To be sure, nothing else is held constant 
between the two groups and hence there are many other unobserved influences 
present. Nevertheless, because these subsamples address the vitally important 
income factor, these data do provide us with a window on some of the impact 
of homelessness on Norfolk students.
Table 5 summarizes the impact of homelessness and economic status on several 
measures of academic performance for the Norfolk sample. As was true in 
Chesapeake, homeless students do not attend school as many days as other 
students, but the difference is not as large as we observed in Chesapeake. 
Proportionately, however, Chesapeake has fewer homeless students and 
perhaps this has something to do with the willingness and desire of those 
students to go to school.
The median grade point average (3.04) of high socioeconomic status students in 
Norfolk was more than one full grade point higher than that of homeless students 
(2.02). Housed, though low socioeconomic status students in Norfolk recorded 
a median grade point average of 2.34. The difference between the median 
grade point averages of the latter two groups (homeless and low socioeconomic 
status) was 0.32, and this might be interpreted as a rough measure of the impact 
of homelessness on student academic performance. “Might” is the operational 
word here since other factors also could be in play, such as parental presence, 
the number of children in the household, the number of times the household 
moved, etc. Still, it is reasonable to assume that homelessness is an important 
factor in the observed differences in grade point averages.
The typical high socioeconomic status student passed 73.7 percent of his/
her SOL examinations during 2012-13, while the comparable averages were 
only 54.8 percent for low socioeconomic status students and 41.7 percent 
for homeless students. It should be borne in mind that students cannot earn a 
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regular high school diploma unless they pass the SOL examinations. Thus, the 
comparatively low passage rate for homeless students does not bode well for 
their future. Note that the median passage rate (the 50th percentile achievement 
rate) was 100 percent for high socioeconomic status students, 66.7 percent 
for low socioeconomic status students and 33.3 percent for homeless students. 
Hence, the typical (50th percentile) student from the “high” group passes all of 
his/her SOL exams, while the typical student from the “low” group passes two-
thirds of his/her SOL exams and the typical student from the “homeless” group 
passes one-third of his/her SOL exams.  
TABLE 5
HOMELESSNESS, ECONOMIC STATUS AND SEVERAL 
MEASURES OF ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE IN NORFOLK, 
2012-2013
(N = 161) 
Homeless








Attendance (Percentage of Days Eligible)
   Mean  87.9% 92.8% 95.1%
   Median 92.2% 95.5% 97.2%
Grade Point Average
   Mean 1.98 2.27 2.86
   Median  2.02 2.34 3.04
SOL Percentage of Exams Passed
   Mean 41.7% 54.8% 73.7%
   Median 33.3% 66.7% 100.0%
Number of Suspensions from School During Academic Year
   Mean 1.18 0.79 0.13
   Median 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source: City of Norfolk Public Schools
The typical homeless student in Norfolk was suspended from school (either via 
an in-school or an out-of-school suspension) 1.18 times during the 2012-13 
academic year. The comparable averages were 0.79 for low socioeconomic 
status students and 0.13 for high socioeconomic status students. Suspensions 
usually are symptomatic of a variety of problems afflicting a student and 
they have practical consequences – they reduce grade point averages and 
graduation rates.  
VIRGINIA BEACH
Table 6 describes a very large anonymous sample provided by the city of 
Virginia Beach. It compares 772 homeless students to 25,464 anonymous 
housed students that the city has identified as coming from low-income 
households.10 This provides several very interesting comparisons that enable 
us to infer some of the impact of homelessness on student performance. Both 
groups of students come from low-income households, but one group of students 
is homeless, while the other is not. To be sure, nothing else is held constant 
between the two groups and hence there are many other unobserved influences 
present. Nevertheless, because they address the vitally important income factor, 
these data do provide us with a window on some of the impact of homelessness 
on Virginia Beach students.
Performance patterns in Virginia Beach are familiar. Homeless students in 
Virginia Beach attend school about 10 percent fewer days than the housed, 
low-income students; as a group, they earn a lower grade point average. Both 
groups pass all of the SOL tests at virtually the same rate, but the homeless 
students are more likely to fail all of the tests. Holding other things constant, there 
do appear to be distinct academic costs associated with homelessness, and 
this is despite the substantial resources that Virginia Beach uses to address the 
challenge of homelessness in that city.  
Table 7 discloses what happened to homeless and housed low-income 
students in Virginia Beach at the end of the 2012-13 academic year. As noted 
here, 91.6 percent of homeless children were promoted or graduated; the 
comparable number for housed, but low-income, children was 93.6 percent. A 
somewhat larger percentage of homeless children was not enrolled in Virginia 
10  A student is considered to come from a low-income family if he/she is eligible for a free or reduced-price meal 
at school. Children coming from households receiving Supplemental Nutrition Assistance (food stamps) or from 
families receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) are automatically eligible and hence are 
considered to come from housed, but low-income families in Virginia Beach.  
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Beach schools at the end of the 2012-13 academic year compared to children 
coming from a low-income but housed household.  
Table 8 compares the five South Hampton Roads school districts in terms of 
on-time high school graduation rates, GED completion rates and high school 
dropout rates. However, Table 8 also supplies interesting information concerning 
the impact that economic disadvantage and homelessness have upon on-time 
high school graduation rates. These data follow cohorts of students from ninth 
grade (2009) through 12th grade (2013); their on-time graduation date was 
spring 2013. Regionwide in South Hampton Roads, a noticeable decline in 
on-time graduation rates is apparent for students classified as coming from an 
economically disadvantaged household. A further decline can be seen for 
students that were homeless sometime during their high school career.   
Graph 2 illustrates the average impact of economically disadvantaged status 
and homeless status upon on-time high school graduation rates in South 
Hampton Roads. Unfortunate though these relationships are, they cannot be 
described as surprising. We saw in Table 6 that economically disadvantaged 
and homeless students don’t attend school as often and don’t pass as many SOL 
exams. Ultimately, this translates into high dropout rates and lower graduation 
rates. 
TABLE 6
ATTENDANCE, SOL PERFORMANCE AND GRADE POINT 
AVERAGES FOR 772 HOMELESS AND 25,464 LOW-INCOME, 
BUT HOUSED STUDENTS IN VIRGINIA BEACH
(N = 772) 
Homeless Students 
(N = 25,464) 
Low-Income, but 
Housed Students
Average Days in 
Attendance
136.3   (N = 772) 151.1     (N = 25,464)
SOL Performance
   Passed All 43.8%   (N = 269) 43.9%   (N = 7,324)
   Failed Some 34.0%   (N = 209) 38.4%   (N = 6,411)
   Failed All 22.1%   (N = 136) 17.8%   (N = 2,975)
Grade Point Average 2.38   (N = 24)   2.52   (N = 1,061) 
Source: City of Virginia Beach Public Schools
TABLE 7
ACADEMIC DISPOSITION OF HOMELESS AND HOUSED, 
LOW-INCOME STUDENTS IN VIRGINIA BEACH AT THE END OF 
THE 2012-13 ACADEMIC YEAR
(N = 728) 
Homeless
(N = 24,454) 
Housed, But From 
a Low-Income 
Household
Promoted 552  (75.8%) 21,990   (89.6%)
Graduated 115  (15.8%)      988     (4.0%)
Not Enrolled at the 
End of the Year
   61   (8.4%)    1,568    (6.4%)
Source: City of Virginia Beach Public Schools
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TABLE 8
PROGRESS AND GRADUATION STATISTICS, SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 2012-2013






 3,283   2,062   1,113  1,097   5,355
District Student Percentages
On-Time Graduation Rate
   All Students 92.0%  77.9% 80.9% 87.2% 88.0% 86.7%
   Males   89.3% 72.4% 74.9% 84.5% 84.4% 82.9%




83.9% 73.4% 77.7%  79.1% 78.5% 79.0%
Homeless Anytime, 
9th to 12th Grade
79.5% 67.1% 76.2% 79.1% 68.9% 72.8%
GED Completion     2.3% 7.6% 5.0% 2.0% 4.0% 4.1%
   Males     3.1% 10.2% 3.5% 1.4% 5.0% 4.9%
   Females     1.6% 5.2% 1.5% .6% 3.1% 2.7%
Dropout Rate     3.8% 10.1% 10.4% 8.1% 4.9% 5.7%
   Males     5.3% 11.7% 14.3% 8.5% 6.4% 7.8%
   Females 2.3% 8.7% 6.4% 6.6% 3.4% 4.5%
Source: Virginia Department of Education, “School, School Division and State Report Cards,” www.doe.virginia.gov/statistics_reports/school_report_card. The student cohorts entered four years previously. 
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GRAPH 2
PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS OF VARIOUS BACKGROUNDS THAT GRADUATED ON TIME IN 2013, 
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Tables 3 through 8 are revealing, but one should resist the urge to reach overly 
strong conclusions based upon them. Consider that:
•  There is a lack of consistency among the cities both in terms of their 
propensities to count homeless students and their attribution of resource 
expenditures (especially transportation) focused on those students. Hampton 
Roads needs a single entity that is the initial focal point for 
all homeless inquiries and which also collects and audits 
homeless children data and information for all of the region’s 
cities and counties. It is a challenge to assess either the costs of 
homelessness, or the impact of programs designed to combat the effects of 
homelessness, when data variously are not available, not standardized or 
not reliable. No study, including this one, can be better than the underlying 
data upon which it relies. Similarly, public policy makers always will be 
handicapped if they do not have an accurate vision of the actual state of 
homelessness.  
•  The “housed, but low-income” samples provided by several of the cities 
appear to contain proportionately smaller numbers of students actually eligible 
for graduation.   
•  We don’t know what happened to most of the students that no longer were in 
the various school districts at the end of the academic year. GED high school 
equivalency certificates represent one avenue students may take when they 
drop out. We know, for example, that 4 percent of the large 5,355 Virginia 
Beach high school cohort earned a GED certificate. Beyond this, we do 
not know much more. Tracking dropouts across district and even 
state lines, and over time, is important if we really want to 
know the impact of homelessness on students.
•  The most important reason why we should be prudent in our conclusions, 
however, is that there are many unobserved characteristics of homeless 
students (and those that are housed) that we would like to know, but don’t. 
For example, we would like to know if a homeless student came from a 
single-parent home, how many different places he/she lived, the education 
and employment characteristics of his/her parents or guardians, his/her 
encounters with the justice system, etc. 
Even with these caveats, however, the apparent effects of homelessness upon 
student academic performance can be seen in Tables 4 through 8. We know 
that homeless students attend class between 5 and 10 percent less often than 
other students. In Norfolk, for example, the correlation between student grade 
point averages and student daily attendance is +.54. Put in different terms, this 
means that we can explain almost 30 percent of the variance in student grade 
point averages (the other 70 percent being due to other factors) if we know how 
often these students attend school.
This is not a trivial relationship. The percentage of homeless students in a city 
is negatively correlated with on-time graduation as one would expect (r = -.86) 
and positively correlated as one would expect with each city’s high school 
dropout rate (r = +.54).  
Homelessness is negatively and strongly related to performance on individual 
SOL tests. In Norfolk, for example, the passage rate of students coming from 
homeless households is 13.1 percent less than those students coming from low 
socioeconomic status households and fully 32 percent less than students coming 
from high socioeconomic status households.  
These results are entirely consistent with the reputable national and regional 
studies noted previously. The bottom line is that homelessness has destructive 
effects on student academic performance.
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The Impact Of Homelessness 
Follows Students Throughout 
Their Lives
What difference do these lower levels of academic performance make 
to homeless students later in their lives? The most measurable impact of 
homelessness is on homeless students’ ability to find jobs and earn income. Put 
simply, if homeless children do not graduate from high school, then they will 
enter job markets at a tremendous disadvantage. Graph 3, which relies upon 
data from the U.S. Census, reveals that the median (50th percentile) income 
of individuals with less than a high school education was only $19,404 in 
2012. This was almost 40 percent less than the median income of high school 
graduates ($27,024). To be sure, some individuals do well even though they 
have not acquired a high school diploma, but as the data in Graph 3 record, 
they are exceptions to the general rule.   
Graph 4 illustrates the unfortunate reality that those individuals that do not 
graduate from high school also are burdened by much higher rates of 
unemployment. Because homeless students are less likely to graduate from high 
school, they are more likely to become unemployed throughout their lives.  
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GRAPH 3
MEDIAN INCOME OF INDIVIDUALS WITH VARING LEVELS OF EDUCATION, 2012
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GRAPH 4
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND WEEKLY EARNINGS BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, 2013
Note: Data are for persons age 25 and over. Earnings are for full-time wage and salary workers.
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Summing It Up For The 
Major Cities Of South 
Hampton Roads
Table 9 provides estimates of many of the societal costs associated with 
homeless children in the context of the five major cities of South Hampton Roads. 
Some of these costs already have been identified and include administrative 
costs connected to the McKinney-Vento obligations of school districts (for 
example, the salary of the district’s coordinator) and the costs of transporting 
homeless students to their “school of origin.”  
Administrative and transportation costs, however, constitute only a small slice 
(perhaps 5 percent) of the total additional costs associated with homeless 
children. Far more important are additional medical and social services costs 
that homeless children impose on the cities in which they live. It is undeniable 
that such costs exist. Homeless children appear in hospital emergency rooms 
more often and are more likely to suffer from chronic health problems, such as 
obesity and diabetes, even while some are undernourished.  
There is abundant evidence that homeless families and their children require 
emergency and transitional housing at a higher rate than the housed population 
and that on a per capita basis, homeless people utilize larger than usual 
amounts of social services, including Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF) and food stamps (the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). These 
general types of costs are included in the social services variable in Table 9.  
What is not clear, however, is the best way to allocate those costs to specific 
homeless children because many of the costs are incurred jointly with other 
members of a family. Consider social safety net services such as food stamps. 
Suppose a single mother of a homeless family of four applies for and receives 
food stamps. Should three-quarters of that expense be attributed to the homeless 
children, or a different proportion? What proportion of a family’s emergency 
or transitional housing costs should be apportioned to a homeless child? The 
national and regional studies cited in footnote 5 do not always answer such 
questions identically. In such cases, this report has adopted their average 
conclusions or assessments.
Some social costs associated with homeless children are more easily measured 
on an individual child basis, for example, hospital emergency room use and 
prison/incarceration expenses. However, these costs are not identical across 
the United States and so we have relied on their average values. Emergency 
medical and hospital room use provides a useful example. We have used a 
$772 per homeless student per year estimate of the total cost to society of 
emergency room use by homeless students. This estimate may be too high, or 
too low, for South Hampton Roads. Therefore, no one should impute precision 
to the estimates contained in Table 9. These estimates are, however, reasonable 
approximations of the total additional costs that society incurs when certain 
events occur.
School districts also must devote extra resources to homeless children. We have 
attempted to capture these at the K-8 level and also to estimate special education 
costs (which apply to homeless children more often than other students). We 
have not computed “in-school” high school costs attributable to homeless 
children. Clearly, such costs exist, but we could not find a reputable, rigorous 
source to backstop any estimates, and so we have not included them in Table 9. 
With these caveats in mind, note that the largest cost incurred 
by society from homeless students is the cost of emergency and 
transitional housing, which accounts for more than 29 percent 
of the total cost. When other housing-related costs are added 
to emergency and transitional housing, together they account 
for slightly more than 48 percent of all of the costs incurred 
by society because of homeless children. This underlines 
once again the conclusion of informed observers concerning 
homelessness, namely, that finding housing for homeless 
individuals quickly is vitally important. However, paying to 
house homeless individuals actually is cost-efficient relative 
to more expensive alternatives. This is a counterintuitive 
conclusion for citizens not familiar with the data found in Table 
9, but an induction that is quickly grasped by those who have 
taken the time to dive into the numbers.
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TABLE 9
ESTIMATED ANNUAL ADDITIONAL TOTAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH 1,548 REPORTED HOMELESS SCHOOLCHILDREN, 
SOUTH HAMPTON ROADS, 2012-2013, BASED ON NATIONAL STUDIES
N = 89) 
Chesapeake 
(N = 442) 
Norfolk
(N = 211) 
Portsmouth
(N = 35) 
Suffolk




   Emergency Room Use $68,708 $341,224 $162,892 $27,020 $595,212 $1,195,056
   Recurring Health Problems $283,020 $1,157,146 $670,980 $111,300 $2,451,780 $4,674,226
   Mental Health Care $122,909 $610,402 $291,391 $48,335 $1,064,751 $2,137,788
Social Services and Housing
   Foster Care $233,568 $1,159,967 $530,032 $87,920 $1,936,752 $3,948,239
   Emergency and Transitional Housing $518,425 $2,547,650 $1,229,075 $203,875 $4,491,075 $8,990,100
   Other Social Service Use $109,025 $541,450 $258,475 $42,875 $944,475 $1,896,300
Education
   Preschool and Elementary $163,493 $881,954 $387,607 $64,295 $1,416,327 $2,843,676
   Special Education Programs $154,682 $768,196 $366,718 $60,830 $1,338,998 $2,689,424
Administrative and Transportation
   Administrative $9,900 $128,721 $69,353 $2,000 $274,606 $   652,696  
   Transportation $252,113 $280,000 $247,035 $       0 $458,138 $1,237,286
Penal System and Incarceration $12,638 $62,764 $29,962 $4,970 $109,482 $   219,816
Failure to Graduate from High School
   Average Present Value of Annual Lost Income 
  (2013 Incomes and Prices) $38,337 $190,392 $90,899 $15,076 $332,112 $   666,816
Totals $1,966,818 $8,599,866 $4,334,419 $668,496 $15,413,708 $30,983,307
Average Cost Per Homeless Student $22,099 $19,457 $20,542 $19,100 $19,992 $20,015
Notes: The estimates rely upon: (1) the number of homeless children in each school district; (2) each school district’s graduation rate; (3) the assumption that the costs of homelessness per student found in national studies 
apply to South Hampton Roads; (4) U.S. Census income data that were used to project future incomes and these incomes were discounted to present value so that future income dollars are equivalent to those in 2013; (5) 
a 3.724 percent rate of discount, the 30-year U.S. government bond rate on March 9, 2014. The present value (PV) estimate is for a single year, not for all the years of a student’s work life. The present value estimates 
also assume that many homeless students will leave their original school district and live elsewhere. While all of the estimates above must be understood to be approximations, they do provide useful information about the 
relative magnitude of these costs if South Hampton Roads mirrors national trends. The individual city averages are bunched together because identical costs per student are assumed for a majority of the services identified 
above. Hence, the most meaningful per-student statistic is the regional average, $20,015 per student. 
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Housing-related costs are followed in importance by recurring health problems, 
at 15 percent. Recurring health problems include conditions ranging from the 
common flu to obesity and diabetes. Together, medical- and health-related 
challenges account for slightly more than $8 million in annual costs.  
Among the cities of South Hampton Roads, Virginia Beach bears the most 
annual additional costs ($15.4 million), primarily because it reports the largest 
total population of homeless students (N = 771). Portsmouth, however, identifies 
the most homeless students on a per capita basis. Chesapeake and Suffolk 
identify the smallest per capita proportions of their populations as homeless 
students. Norfolk and Virginia Beach are roughly similar on a per capita basis.  
A portion of the city-to-city per capita homeless children disparities in Table 9 
reflects well-known demographic and economic differences among the cities. 
After all, they are not clones of each other. Nevertheless, while the same 
laws (especially McKinney-Vento) apply to all of the cities, the 
cities do not always appear to interpret and apply the laws 
and accompanying regulations in the same fashion. Perhaps 
the observed disparities in application represent unofficial city 
policies pursued by administrators, or instead, simply tradition. 
Finally, while we have computed per-child costs for homeless children, most 
homeless children are part of some kind of larger family unit. How does the 
approximate $20,000 per homeless child computation relate to the cost for an 
entire family unit? Other studies suggest a 2.5X to 3X multiplier for those costs, 
that is, something in the range of $50,000 to $60,000 as the cost to society 
of an entire “typical” homeless family. Reality is, however, that homeless families 
differ substantially in size and character and therefore family cost estimates are 
less precise than those for individuals. One of the most important variables, for 
example, relates to whether or not both parents are present. We would need 
to know such things if we were going to make a reliable estimate of the family 
costs connected to homelessness.  
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The Impact of Vehicle Tolls 
on Hampton Roads
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THE IMPACT OF VEHICLE TOLLS ON HAMPTON ROADS:  
JOB MOBILITY, RESIDENTIAL LIVING CHOICES AND 
REGIONAL COHESION
V
ehicle tolls are nothing new in Hampton Roads. Both the Downtown Tunnel (DTT), which opened in 1952, and the Midtown Tunnel (MTT), which opened 
in 1962, extracted 25-cent tolls from drivers of vehicles passing through them until 1986. The Virginia Beach Expressway (now I-264) opened in 1967 
and was funded with tolls as high as 25 cents for passenger cars and a bit higher on a per axle basis for trucks. These tolls were removed in 1996.  
The Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel (HRBT) extracted a $1.25 toll from 
automobiles between 1957 and 1976.  
The Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel (CBBT) has been tolled since it opened in 
1964. Currently, that toll is $13 for passenger cars for a single trip, $26 for a 
three-axle truck and $47 for a six-axle truck. Repeat travelers qualify for much 
lower tolls. 
Now, we have a new set of tolls – this time on the DTT, MTT and the Martin 
Luther King Freeway (MLK). The tolls are designed to help pay for a $2.16 
billion transportation improvement project negotiated by the Commonwealth 
of Virginia under the aegis of the Public/Private Partnership Act of 1995. The 
centerpiece of the project is a new tunnel tube for the MTT that will improve 
traffic flow between Norfolk and Portsmouth, as well as to points west and 
south. The new tube will increase the MTT to four lanes and presumably 
expedite traffic going to and from the Sentara/Eastern Virginia Medical School 
health complex, Old Dominion University, the port and Naval Base Norfolk. 
More than a little controversy has accompanied this project because at least 
one study has suggested that the adverse impact of new vehicle tolls would be 
especially large for the city of Portsmouth.1 The new tolling arrangement also has 
pushed to the forefront questions about the viability of any regional strategy that 
would pay for a new (third) crossing over the James River estuary, and perhaps 
1   James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014. The report may be 
accessed at www.jamesvkoch.com under the “Consulting Reports” icon.  
even the widening of I-64 to Richmond, by means of tolls. Finally, this project 
has caused both members of the public and legislators to take a closer look at 
the Public-Private Partnership Act of 1995, which enabled the current project 
and its surrounding financial arrangements.  
What are the new DTT, MTT and MLK tolls? While 
lower initially, beginning in 2016, drivers of passenger cars 
going through either the DTT or MTT tunnel will pay 
$1.84 during peak hours, while drivers of trucks will pay 
$7.36. During off-peak hours, they will pay $1.59 and $4.77, 
respectively. MLK tolls will be 50 cents for tunnel users 
and $1 for non-tunnel users. However, these are E-ZPass 
(electronic) rates and drivers of vehicles without an 
E-ZPass transponder will pay triple these amounts.  
The Public-Private 
Partnership Act Of 1995
The tolls on the DTT, MTT and MLK are one product of a 58-year 
“Comprehensive Agreement” between the Commonwealth of Virginia and 
Elizabeth River Crossing OpCo (ERCO),2 made possible under provisions of the 
1995 Public-Private Transportation Act (PPTA).3 This particular agreement took 
effect in 2012 and has been amended since then.  
The Comprehensive Agreement with ERCO included the construction of a 
second MTT tunnel tube (increasing it to four lanes), extending the MLK Freeway 
from High Street to I-264, and rehabilitating the existing DTT and MTT tunnels. 
The advertised total cost of these projects was $2.16 billion.   
The primary impetus for the PPTA was the apparent inability of the 
Commonwealth to finance most of the large transportation infrastructure 
projects that legislators and citizens wished to pursue. Hence, in the PPTA, the 
Commonwealth turned to the private sector for help. It is not clear that, at the 
time, all concerned understood that private-sector investors/operators would 
demand a rate of return on their invested capital that would be competitive in 
the milieu of large, private-sector corporations. This would not be a world of 
3 percent interest rates on 10-year U.S. government bonds.  
The PPTA delegates responsibility for developing and approving public-private 
transportation partnerships to the governor, who in turn may delegate that 
responsibility to another individual, such as the secretary of transportation. 
As of this writing, approval of the Virginia General Assembly is not required, 
regardless of the size of the project.  
ERCO is responsible for collecting tolls and for achieving the traffic volumes 
outlined in its forecasts, which may be a bit optimistic. While there is no 
guaranteed rate of return for ERCO on its investment, ERCO is authorized 
2   ERCO’s lead firms are Skanska Infrastructure Development and Macquarie Group, both of which are public-
private partnership (PPP) developers and infrastructure investors as well as operators throughout the world. For 
more information about ERCO, see www.erc-info.com. 
3   Among completed Virginia PPP projects are: the Pocahontas Parkway (Route 895) across the James River, south 
of Richmond; a 17.5-mile stretch of Route 288 west of Richmond; and the Route 199 partial loops around 
Williamsburg. 
to earn 13.5 percent on its invested capital. If that rate of return does not 
materialize because competing facilities have been constructed by the 
Commonwealth, then the Commonwealth must compensate ERCO for the 
shortfall. However, if ERCO’s revenues exceed forecasts (implicitly, the 13.5 
percent rate of return), then ERCO will share a portion of the excess with the 
Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT). The percentage share of excess 
gross revenues increases as the amount of gross revenues earned by ERCO 
increases.4 VDOT is required by law to use the shared revenue on transportation 
improvements in the corridor. 
The Comprehensive Agreement gives ERCO the authority to raise tolls 3.5 
percent annually if it wishes to do so, beginning in 2016. However, if the 
annual growth rate of the consumer price index (CPI) in the preceding 12 
months was higher than 3.5 percent, then ERCO may choose to increase its tolls 
by that percentage. Assuming that ERCO takes advantage of these provisions, 
this means, at a minimum, that the peak hours and non-peak 
hours tolls for passenger vehicles would rise to at least $11.79 
and $8.71, respectively, by 2070. (Peak hours are defined as 
5:30 a.m. to 9 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. to 7 p.m.) Comparable truck 
tolls would rise to at least $47.17 and $30.57, respectively, by 
2070. As we will soon see, because of the CPI provision, tolls 
actually are likely to rise much more than these amounts.
4   If gross revenues exceed baseline forecasts from 5% to 10%, 10% to 20%, 20% to 30% and in excess of 30%, 
then VDOT will share 5%, 15%, 30% and 60%, respectively. ERCO may earn gross revenues up to 5% in excess 
of baseline forecasts before VDOT shares in profits.  
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The Positive Overall 
Economic Impact Of The 
Newly Tolled Project
There is a tendency for the supporters of toll-financed projects to neglect the 
costs associated with those projects and for the opponents of toll-financed 
projects to neglect the benefits of the same projects. Reality is that both benefits 
and costs are generated by toll-financed projects such as the DTT/MTT/MLK 
undertaking in Hampton Roads.  
Let’s focus for a moment on the primary benefits typically associated with a new 
toll project:
• Reduced travel times
• Increased trip and travel reliability
• Reduced traffic congestion 
• Increased fuel economy
• Reduced vehicle operating costs
• Reduced carbon emissions and diminished environmental harm
•  As many as 1,500 additional jobs and associated increased incomes 
connected to construction.
At least five reputable studies have documented that some or all of these benefits 
will be associated with the DTT/MTT/MLK tolling project. For example, The 
Hartgen Group estimates that after completion, the project will increase the 
gross regional product of Hampton Roads by an incremental $365 million to 
$390 million annually and in the process create 4,401 additional jobs.5 “West 
Side” benefits that will accrue are estimated by Hartgen to range between 
$144 million and $148 million, along with 1,736 jobs. The Hartgen Group 
5   “Impacts of Mid-Town Tunnel Improvements on Regional Productivity and Job Mobility,” The Hartgen Group 
(2009), p. 3, www.hartgengroup.net  
also estimated that the increased reliability of travel time across the Elizabeth 
River will have a median value of $63 million to the region.6  
Reputable analysts attribute significant financial benefits to the completion of the 
DTT/MTT/MLK project. It also is fair to say that the analytic consensus is that the 
project will yield significant benefits to the region and the Commonwealth. This, 
however, is not the same as saying that the benefits and costs of the project will 
be spread evenly (or equitably) across the region, or even that the benefits and 
costs will be spread evenly (or equitably) among the residents and businesses 
inside a specific city.  
We Live In An Economically 
Interdependent Region
Both the benefits and the costs of the DTT/MTT/MLK accruing to any city 
depend substantially on how many people in those cities will use these venues 
and end up paying tolls, either because they leave a city (perhaps Suffolk) to 
work in another, or because people in other cities leave those cities to come 
work in this city (Suffolk). Table 1 reports U.S. Census data describing where 
people live and where they work in Hampton Roads.  
Reading down the columns, one can see to whom each city or county is 
supplying workers. Taking Newport News as an example, one can see that 
this city supplies 13,744 people who work in Hampton; 40,661 workers 
in Newport News remain there for their jobs; 5,236 go to work in Norfolk; 
3,724 travel to work in Virginia Beach; and 15,062 workers are employed 
outside of Hampton Roads.
Reading across the rows, one can discover where a city or county’s workers 
come from. Virginia Beach, for example, receives 23,138 workers from 
Norfolk; 6,925 from Portsmouth; 10,727 from Hampton Roads locations north 
of the James River;7 and 29,576 workers from outside Hampton Roads.  
6   “Value of Improvements in the Reliability of Travel Time Resulting from MTT Improvements,” The Hartgen Group 
(2009), p. 2, www.hartgengroup.net   
7   These workers travel to Virginia Beach from Gloucester County, James City County, Mathews County, York 
County, Hampton, Newport News, Poquoson and Williamsburg.
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Currituck County, N.C. 7,482 2,693 12 -   12 1 1 1 -   7 385 11 11 54 1 47 52 335 3 3,856
Franklin 13,545 20 2,847 30 860 57 20 3,329 90 47 345 60 204 194 13 355 1,372 281 -   3,422
Gloucester County 13,206 3 5 5,550 61 428 665 28 2 489 116 317 972 127 75 116 99 280 54 3,819
Isle of Wight County 14,025 36 184 20 4,265 183 38 441 320 164 547 807 1,381 285 36 731 1,836 293 20 2,435
James City County 37,618 16 38 1,363 310 12,055 286 82 329 2,869 418 1,269 4,827 347 234 356 401 757 1,130 10,532
Mathews County 2,045 4 4 267 4 28 711 -   2 37 22 37 66 13 9 7 9 17 2 808
Southampton County 3,543 4 327 4 153 4     -   1,554 40 8 46 12 20 32 1 58 120 43 1 1,116
Surry County 3,113 3 5 48 258 115 11 41 726 89 117 79 171 35 16 50 83 138 11 1,115
York County 28,992 8 28 1,695 417 3,388 208 63 74 6,067 446 2,380 5,347 428 613 428 391 828 526 5,656
Chesapeake 132,806 1,777 97 478 1,441 701 104 178 70 15 41,070 3,162 3,288 13,226 137 9,498 6,504 30,394 129 20,535
Hampton 76,504 43 40 1,130 1,717 1,833 189 70 30 5,047 3,469 23,816 13,744 3,910 1,634 1,956 2,103 5,088 213 10,471
Newport News 134,154 116 127 4,822 4,837 4,463 662 246 102 10,072 4,819 21,508 40,661 3,973 2,193 3,518 4,659 6,376 463 20,537
Norfolk 192,051 1,086 63 106 1,742 1,334 183 163 65 1,432 27,297 6,484 5,236 50,825 285 10,249 6,909 52,164 228 26,201
Poquoson 2,410 1      -   50 35 40 5 4      -   291 50 297 344 37 875 32 33 80 3 232
Portsmouth 61,237 392 50 131 1,312 255 34 92 38 304 11,722 1,721 1,881 6,044 44 16,620 5,065 8,466 38 7,027
Suffolk 37,179 155 447 222 2,074 333 40 825 101 368 4,341 885 1,355 1,710 76 3,015 12,107 2,905 29 6,193
Virginia Beach 229,365 1,621 -   612 1,329 1,130 137 179       -   1,082 25,843 3,631 3,724 23,138 196 6,925 4,790 125,237 215 29,576
Williamsburg 19,123 5 13 921 145 5,679 105 41 174 2,078 205 686 3,162 212 125 196 184 348 1,407 3,437
Outside Hampton 
Roads      -     5,045 2,163 2,151 320 1,935 1948.4 5,314 1,794 11,600 15,274 11,424 15,062 16,090 2,201 477 16,026 32,761 2,591          - 
1,008,398 13,027 6,451 19,600 21,293 33,962 5,347 12,652 3,958 42,067 136,532 78,584 101,456 120,681 8,765 54,634 62,745 266,790 7,062 156,968
Sources:  U.S. Census Bureau, 2013: OnTheMap Application. Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics Program. http://onthemap.ces.census.gov 
http://lehd.ces.census.gov/applications/help/onthemap.html#!what_is_onthemap 
Jobs are “primary jobs,” and include military personnel and self-employed. 
Primary jobs: Public- and private-sector jobs, one job per worker. A primary job is the highest-paying job for an individual worker. 
Source of jobs data: “Civilian Labor Force and Unemployment by Census Region and Division, Seasonally Adjusted,” www.bea.gov
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The import of the numbers in Table 1 is inescapable:
•  Economically speaking, we are a highly interdependent region – most of our 
workers live in one city or county, but work in another. Fully 64.9 percent of 
our workers leave their home city or county when they go to their jobs.    
•  Even Norfolk, bolstered by its traditional role as a headquarters site and job 
magnet, finds that 57.9 percent of its employed residents work in a different 
city or county.
•  Many of our workers “cross the water” in north-south directions. An estimated 
71,000 people holding jobs in Hampton Roads cross the James River estuary 
every day to and from Hampton and Newport News to go to work.8 They 
account for approximately 120,000 daily trips.
•  Business and delivery trucks crossing the James River to and from Hampton 
and Newport News add approximately 70,000 daily trips to this number on 
a typical day.   
•  Many of our workers also “cross the water” in east-west directions. Roughly 
85,000 people (8.5 percent) move between eastern Hampton Roads and 
western Hampton Roads as they travel to work. About two-thirds of them 
utilize the DTT and/or MTT when they do so. This activity accounts for 
approximately 140,000 daily trips.
•  Business and delivery trucks (for example, those emanating from the port) add 
an approximate additional 75,000 trips to this east-west number.9
Some important deductions spring from these data. Approximately 25 
percent of all workers in the region are tied to jobs that 
require them to commute over bridges and tunnels to their 
jobs, or whose jobs require them to make business and 
delivery trips that utilize the same crossings. To the extent that 
drivers must pay high tolls when they utilize these venues, 
we risk dividing our region into three parts: Eastern Hampton 
Roads (Norfolk and Virginia Beach), Western Hampton Roads 
8   Approximately 20 percent of individuals utilize car pools or public transportation, or telecommute, thus reducing 
the actual number of trips undertaken.
9  The business and delivery trip estimates are based upon the Koch study cited in footnote 1 and are based upon, 
inter alia, an actual physical count of the types of vehicles entering the DTT and MTT.
(Portsmouth, Suffolk and points west) and the Peninsula. Only 
Chesapeake would appear to be situated in such a way that its drivers would 
not have to access the DTT and MTT with any frequency. However, Chesapeake 
drivers, like all others Southside, would have to pay to get to the Peninsula if 
those crossings were to become tolled.   
Nearly two and a half centuries ago, in 1776, Adam Smith, in his “An Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,” noted how the division 
and specialization of labor and general economic prosperity were tied to the 
size of available markets. This is among the reasons Smith was a free trader. 
He objected to tariffs and taxes that prevented consumers and businesses from 
making mutually profitable connections. A toll may be viewed as a tariff (tax) 
on movement. Were he alive today, Smith likely would eschew tolls in favor of 
other means of funding road, bridge and tunnel improvements.  
If we impose high tolls on bridges and tunnels in Hampton Roads and separate 
our regional market into three distinct and perhaps competing parts, then there 
will be consequences. The size of our labor pool will shrink as 
workers decline to pay the tolls necessary to commute over 
bridges and tunnels. This will mean some employees will have 
to settle for lower wages and some employers won’t be able 
to hire the best possible employees. Businesses will find that 
the number of customers to whom they have easy access will 
decline. Customers will have an incentive to find alternate, less 
expensive suppliers, perhaps using the Internet to fuel their 
searches. This is a recipe for economic decline.
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The Relative Burden Of 
The Tolls
Only a brief glance at the Table 1 commuting matrix is needed to see that the 
imposition of tolls on the DTT, MTT and MLK will not have much impact on the 
Peninsula. It’s true that 1,721 Hampton residents commute to Portsmouth for 
their jobs and 1,956 Portsmouth residents commute to Hampton for their work. 
Some of these 3,677 people may have to pay the tolls, though many of them 
may choose the “back side” commuting path of some combination of I-664, 
I-264, State Route 164 and U.S. Route 17 to travel to their jobs. Virtually all 
who reside in Newport News or to the north will be able to exercise the same, 
toll-free option.  
Not surprisingly, the primary burden of the tolls will fall upon four Southside 
cities: Norfolk, Portsmouth, Suffolk and Virginia Beach. Of these cities, easily the 
largest burden will fall upon those who live or work in Portsmouth and must travel 
back and forth through the DTT or MTT to get to their jobs and return home. 
Table 1 illustrates Portsmouth’s exposed situation. Fully 10,249 people live in 
Portsmouth and work in Norfolk; 6,044 do the reverse. Another 6,925 people 
live in Portsmouth and work in Virginia Beach, while 8,466 reverse that flow. 
When one adds the very few individuals that live or work in Chesapeake or 
Currituck County, but nevertheless use the DTT and MTT, a total of 32,279 
people likely will use the DTT and MTT to go to work in and out of Portsmouth.  
Portsmouth’s job base of 61,237 is an approximate measure of the size of 
its economy. A rough-and-ready measure of the impact of the new tolls on 
Portsmouth is the percentage (52.7 percent) of the city’s “in and out” commuters 
among its job base.  
How does this compare to the other Southside cities that primarily will be 
affected by the tolls? Graph 1 indexes the impact the tolls will have on Norfolk, 
Portsmouth, Suffolk and Virginia Beach as the percentage of each city’s job 
base consisting of “in and out” commuters that must use the DTT and MTT to go 
back and forth to work. The impact is least on Virginia Beach. While Table 1 
discloses that an estimated 6,925 + 8,466 = 15,391 people will be “in and 
out” commuters to and from Virginia Beach and Portsmouth, Suffolk and points 
west (and hence probably must use the DTT and MTT), this is only 6.7 percent 
of Virginia Beach’s substantial job base of 229,365.  
Graph 1 indexes Virginia Beach’s percentage at 1.00. Norfolk slides in 
above Virginia Beach with an index of 1.15, followed by Suffolk at 3.45 and 
Portsmouth at 4.12. In relative terms, the impact of the tolls will be more than 
four times greater upon Portsmouth than on Virginia Beach. The relative impact 
of the DTT and MTT tolls upon Chesapeake and the cities and counties on the 
Peninsula is minuscule by comparison.   
How high is “high” when we are talking about tolls? In 
2016, drivers of passenger cars will pay $1.84 during peak 
hours to drive through either the DTT or MTT. Workers/
drivers that do so twice a day, 250 days per year (and 
perhaps throw in a couple of more passages per month 
for other purposes) will spend about $1,000 per year on 
these tolls. This is approximately 2.2 percent of the median 
household income in the cities of Portsmouth and Norfolk 
and, based upon studies in other metropolitan areas, it is 
sufficient to change behavior. Tolls that extract 1 percent 
or less of median household income annually appear to be 
regarded by most drivers as a nuisance, but do not often 
change decisions about where they choose to work, live or 
spend leisure time.
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GRAPH 1
RELATIVE BURDEN OF THE NEW TOLLS UPON SOUTHSIDE HAMPTON ROADS CITIES
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Future Increases In Tolls For 
The DTT And MTT
The Commonwealth’s agreement with Elizabeth River Crossings permits ERCO to 
increase tolls by 3.5 percent annually, or the growth in the consumer price index 
over the trailing 12 months, if that is higher. As Graph 2 illustrates, this means 
that the $1.84 peak-time toll for passenger cars would increase to $11.79 in 
2070 if tolls increased at only 3.5 percent annually, but would jump to $21.56 
if the growth in the CPI between now and 2070 matched what was true 
between 1956 and 2014. During that 58-year time period, the annual growth 
in the CPI was higher than 3.5 percent on 24 occasions.  
Specifically, past CPI growth suggests that tolls will increase at an average of 
4.66 percent per year, not 3.5 percent. Thanks to the miracle of compound 
growth, this would increase ERCO’s total revenue by slightly more than 82 
percent over the 3.5 percent scenario.10
Graph 3 reveals that the $7.36 peak-hour toll that trucks will pay in 2016 
will grow to $47.17 if tolls increase at only 3.5 percent annually, but to a 
stupendous $86.24 if they grow at the aforementioned 4.66 percent annually. 
It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which such tolls inhibit economic 
activity in Hampton Roads.
10  James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014.
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GRAPH 2
GROWTH OF PASSENGER VEHICLE TOLLS, 2016 THROUGH 2070  
(ASSUMING ANNUAL INCREASES OF 3.5 PERCENT OR THE CPI, WHICHEVER IS GREATER)
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GRAPH 3
GROWTH OF TRUCK TOLLS, 2016 THROUGH 2070  
(ASSUMING ANNUAL INCREASES OF 3.5 PERCENT OR THE CPI, WHICHEVER IS GREATER)
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The Key Role Of 
Discretionary Drivers
Table 2 reveals that 32,279 people potentially will go “in and out” of 
Portsmouth daily because of their jobs. If they make round trips, this means there 
are 64,558 potential trips made daily through the tunnels by workers. Some, 
however, will carpool; others will use mass public transportation. Still others 
may telecommute. Based upon the experience of other metropolitan areas, 20 
percent is an approximate estimate of the number of people that will utilize these 
alternatives.  
An estimated 25,000 vehicle trips through the tunnels reflect trucks and business 
vehicles plying their trades on a daily basis. Since the average number of total 
trips through the two tunnels is approximately 125,000 (about 70 percent 
through the DTT), this leaves approximately 50,000 “discretionary” trips daily 
that do not relate to job commuting or the activities of businesses.11 It is these 
individuals who are most likely to be negatively influenced by the new tolls. 
They are people who drive through the tunnels for sundry purposes – shopping, 
recreation, excursions to restaurants and churches, visits to friends and transit to 
other locales.
Discretionary drivers are more likely to utilize the tunnels 
during non-peak hours because they have no need to drive 
during the most congested and more expensive peak hours 
(5:30 a.m. to 9 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. to 7 p.m.). Preliminary evidence 
on tunnel traffic immediately after the imposition of tolls on Feb. 1, 2014, 
revealed that the decline in traffic was much larger during non-peak hours than 
peak hours (Dave Forster, “Traffic Surges to Gilmerton, High-Rise After Tunnel 
Tolls,” The Virginian-Pilot, Feb. 14, 2014). This is precisely the reaction one 
would expect. Those that don’t really need to pay the tolls are the ones most 
likely to decide to stay home, or to relocate their activities closer to their home 
bases.   
11  James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014.
TABLE 2
SUMMARY COMMUTING MATRIX FOR PORTSMOUTH, 2011
Downtown and Midtown Only
From Portsmouth Into Portsmouth
Chesapeake 95 117
Norfolk 10,249 6,044
Virginia Beach 6,925 8,466
Currituck County, N.C. 24 196
Outside Hampton Roads 24 351
Totals 17,317 15,174
“In and Out” total is 32,491, which is 53.1 percent of Portsmouth’s 
job base of 61,237.
All Tolled: DTT, MTT, HRBT, MMMBT, RT17
From Portsmouth Into Portsmouth
Chesapeake 95 117
Norfolk 10,249 6,044
Virginia Beach 6,925 8,466
Currituck County 24 196
Gloucester County 116 131
Mathews County 7 34
York County 428 304
Hampton 1,956 1,721
Newport News 3,518 1,881
Poquoson 32 44
Williamsburg 196 38
Outside Hampton Roads 95 1,405
Totals 23,641 20,381
“In and Out” total is 44,022, which is 71.9 percent of Portsmouth’s 
job base of 61,237.
Note: Downtown Tunnel (DTT), Midtown Tunnel (MTT), Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel (HRBT), Monitor-Merrimac 
Memorial Bridge-Tunnel (MMMBT) and James River Bridge (RT17) 
Source: James V. Koch, “The Differential Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014
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To the extent that discretionary drivers avoid the tolled tunnels, this will inflict 
financial injury upon Southside businesses that have regional rather than local 
clienteles. Consider a restaurant in Olde Towne Portsmouth, an area that 
attracts a significant portion of its guests from outside of the city. Suppose the 
average tab paid by a diner is $35 (counting both lunch and dinner). Then, in 
2016, the $1.84 x 2 = $3.68 tolls paid by the diner would be equivalent to 
a 10.5 percent tax on that dining experience. This is not a recipe for success.  
Contemporary estimates of “price elasticity of demand” (the sensitivity of 
consumers to price changes) suggest that such a 10.5 percent increase in price 
because of the tolls would result in an 8 percent to 12 percent decline in sales 
revenue (holding everything else, such as Department of Defense expenditures 
and general prosperity, constant).  
The financial injury does not end there. Let’s once again focus on Portsmouth. 
Each 1 percent decline in sales tax collections will cost the city of Portsmouth 
$6 million annually. Further, declining sales and profits eventually will reduce the 
value of the city’s businesses and the properties where they are located. Each 
1 percent decline in the assessed valuation of properties in the city of Portsmouth 
will reduce its tax collections by about $900,000. Of course, Portsmouth’s loss 
could become another city’s gain.
While Portsmouth is the Southside city most vulnerable to 
the tolls, other cities such as Norfolk also attract many of 
the discretionary drivers that utilize the tunnels to travel to 
businesses and restaurants in Norfolk, patronize regional 
attractions such as the Chrysler Museum of Art, the Norfolk 
Tides and the Norfolk Admirals, or drive to educational 
institutions such as Tidewater Community College, Norfolk 
State University and Old Dominion University. Indeed, because 
of its long-standing status as a cultural, legal, financial and 
educational center for Hampton Roads, Norfolk appears to 
attract a higher proportion of discretionary travelers than any 
other city in the region. Hence, it will not escape the burden of 
the tolls.
Future Traffic Volumes 
Through The DTT And MTT
Estimation of traffic volumes when new tolls are imposed upon a travel venue 
is somewhat speculative simply because the tolls represent something entirely 
new as opposed to an increase in price of something that already exists. The 
Commonwealth commissioned several consultants and agencies to provide 
traffic estimates through the DTT and MTT. Among them was Steer, Davies and 
Gleave, whose 2010 report and final report in March 2012 estimated traffic 
flows through 2070: “Downtown Tunnel/Midtown Tunnel/Martin Luther King 
Freeway (MLK) Extension: Traffic and Revenue Forecasts.”  
Steer, Davies and Gleave opined that a 24 percent to 48 percent immediate 
decline in tunnel traffic might occur because of a “shock effect.” The actual 
declines in tunnel traffic that occurred in February 2014, while substantial, were 
not this large. The consulting firm predicts slow, gradual growth in traffic once 
drivers adjust to tolls.  
Straightforward economic analysis suggests that the typical 
passenger car driver eventually will decide to pay the tolls. 
Suppose the value of a driver’s time is $10 per hour and that 
avoiding the tunnels adds 30 minutes to the length of a trip 
across the Elizabeth River. The value of those extra 30 minutes 
to this typical driver is .5($10) = $5, which is substantially 
higher than either the $1 toll in 2014, or the $1.84 toll in 
2016. Hence, an armchair prediction is that the typical driver 
will grumble and perhaps attempt to minimize his/her trips, 
but ultimately will decide that driving through the tunnels 
“Drop in Traffic Takes Toll on Investors in Private Roads,” 
reported The Wall Street Journal on Nov. 20, 2013. The 
WSJ’s Ryan Dezember and Emily Glazer noted that traffic 
volume projections often have been overly optimistic on 
privately owned or operated toll projects.
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(and paying the tolls) is cost efficient after all. Still, this will be 
less true for discretionary drivers than for job commuters and 
businesses.   
Nightmare On Elm Street: 
Tolling The James River 
Crossings
If placing tolls on the DTT, MTT and MLK has generated problematic results, then 
consider what would happen if all vehicles using the three major un-tolled James 
River crossings (the Route 17 Bridge, the Monitor-Merrimac Memorial Bridge-
Tunnel and the Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel) were subjected to tolls. These 
three James River crossings (which we abbreviate as RT17, MMMBT and HRBT, 
respectively) likely would be tolled if a third crossing over the James River were 
constructed. A third crossing would have cost $2.7 billion a decade ago and 
quite simply neither the Commonwealth nor the region possessed such a revenue 
source.
Refer back to the commuting matrix data found in Table 1. Let’s use Hampton 
as an instructive example. As Table 3 reveals, a total of 15,883 people live 
in Hampton, but are employed in the five major Southside cities: Chesapeake, 
Norfolk, Portsmouth, Suffolk and Virginia Beach. It would be nearly impossible 
for these commuters to avoid paying tolls unless they carpool, use mass 
transportation or telecommute. There also is a reverse flow: 16,526 people 
live in one of the five Southside cities, but are employed in Hampton. Hence, a 
total of 32,409 people with connections to Hampton would be affected by tolls 
on RT17, MMMBT and HRBT. The comparable number for Newport News is 
38,829. The total for the two Peninsula cities is 71,238.  
Thus, 71,238 is the average daily number of people who 
live in either Hampton or Newport News, but are employed 
Southside plus those people that live Southside, but are 
employed in either Hampton or Newport News.12 Most of these 
people would pay a toll – twice a day – if RT17, the MMMBT 
and the HRBT were tolled in order to pay for a third crossing.
If approximately 20 percent of these commuters carpool, use mass transportation 
or telecommute, then we still are left with about 57,000 vehicles that cross 
the James River each day because of their employment. Add to this perhaps 
25,000 daily business trips and about the same number of discretionary trips, 
and the total average estimated trips nears 110,000.  
12  Note that there are other people who live or work in locations such as Poquoson, James City County and 
Williamsburg that also commute across the James River.  
“My recommendation would be to toll all 4 crossings with 
electronic toll collection, with dynamic pricing (congestion 
pricing, with all the revenues utilized only on the 4 crossings) 
based on time-of-day and day-of-week, designed to optimize 
the usage of all 4 crossings, with a price structure that would 
pay for the entire total cost (debt service on toll revenue bonds) 
of the Third Hampton Roads Crossing project, justifying the 
re-tolling of the JRB and HRBT on the basis that the Third 
Crossing would provide them traffic relief as well as revenues for 
maintenance, and for providing an adjustable optimal traffic 
balance over all 4 crossings.” Scott M. Kozel, “Roads to the 
Future,” April 10, 2005, http://www.roadstothefuture.com/
HR_Crossing_Study.html#PPP-2001
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TABLE 3
WORKERS CROSSING THE JAMES RIVER ON A DAILY BASIS: 
THE FLOW OF MAJOR CITY WORKERS OVER THE RT17 
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Newport News Total: 38,829
To the Southside Total 31,367 To the Peninsula Total 39,871
Grand Total, “to and from”: 71,238
Source: James V. Koch, “The Different Impact of Tolls on the City of Portsmouth,” Jan. 6, 2014
One can quibble with the precise nature of these estimates; they are 
approximations. Even so, the broad lessons of these numbers can 
be grasped easily. The cities and counties of our region are highly 
interdependent. Anything that reduces or frustrates this economic 
interdependence will make us worse off. Significant tolls on 
the three currently non-tolled James River crossings would fall 
into that category because they would increase costs, diminish 
the size of our market, reduce labor mobility and cause our 
incomes to stagnate or decline. Viewed from a national perch, 
significant James River tolls would do much to make our 
region noncompetitive.
Summing It Up
A variety of independent studies have predicted that the overall economic 
impact of the DTT/MTT/MLK project on Hampton Roads will be positive. These 
studies rely upon “present value” estimates that collapse future revenues and 
costs into current dollars so that, for example, costs and revenues in 2040 can 
be compared to costs and revenues in 2016. This is conventional practice in 
economics and finance, and the studies cannot be faulted for their methodology. 
The conclusion, however, is that this project, when completed, will be good for 
our region.  
However, a finding that discounted benefits of the project 
exceed its discounted costs for Hampton Roads as a region 
does not guarantee that all cities and counties in our region 
will experience the same proportionate benefits and costs. 
Indeed, perhaps the most important lesson here is that the 
benefits and costs of the project are unequally distributed 
across Hampton Roads. Much depends upon the locations where people 
actually live and work, which businesses and institutions attract out-of-town 
customers and guests, and the behavior of discretionary drivers.
Norfolk, Portsmouth and Suffolk are the cities most affected by the tolls. 
Portsmouth in particular appealed to the Commonwealth for relief, and Gov. 
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Terry McAuliffe delayed the full onset of the tolls until 2016 by providing the 
project with what has been advertised as $82 million in toll revenue subsidies. 
Prospects for significant long-term financial assistance to the cities are not good, 
however.
Accordingly, the cities should consider:
•  Subsidizing or rebating portions of tolls paid by citizens or 
employees. Moffatt and Nichols’ useful 2012 report to Portsmouth focused 
on ways that this city itself might subsidize or rebate toll payments.13 The cities 
should consider jointly advocating a state income tax credit for cumulative 
tolls paid by an individual above a certain level, say, $250 annually. This tax 
credit easily could be tied to the size of someone’s taxable income in order to 
focus it upon lower-income individuals and households. This would constitute 
a drain on the Commonwealth’s treasury, but the drain would be much smaller 
and more distributed over time than, say, a request for an additional $100 
million in cash or debt contribution by the Commonwealth to the project. This 
might appeal to toll payers elsewhere in the Commonwealth. The cities also 
could rebate their own property taxes and the like on much the same basis.
•  Additional tolling time periods. Daily vehicle traffic through the DTT 
and MTT varies up to 30 percent during a typical week and much more than 
this during a single day. ERCO has responded to these data by developing a 
two-time period model – peak hours and non-peak hours – in terms of the tolls 
it will charge. Experience at other toll sites nationally suggests that as many as 
four distinct tolling time periods may be optimal.  
•  Additional tolling time periods would not cost ERCO revenue if the demand 
for tolled travel were “unit elastic” or better. Practically, this means that a 10 
percent reduction in tolls must result in a more than 10 percent increase in 
toll customers, or a 20 percent reduction in tolls must cause a more than 20 
percent increase in toll customers. 
•  The cities should request that ERCO experiment with additional tolling time 
periods to determine the reaction of drivers. The aim would be to attract 
13   “City of Portsmouth Policy and Legislative Recommendations: Midtown and Downtown Tunnel Toll 
Implementation,” Moffatt and Nichols, Aug. 27, 2012.
more discretionary drivers (for example, those who might patronize a store or 
restaurant, attend church or visit friends).  
•  Enhanced public transportation. The cities should do their utmost to 
publicize Hampton Roads Transit’s Traffix website, www.gohrt.com/services/
traffix, where prospective car poolers can make contact with each other. 
A three-person car pool slices two-thirds of the cost from the tolls paid by a 
single passenger vehicle. Further, the cities should explore additional Elizabeth 
River bus and ferry service with HRT.  
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES: 
COMPETING AGAINST OURSELVES?
As Companies Seek Tax Deals, Governments Pay High Price
– Louise Story, The New York Times (Dec. 1, 2012)
A
ided and abetted by the media, nearly all of us have done it. We count the number of new firms attracted to our area in a given year and then use that 
number as a thermometer of the economic health and vitality of the region. To be sure, we know that other things such as national economic conditions 
and, in the case of Hampton Roads, defense spending, are so important that they can overwhelm the efforts of even the most energetic and successful 
economic developers to attract new firms. Nevertheless, the number of new firms attracted to an area remains one of the most popular measures of 
economic health.
Counting new businesses is easy, but often is deceptive for some of the reasons 
just noted. Fundamentally, however, the single-minded focus of economic 
developers on attracting new firms may be misguided. Spending an equivalent 
number of dollars on helping existing firms expand, or incubating startup firms 
or commercializing basic research usually is a more productive strategy in 
terms of generating jobs and expanding the tax base. Further, as we will see, 
attempts to attract new firms not only can be expensive, but also can result in 
counterproductive bidding of one governmental unit against another. Finally, the 
rationale for government choosing favorites and providing financial assistance to 
one firm, but not another, in a roughly equivalent situation is shaky.  
In this chapter, we look at our regional economic development programs at 
the policy level. We attempt to assess the overall productivity of our local and 
regional efforts (which often cooperate with those of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia) and then ask the obvious questions: Do these programs represent a 
sound investment of scarce public and private funds? Are they worth it? And, 
what are the alternatives?
The longstanding premise that has motivated most local, 
regional and state economic development programs – “Let’s 
go out and attract new firms in order to bolster the economy” 
– now is being challenged by those who argue that it is more 
productive to: (1) “garden” and expand existing firms; (2) 
incubate startup firms; and (3) commercialize and bring to 
market the basic research emanating from the Jefferson 
Laboratory, NASA Langley, Eastern Virginia Medical School 
and Old Dominion University. In this new, emerging view, the efforts 
of organizations such as the Hampton Roads Economic Development Alliance 
(HREDA) either should be refocused, or a new hybrid organization capable of 
these broader mandates should be created.  
Nationally, the most economically dynamic regions tend to do all of these 
things well. They cultivate existing firms and incubate new firms even while 
attempting to attract new firms. They simultaneously stimulate and encourage 
the commercialization of basic research being undertaken at their academic 
institutions. They may also utilize economic development incentives as a part of 
their growth strategy, but this is not the centerpiece of their overall approach to 
economic development.  
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A current hot concept in economic development is the “innovation district,” 
which Fortune magazine describes as the clustering of “cutting-edge research 
institutions and R&D-intensive companies with start-ups and business incubators. 
They are physically compact, transit-accessible, and offer mixed-use housing, 
office, and retail.” (Katz and Wagner in Fortune, June 13, 2014). The only 
area of Hampton Roads that even approaches this description currently is the 
Old Dominion University/Eastern Virginia Medical School/Granby Street 
corridor, though some of these building blocks exist on the Peninsula because of 
the existence of NASA Langley Research Center, the Thomas Jefferson National 
Accelerator Facility and the incipient Virginia Tech development; and in Virginia 
Beach along Princess Anne Road because of the burgeoning medical complex 
and the Virginia Beach Higher Education Center. Cultivation and promotion of 
these developments, rather than attempting to attract a large corporation, would 
require a reorientation of our regional economic development efforts.
A Quick Scan Of Our 
Economic Development 
Efforts
Virginia, along with its cities, counties and regions, works aggressively to lure 
new businesses and in 2012 spent an estimated $1.89 billion on such efforts. 
Even so, the Commonwealth has eschewed very large economic incentives such 
as those that assisted South Carolina in attracting a BMW production facility 
and Alabama in attracting a Mercedes production plant.  
Media campaigns, recruiting trips, worldwide offices, conventions and a variety 
of incentives all are utilized by the Commonwealth and Hampton Roads to 
attract new business activity. Nevertheless, even though the 50 states 
are spending an estimated $50 billion per year on economic 
development incentives, and regional and local governments 
an estimated $30 billion more, there is surprisingly little 
agreement as to what works best, or even what works at all, 
in attracting new businesses from other locations.1 Indeed, the 
academic consensus on the subject is that economic development incentives 
seldom determine company locational decisions.
Virginia typically has not chosen to play in the “let’s pay out large incentives to 
attract a new firm” arena. The actual financial grants awarded for economic 
development purposes by the Commonwealth usually have not been sizable. 
1   Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, “Tax Incentives: Costly for States, Drag on the Nation,” http://itep.
org/itep_reports/2013/08/tax-incentives-costly-for-states-drag-on-the-nation.php#.U4XKpXy-l5cl, for the $50 
million figure, and Louise Story, The New York Times, Dec. 1, 2012, for the remaining regional and local $30 
billion. For additional evidence on the questionable productivity of economic development financial incentives, 
see Yoonsoo Lee, “Geographical Redistribution of U.S. Manufacturing and the Role of State Development 
Policy,” Journal of Urban Economics, 64 (2008); Terry F. Buss, “The Effect of State Tax Incentives on Economic 
Growth and Firm Location Decisions: An Overview of the Literature,” Economic Development Quarterly, 15 
(2001); and Carlos F. Liard-Muriente, “U.S. and E.U. Experiences of Tax Incentives,” Area 186 (2007).  
What is meant when one talks about the “gardening” of 
existing firms? The notion originated in Littleton, Colo., in 
the 1980s and was popularized by MIT’s David Birch (“The 
Job Generation Process,” 1979), who argued that most new 
jobs in any community are generated by a small cadre of 
local businesses, which he later termed “gazelles.” Littleton 
and other “gardening communities” made life easier for 
their small businesses by giving them access to information 
and high-speed Internet connections, arranging sessions 
for them with financial institutions and venture capital 
firms, connecting them to academic, engineering, computer, 
Internet and accounting expertise, and providing them with 
very short-term tax incentives. A frequent example involves 
raising the visibility of a small firm on the Internet by 
optimizing its presence in Internet search engine activities. 
The focus is on second-stage firms that have demonstrated 
solid possibilities for growth, but now could benefit from 
assistance. Today, the Edward Lowe Foundation is a 
particularly energetic supporter of economic gardening 
and states that it is “an entrepreneur-oriented approach to 
economic prosperity.” www.edwardlowe.org
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A November 2012 study by the Virginia Joint Legislative Audit and Review 
Commission (JLARC) found that most of the 3,372 financial grants for economic 
development awarded in the Commonwealth by state government between 
fiscal years 2002 to 2011 averaged only a bit more than $200,000.2 While 
seven recipients received more than $20 million each, most received less than 
$100,000. Table 1 lists the 50 businesses in Hampton Roads that received 
incentive grants from the beginning of 2009 to the end of 2013.
The Commonwealth and local governmental units operate 
21 primary economic development programs (see Table 2). A 
host of state agencies exist to administer these programs. Any 
city, county or region worthy of the name has an economic 
development agency and one or more programs designed 
to attract and retain businesses to that jurisdiction. Table 3 
summarizes the state, regional and local agencies and groups that profess 
economic development to be one of their significant aims.  
This veritable blizzard of programs and agencies naturally provokes the 
question: Are we getting our money’s worth? Do these programs work? Do they 
invest money wisely? Can they demonstrate results?  
To be sure, we are not the first to ask these questions, nor are these questions 
unique either to Hampton Roads or to the Commonwealth of Virginia. However, 
given the only “so-so” performance of our regional economy, it is appropriate 
once again to raise these questions and to summarize the evidence.  
2  Review of State Economic Development Grants (Richmond, Virginia: JLARC, November 2012, http://jlarc.
virginia.gov/reports/Rpt431.pdf).
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TABLE 1
VIRGINIA ANNOUNCEMENTS OF EMPLOYMENT CREATION AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT FOR PROJECTS RECEIVING INCENTIVES 
IN HAMPTON ROADS, CALENDAR YEARS 2009-2013  









AMAC Leasing LLC Southampton County M N 26 $5.60 02/2013 0 $0.300 Rail
Atomized Products Group Inc. Chesapeake M N 26 $4.30 07/2013 0 $0.100 GOF
Bauer Compressors Inc.* Norfolk M E 130 $15.00 03/2013 0 $0.100 EZ
Canon Virginia Inc.* Newport News M E 0 $27.00 06/2013 12 $3.000 VIP
DESMI* Chesapeake M E 34 $1.90 10/2013 0 $0.031 VJIP
Eska Graphic Board* Chesapeake M E 18 $0.55 03/2013 0 $0.015 VJIP
Franklin Lumber LLC Isle of Wight County M N 72 $14.80 06/2013 0 $0.000  
Greystone Inc. James City County M E 34 $1.50 06/2013 0 $0.025 VJIP
Hamilton Consulting Corp. Chesapeake N E 58 $0.50 06/2013 0 $0.058 VJIP
Hampton Farms/Severn Peanut Co. Southampton County M N 60 $5.50 08/2013 0 $0.200 GOF
High Liner Foods Inc.* Newport News M E 57 $6.60 05/2013 0 $0.501 GOF/VJIP/EZ
Liebherr Mining Equipment Newport 
News Co.* Newport News M E 174 $45.43 02/2013 0 $1.300 GOF/VIP
Lipton* Suffolk M E 0 $96.20 03/2013 0 $1.000 VIP
Mills Marine & Ship Repair, LLC Suffolk M E 142 $3.00 04/2013 0 $0.156 VJIP
Oceaneering International Inc. Chesapeake M E 67 $32.90 11/2013 463 $3.090 GOF/VIP/Road
PRUFREX Innovative Power Products 
GmbH* Virginia Beach M N 60 $7.33 07/2013 0 $0.200 GOF/VJIP
Sutherland Global Services Chesapeake N E 275 $6.87 01/2013 0 $0.193 VJIP
17       1,233 $274.98 2013 Totals   $10.269  
Notes:
*Indicates foreign affiliation
Type: New or Expansion
Mfg: Manufacturing or Nonmanufacturing
2013 announcements are preliminary.
All announcements are subject to revision.
GOF - Governor Opportunity Fund
VIP - Virginia Investment Partnership Grant
VEDIG - Virginia Economic Development Incentive Grant
VJIP - Virginia Jobs Investment Program
Rail - Rail Industrial Access Program
MBFJTC - Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit
EZ - Enterprise Zone Job Creation Grant
Road - Economic Development Access Program
Source: Virginia Economic Development Partnership
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TABLE 1
VIRGINIA ANNOUNCEMENTS OF EMPLOYMENT CREATION AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT FOR PROJECTS RECEIVING INCENTIVES 
IN HAMPTON ROADS, CALENDAR YEARS 2009-2013  









Faneuil Inc. Portsmouth N N 50 $1.00 08/2012 0 $0.000  
Hobbs & Associates Norfolk N E 20 $3.35 12/2012 0 $0.016 VJIP
La Tienda James City County N E 32 $0.17 12/2012 0 $0.023 VJIP
Manufacturing & Design Technology 
Inc. Chesapeake M E 21 $1.80 12/2012 0 $0.018 VJIP
Mosquito Joe Virginia Beach N E 16 $0.21 12/2012 0 $0.014 VJIP
Sumitomo Machinery Corp. of 
America* Chesapeake M E 96 $13.25 01/2012 0 $0.152 VJIP
Tak Investments Inc. (ST Tissue) Isle of Wight County M N 85 $60.00 07/2012 0 $0.889 GOF/VJIP/EZ
Virginia Packing LLC James City County M E 18 $0.12 12/2012 0 $0.013 VJIP
Virginia Toy and Novelty Co. Virginia Beach N E 52 $0.13 12/2012 0 $0.037 VJIP
9       390 $80.03 2012 Totals   $1.161  
Ace Hardware Corp. Suffolk N E 75 $14.00 09/2011 0 $0.224 GOF/VJIP
Applied Process Technology 
International, LLC* James City County N E 30 $0.35 05/2011 0 $0.030 VJIP
Bay Diesel & Generator Chesapeake N E 18 $1.00 04/2011 0 $0.018 VJIP
California Cartage Co., LLC Suffolk N N 75 $12.50 08/2011 0 $0.056 VJIP
CDYNE Corp. Chesapeake N E 88 $0.10 04/2011 0 $0.071 VJIP
Eagle Aviation Technologies Inc. Hampton M E 30 $0.10 09/2011 0 $0.030 VJIP
Enviva LP Southampton County M N 72 $91.00 11/2011 0 $0.989
GOF/MBFJTC/
Road
IMS:GEAR Virginia Inc.* Virginia Beach M E 80 $35.50 12/2011 0 $0.500 GOF/VIP
Notes:
*Indicates foreign affiliation
Type: New or Expansion
Mfg: Manufacturing or Nonmanufacturing
2013 announcements are preliminary.
All announcements are subject to revision.
GOF - Governor Opportunity Fund
VIP - Virginia Investment Partnership Grant
VEDIG - Virginia Economic Development Incentive Grant
VJIP - Virginia Jobs Investment Program
Rail - Rail Industrial Access Program
MBFJTC - Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit
EZ - Enterprise Zone Job Creation Grant
Road - Economic Development Access Program
Source: Virginia Economic Development Partnership
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TABLE 1
VIRGINIA ANNOUNCEMENTS OF EMPLOYMENT CREATION AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT FOR PROJECTS RECEIVING INCENTIVES 
IN HAMPTON ROADS, CALENDAR YEARS 2009-2013  









International Paper Isle of Wight County M N 213 $83.00 05/2011 0 $0.563 GOF/VJIP
Katoen Natie* Norfolk N N 225 $12.00 03/2011 0 $0.466 VJIP/EZ
Keurig Green Mountain Inc. Isle of Wight County M N 800 $180.00 10/2011 0 $6.640 GOF/VJIP/EZ
KITCO Fiber Optics Virginia Beach M E 128 $0.10 04/2011 0 $0.103 VJIP
Scientific Research Corp. Chesapeake N E 89 $2.20 03/2011 0 $0.082 VJIP
13       1,923 $431.85 2011 Totals   $9.772  
InMotion Hosting Inc. Virginia Beach N E 275 $0.25 09/2010 0 $0.399 VJIP/MBFJTC
KmX USA* Accomack County M E 9 $5.25 09/2010 0 $0.102 Rail
MYMIC LLC Portsmouth N E 90 $0.30 06/2010 0 $0.090 VJIP
Orion Air Group Newport News N E 51 $4.00 05/2010 57 $0.051 VJIP
Solutionz Conferencing Inc. Williamsburg N E 19 $2.00 12/2010 0 $0.030 VJIP
5       444 $11.80 2010 Totals   $0.671  
Alcoa Howmet Hampton M E 25 $25.00 06/2009 0 $0.519 VIP/VJIP
Avis Budget Group Inc. Virginia Beach N E 70 $0.60 03/2009 0 $0.036 VJIP
Cobham Composite Products* Suffolk M N 198 $13.20 03/2009 0 $0.839 GOF/VJIP/EZ
Greenwood RRST, LLC Southampton County N N 10 $2.20 12/2009 0 $0.047 Rail
Owens-Illinois Inc. James City County M E 0 $20.00 04/2009 180 $0.054 VJIP
Southampton Terminal, LLC Southampton County N E 35 $3.20 05/2009 0 $0.000  
6       338 $64.20 2009 Totals   $1.494  
50       4,328 $862.86 Grand Totals   $23.367  
Notes:
*Indicates foreign affiliation
Type: New or Expansion
Mfg: Manufacturing or Nonmanufacturing
2013 announcements are preliminary.
All announcements are subject to revision.
GOF - Governor Opportunity Fund
VIP - Virginia Investment Partnership Grant
VEDIG - Virginia Economic Development Incentive Grant
VJIP - Virginia Jobs Investment Program
Rail - Rail Industrial Access Program
MBFJTC - Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit
EZ - Enterprise Zone Job Creation Grant
Road - Economic Development Access Program
Source: Virginia Economic Development Partnership
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TABLE 2
INCENTIVES FOR BUSINESS LOCATION AND EXPANSION
Governor’s Opportunity Fund
The Governor’s Opportunity Fund (GOF) is a discretionary incentive available to the governor to secure a 
business location or expansion project for Virginia. Grants are awarded to localities on a local matching basis 
with the expectation that the grant will result in a favorable location decision for the Commonwealth.
Governor’s Agriculture and Forestry 
Industries Development Fund
The Governor’s Agriculture and Forestry Industries Development Fund (AFID) offers strategic grants made to 
businesses that add value to Virginia-grown agricultural and forest products. AFID grants are made at the 
discretion of the governor with the expectation that a grant awarded to a political subdivision will result in a 
new or expanded processing/value-added facility for Virginia-grown agricultural or forest products, and with 
the expectation that the grant will be critical to the success of the project. 
Virginia Investment Partnership Act
The Virginia Investment Partnership (VIP) Grant and the Major Eligible Employer Grant (MEE) are discretionary 
performance incentives designed to encourage continued capital investment by Virginia companies, resulting 
in added capacity, modernization, increased productivity or the creation, development and utilization of 
advanced technology. 
Virginia Economic Development Incentive 
Grant
The Virginia Economic Development Incentive Grant (VEDIG) is a discretionary performance incentive, 
designed to assist and encourage companies to invest and create new employment opportunities by locating 
significant headquarters, administrative or service-sector operations in Virginia. 
Clean Energy Manufacturing Incentive 
Grant
The Clean Energy Manufacturing Incentive Grant (CEMIG) is a discretionary performance incentive, designed 
to encourage clean-energy manufacturers to grow in Virginia. 
Virginia Jobs Investment Program
The Virginia Jobs Investment Program (VJIP) offers customized recruiting and training assistance to companies 
that are creating new jobs or experiencing technological change. The program is designed to reduce the 
human resource development cost of new and expanding companies. 
Corporate Income Tax Credits
Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit Recycling Equipment Tax Credit
Day Care Facility Investment Tax Credit Worker Retraining Tax Credit
Virginia Port Tax Credit Programs Research and Development Tax Credit
Green Job Creation Tax Credit
Sales and Use Tax Exemptions Virginia offers some of the broadest sales and use tax exemptions in the United States. 
Property Tax Exemptions
Virginia does not tax intangible property, manufacturers’ inventory and manufacturers’ furniture, fixtures and 
corporate aircraft. 
Economic Development Access Program
Administered by the Virginia Department of Transportation, this program assists localities in providing adequate 
road access to new and expanding basic employers. 
Sources: Virginia Economic Development Partnership (VEDP) and the Joint Legislative Audit Review Commission (JLARC). Additional information is available at www.yesvirginia.org.
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TABLE 2
INCENTIVES FOR BUSINESS LOCATION AND EXPANSION
Rail Industrial Access Program
This program provides funds to construct railroad tracks to new or substantially expanded industrial and 
commercial projects. 
Transportation Partnership Opportunity 
Fund
TPOF is a discretionary grant available for transportation issues related to unique economic development 
projects. 
Virginia Small Business Financing 
Authority
VSBFA offers programs to provide businesses with access to capital needed for growth and expansion.
Enterprise Zones
Virginia’s Enterprise Zone program provides state and local incentives to businesses that invest and create jobs 
within Virginia’s enterprise zones, which are located throughout the state. 
Technology Zones
Virginia authorizes its communities to establish technology zones to encourage growth in targeted industries. 
Currently, 30 cities and counties and six towns have created zones throughout the state.
Foreign Trade Zones
Virginia offers six foreign trade zones designed to encourage businesses to participate in international trade by 
effectively eliminating or reducing customs duties. Also, numerous subzones are provided and additional ones 
can be designated to enhance the trade capabilities of specific companies. 
Defense Production Zones
Virginia authorizes its communities to establish local defense production zones to benefit businesses engaged 
in the design, development or production of materials, components or equipment required to meet the needs of 
national defense. Companies deemed ancillary to or in support of the aforementioned categories would also 
apply.
Tobacco Indemnification and Community 
Revitalization Commission
Tobacco Region Opportunity Fund
Virginia Film Office Governor’s Motion Picture Opportunity Fund
Virginia Coalfield Economic Development 
Authority
Coalfield Regional Opportunity Fund
Virginia Port Tax Credits
Port Volume Increase Tax Credit available to companies that increase port cargo through public or private 
facilities in Virginia by a minimum of 5 percent in a single year.
Barge and Rail Usage Tax Credit for companies that move cargo by barge or rail.
International Trade Facility Tax Credit for new job creation or capital investment in an international trade facility 
as a result of moving 10 percent more cargo through a Virginia Port Authority facility.
Port of Virginia Economic and Infrastructure Development Grant Program for companies that locate in the port 
zone and create at least 25 new jobs involved in maritime commerce.
Sources: Virginia Economic Development Partnership (VEDP) and the Joint Legislative Audit Review Commission (JLARC). Additional information is available at www.yesvirginia.org.
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TABLE 3
MAJOR AGENCIES INVOLVED IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES IN HAMPTON ROADS  
State Level
Virginia Economic Development Partnership
Department of Business Assistance
Department of Housing and Community Development
Department of Rail and Public Transportation
Tobacco Indemnification and Community Revitalization Commission
Virginia Coalfield Economic Development Authority
Virginia Film Office
Center for Innovative Technology
Regional Level
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce
Hampton Roads Economic Development Alliance
Hampton Roads Planning District Commission
Port of Virginia
Local Level
Local Chambers of Commerce City of Virginia Beach Economic Development
City of Chesapeake Economic Development City of Williamsburg Economic Development Authority
City of Hampton Economic Development County of Gloucester Economic Development
City of Newport News Economic Development 
Authority
County of Isle of Wight Economic Development
City of Norfolk Economic Development County of James City Economic Development
City of Poquoson Economic Development County of Surry Economic Development
City of Portsmouth Economic Development County of York Economic Development
City of Suffolk Economic Development Franklin Southampton Economic Development
Other Organizations
Future of Hampton Roads Inc.
Hampton Roads Community Foundation and constituent committees
Hampton Roads Planning District Commission
Technology Council of Hampton Roads
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The Economic Development 
Incentive Scorecard for 
Hampton Roads
A logical place for us to start our analysis is with the Hampton Roads Economic 
Development Alliance (HREDA), which describes itself as “the recruitment 
organization tasked with attracting new opportunities for the entire Hampton 
Roads region.” HREDA’s future is uncertain for three reasons. First, the Great 
Recession that began in 2008 understandably diminished the Alliance’s ability 
to “score” in terms of attracting new firms to the region. Second, and not 
unrelated, HREDA’s financial viability depends substantially upon a per citizen 
assessment paid by each of the region’s cities; it seems likely that several cities 
will reduce or eliminate their payments to HREDA. Third, as noted above, some 
observers believe that HREDA’s focus on attracting new firms to the region is off 
target and that either HREDA or a successor organization instead should place 
emphasis on the “gardening” of existing firms, incubation of new firms and 
commercialization of research.  
This past year (2013) was a more active one for the Alliance, however. Staff 
report they met with 342 corporate decision makers and 140 site selection 
consultants in 12 countries and 16 states.
Many recruitment efforts take years to reach fruition and 
therefore one should not place undue emphasis on the 
performance of an economic development authority in any 
single year. In 2013, HREDA (which has a proposed budget of 
$2.59 million for 2014) announced six significant successful 
firms with whom it had worked to convince them to locate 
in Hampton Roads. In addition, 47 other announcements were made by 
the Commonwealth of new or expanded businesses for the region. Table 4 
traces the number of announcements and resulting expected job growth and 
investment for the region for the past five years. There has been a consistency 
in the number of new companies attracted to the region, but the number of new 
employees and the capital investment have varied over the years without any 
apparent trend.
TABLE 4
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ANNOUNCEMENTS OF JOB 
CREATION AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 
CALENDAR YEARS 2009-2013
Year Companies Employment Investment
2009 61 3,023 $467.14 million
2010 51 2,430 $129.10 million
2011 56 3,125 $599.33 million
2012 57 1,852 $176.14 million
2013 53 2,075 $525.33 million
Totals 278 12,505 $1,897.04 million
Source: Virginia Economic Development Partnership
Table 5 summarizes the general types of economic development incentives that 
were offered to firms that chose to locate in Hampton Roads between 2009 
and 2013. Note that some of the incentives involved road and transportation 
improvements, including railway improvements. The deals made in Hampton 
Roads involved an estimated $863 million of new investment in plant, 
equipment and improvements. An estimated 4,328 new jobs were generated 
by these projects.  
These are positive results, but it’s also worth noting that according to JLARC, no 
more than 15 percent of corporate expansion or relocation deals over the last 
10 years in Virginia have included tax incentive programs. These deals were 
developed primarily with larger companies that JLARC estimated have created 
40 percent of all new jobs in Virginia.  
Table 6 provides us with a flavor of job creation results for 
Hampton Roads. Total “new job” announcements were 
made by Virginia involving 12,505 new jobs in our region. 
As just noted, 4,328 of these jobs (or about 35 percent) 
involved economic development incentives being granted to 
the firms creating the jobs. The remaining did not. Where 
new investment in plant, equipment and improvements was 
concerned, economic development incentives were attached 
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to about 45 percent of the investments announced by the 
Commonwealth. Only 18 percent of the companies involved 
in these job announcements actually received economic 
development incentives from state or local authorities. The total 
value of incentives provided from all sources during this time 
period was $23.367 million, or about $5,400 per job.3
3  The results in Table 5 reflect the definition of Hampton Roads utilized by the Virginia Economic Development 
Partnership, which includes in its Region 8 (Hampton Roads) the jurisdictions of Accomack County, Chesapeake, 
Franklin, Gloucester County, Hampton, Isle of Wight County, James City County, Newport News, Norfolk, 
Northampton County, Poquoson, Portsmouth, Southampton County, Suffolk, Virginia Beach, Williamsburg and 
York County. This is not the same as the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) definition utilized by the U.S. Census.
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TABLE 5




























2013 17 1,233 $274.98 $1.920 $5.550 $0.000 $1.534 $0.300 $0.000 $0.315 $0.650 $0.000
2012 9 390 $80.03 $0.200 $0.000 $0.000 $0.437 $0.000 $0.000 $0.524 $0.000 $0.000
2011 13 1,923 $431.85 $4.950 $0.300 $0.000 $1.847 $0.000 $0.039 $1.986 $0.650 $0.000
2010 5 444 $11.80 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 $0.345 $0.102 $0.225 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000
2009 6 338 $64.20 $0.300 $0.500 $0.000 $0.349 $0.047 $0.000 $0.299 $0.000 $0.000
Grand 
Total
50 4,328 $862.86 $7.370 $6.350 $0.000 $4.512 $0.448 $0.264 $3.123 $1.300 $0.000
Source: Virginia Economic Development Partnership
Note: 2013 announcements are preliminary. GOF - Governor Opportunity Fund MBFJTC - Major Business Facility Job Tax Credit
VIP - Virginia Investment Partnership Grant EZ - Enterprise Zone Job Creation Grant
VEDIG - Virginia Economic Development Incentive Grant Road - Economic Development Access Program
VJIP - Virginia Jobs Investment Program TROF - Tobacco Region Opportunity Fund
TABLE 6
VIRGINIA ANNOUNCEMENTS OF EMPLOYMENT CREATION AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT, 
HAMPTON ROADS PROJECTS, CALENDAR YEARS 2009-2013
Total Projects Projects with Incentives Percentages
Year Companies Employment Investment Companies Employment Investment Companies Employment Investment
2013 53 2,075 $525.33 17 1,233 $274.98 32% 59% 52%
2012 57 1,852 $176.14 9 390 $80.03 16% 21% 45%
2011 56 3,125 $599.33 13 1,923 $431.85 23% 62% 72%
2010 51 2,430 $129.10 5 444 $11.80 10% 18% 9%
2009 61 3,023 $467.14 6 338 $64.20 10% 11% 14%
Total 278 12,505 $1,897.04 50 4,328 $862.86 18% 35% 45%
Note: Investments in millions
Source: Virginia Economic Development Partnership
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Mixed Evidence Where 
Incentives Are Concerned
Virginia periodically appears on the Forbes magazine list of the Best States for 
Business and currently is ranked No. 1. Forbes has developed an index that 
looks at six factors influencing the business climate: (1) costs, (2) labor supply, 
(3) regulatory environment, (4) current economic climate, (5) growth prospects 
and (6) quality of life.4 This past year, Virginia was the only state to rank in 
the top five in at least four of the six areas – the Commonwealth missed only 
on costs and growth prospects. Hence, it is not a difficult case for Hampton 
Roads economic developers to argue that the region is an attractive place to 
do business. In its 2013 list of 200 best places in the country for business and 
careers, Forbes ranked the Virginia Beach/Norfolk/Newport News SMA as 
No. 77. The Richmond SMA was ranked 56th and the Roanoke SMA 99th. 
In many ways Hampton Roads, broadly defined, has an attractive story to tell:
• The Port of Virginia is the largest natural deepwater harbor on earth.
• The region is within a day’s drive of 97 million consumers.
•  Eight universities and four community colleges serve more than 100,000 
students in the region.
•  The growth rate of federally funded research and development expenditures in 
the region is high.
•  The region has a high concentration of federal laboratories and installations.
•  The labor force includes many military veterans, who are viewed as talented, 
reliable and disciplined.
•  The region is rich with cultural opportunities.
In the end, are these strengths of Hampton Roads what really 
count, or do the economic incentives that are proffered to firms 
matter more? Virtually every review of existing studies that 
4 www.forbes.com/best-states-for-business
focus on economic development incentives points to factors 
such as those listed above as being the critical determinants 
of why firms choose to locate one place or another. While firms 
pondering a new location value incentives and often negotiate vigorously to 
receive them, relatively few mention incentives as being critical to their final 
decision. In January 2014, the Pew Research Center issued a fact sheet titled 
“Evaluating State Tax Incentives: How to Measure Economic Impact” (The Pew 
Charitable Trusts, Feb. 7, 2014) about tax incentive programs in Minnesota, 
Louisiana and Massachusetts, which are regarded as “models for other states to 
follow when measuring the results of their own incentives.”5 Pew noted:
•  In Minnesota, evaluators estimated that 79 percent of the jobs created at 
companies receiving incentives were likely to have been generated without 
the incentives. Jobs created cost the state more than $26,000, or about five 
times more than originally estimated, according to the analysts.
•  Louisiana’s evaluation of its Enterprise Zone program found that in certain 
economic sectors, 90 percent of new jobs created in the program were 
displacing jobs with other employers. Evaluators concluded that the program 
had created about 3,000 jobs instead of the more than 9,000 jobs that 
participating businesses had reported.
•  An analysis of the Massachusetts film industry tax credit reported by the Pew 
Research Center found that the more than 5,900 jobs created from 2006 
through 2011 cost the state $326 million, which had to be offset by cuts 
elsewhere in the budget. The evaluation estimated that these cuts cost the state 
more than 3,700 jobs, leaving Massachusetts with a net gain of 2,200 jobs 
for its investment, making each job gain much more costly than had been 
estimated earlier.
There are other skeptical assessments of the effectiveness of economic incentives 
as well. An Aug. 14, 2013, report by the Institute on Taxation and Economic 
Policy, titled “Tax Incentives: Costly for States, Drag on the Nation,” estimated 
that $50 billion is spent annually on tax incentives, but “the evidence suggests 
that tax incentives are of little benefit to the state and localities that offer them 
and are actually a drag on national economic growth.”
5  www.pewstates.org/research/fact-sheets/evaluating-state-tax-incentives-how-to-measure-economic-
impact-85899539342
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In 2012, New York Times reporters spent 10 months compiling data on state 
and local incentives provided to business. The Times found that there is little 
knowledge of whether the money is worth it because rarely is there tracking of 
how many jobs are created, and even with tracking “it is impossible to know 
whether the jobs would have been created without the aid.” (The New York 
Times, Dec. 1, 2012)
Professor Richard Florida (head of the Martin Prosperity 
Institute at the University of Toronto’s Rotman School of 
Management) analyzed the data gathered by The New 
York Times. In a Dec. 7, 2012, issue of The Atlantic Cities, he 
concluded, in an article titled “The Uselessness of Economic 
Development Incentives,” that “there is virtually no association 
between economic development incentives and any measure 
of economic performance.” Florida went on to say “companies typically 
select locations based on factors such as workforce, proximity to markets, and 
access to qualified suppliers, and then pit jurisdictions against one another to 
extract tax benefits and other incentives.”
The Tax Foundation publishes annually a State Business Tax Climate Index that 
ranks the states on more than 100 different variables in five areas of taxation 
(major business taxes, individual income taxes, sales taxes, unemployment 
insurance taxes and property taxes).6 The Foundation maintains that states with 
more competitive tax systems score well in the Index because they are best 
suited to generate economic growth. The Tax Foundation is critical of 
states that attempt to lure business with tax incentives and 
subsidies rather than broad-based tax reform that lowers 
rates overall and eliminates special tax breaks that suggest 
crony capitalism. It cites North Carolina, which agreed to $240 million 
worth of tax incentives to lure Dell to the state, only to have Dell close its plant 
after only four years. According to the Tax Foundation, “lawmakers create these 
deals under the banner of job creation and economic development, but the truth 
is that if a state needs to offer such packages, it is most likely covering for a 
woeful business tax climate. A far more effective approach is to systematically 
improve the business tax climate for the long term so as to improve the state’s 
competitiveness.” 
6 taxfoundation.org/article/2014-state-business-tax-climate-index
With respect to the general tax climate in Virginia, the Tax Foundation ranks 
Virginia 26th among the 50 states. Only a brief look at the Tax Foundation map 
(Figure 1) is needed for one to conclude that low taxes, per se, are not sufficient 
to generate high levels of economic growth. An attractive tax climate is exactly 
that – attractive – but many other factors also determine where people choose 
to live and where firms decide to locate. Table 7 records the attempts of several 
reputable organizations to take these other factors into account.
The Virginia Joint Legislative and Audit Review Commission undertook a review 
of the effectiveness of economic development incentive grants available in 
Virginia at the direction of the General Assembly and issued a report, “Review 
of State Economic Development Incentive Grants,” in November 2012. The 
researchers found the plethora of economic development programs, agencies 
and incentives in Virginia to be both overlapping and confusing. At least 
eight state agencies are involved as well as regional and local officials, as 
documented in this chapter.
JLARC researchers looked at several meta-reviews of 80 or 
more econometric studies published since 1979 and found 
these reviews concluded that incentive grants might sway, on 
average, 10 percent of the site location decisions of businesses 
that receive an award. While this is not the last word on a still hotly 
debated subject, JLARC staff concluded there is no empirical evidence to 
suggest “most or even the majority of business location decisions are swayed by 
incentive grants.”
While the report concluded “incentive grants appear to have a positive, but 
small impact on the site selection decisions of businesses relative to other 
considerations such as transportation and labor costs,” there is not a uniformity 
of data or practices among the many agencies involved to make a strong case 
for the importance of incentives to attract businesses.
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 2014124
FIGURE 1
TAX FOUNDATION 2014 STATE BUSINESS TAX CLIMATE INDEX
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TABLE 7
ALTERNATIVE RANKINGS OF THE STATES ON THEIR BUSINESS CLIMATES
Ranking
Forbes Best States for 
Business - 2013
Pollina Top 10 Pro-Business 
States - 2013
Tax Foundation Business Tax 
Climate - 2014
  1 Virginia Utah Wyoming
  2 North Dakota Nebraska South Dakota
  3 Utah North Dakota Nevada
  4 North Carolina Virginia Alaska
  5 Colorado Wyoming Florida
  6 Nebraska Kansas Washington
  7 Texas Indiana Montana
  8 Minnesota South Dakota New Hampshire
  9 Washington Missouri Utah
10 Georgia Alabama Indiana
26 Virginia
Notes:  Forbes says it measures costs, labor supply, regulatory environment, current economic climate, growth prospects and quality of life by examining 35 different variables. www.forbes.com/best-states-for-business 
Pollina Corp. specializes in business location. It says its ranking is based on 32 factors. http://www.pollina.com 
The Tax Foundation considers five different business taxes. http://taxfoundation.org/article/2014-state-business-tax-climate-index
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Lessons Learned?
CURTAIL THE USE OF TAX INCENTIVES
As we have seen, the weight of empirical evidence suggests 
that improving a state or region’s overall business climate is 
a more important spur to economic development than tax 
incentives. What are the alternatives? The old standbys surge back to the 
fore. We should think long term and improve K-12 schools, stimulate workforce 
development in community colleges and universities, promote research and 
development activities, enhance our transportation infrastructure, stimulate the 
development of cultural amenities and reduce crime, even while we ensure 
that our tax structure remains competitive. In essence, we need to 
improve the quality of our overall environment because, in 
the long term, this is what most effectively attracts and retains 
businesses. 
Reality intrudes on a persistent basis, however. Despite their apparent 
ineffectiveness, cutting back on the use of governmental tax and financial 
incentives could be politically risky to a governor or to members of the General 
Assembly if this lends the impression that they are not doing everything in their 
power to help their regional or state economies expand. Former Gov. Bob 
McDonnell’s “Bob’s for Jobs” slogan resonated well in the voting public even 
though there is general agreement that a one-term governor actually cannot 
do very much to influence the state’s economic climate during his/her term. 
Ironically, it usually is the next governor who either benefits from or is hurt by the 
previous governor’s economic development actions.
A statement by any elected official that jobs and economic development 
are his/her highest priority is likely to be well received, and most economic 
incentive programs, despite their questionable impacts, give the appearance 
that the elected official is serious. Successful elected officials understand 
that impatient constituents want action and they want it now. Investments 
in education, transportation, and research and development may have the 
greatest long-term effect, but don’t necessarily put food on the table today or 
pay mortgages. Therefore, pressures from supporters are likely to preserve and 
protect economic incentive payments far into the future. Economist John Maynard 
Keynes understood this demand for short-term action when he caustically noted, 
“In the long run, we are all dead.”  
THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA AND COOPERATION     
There is, however, yet another reason why the use of economic incentives 
oftentimes turns out to be unproductive. It is contained in the phenomenon that 
has become known as the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” and afflicts governments at 
all levels when they rush to offer financial incentives in order to attract specific 
businesses. When many cities, regions or states simultaneously 
romance prospective businesses and offer such incentives, 
they compete themselves into a situation in which the eventual 
price of such incentives is well above what would have 
occurred without that competition. This is an argument in 
favor of the existence of organizations such as the Hampton 
Roads Economic Development Alliance because they have the 
potential to diminish the equivalent of “auction fever” on eBay, 
whereby cities and counties compete against each other to 
attract a business.   
Coordination and cooperation can occur. Business leaders in the bi-state Kansas 
City community have made great progress in achieving cooperation in their 
economic development activities.   
This State of the Region report (page 95) contains a statistical matrix 
demonstrating that almost 65 percent of all job holders live in one city or county, 
but commute to another for their jobs. For example, 21,508 people holding 
jobs in Newport News live in Hampton, while 13,714 people holding jobs in 
Hampton live in Newport News. The bottom line is that one city or county’s job 
prosperity nearly always is shared with other cities and counties.  
Further, those who insist that all jobs be located in their city or county should 
remember that hosting certain kinds of jobs could be very expensive in terms 
of the infrastructure, policing and social services they require compared to the 
taxes they generate. The strenuous competition among the cities and counties 
that we sometimes now observe for jobs often turns out to impose losses on 
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everyone involved. Cooperative economic development activities make more 
financial sense because they increase the probability that there will be many 
winners within Hampton Roads when a new firm decides to locate here or an 
existing firm expands. 
IMPROVE THE DESIGN OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES 
All economic development incentives should include “claw 
back” provisions, or money-back guarantees, whereby the 
governmental unit can recoup the incentive payments if the 
businesses in question fail to live up to their job creation or 
investment promises. Further, following the interesting example of the city 
of St. Louis with respect to the St. Louis Cardinals baseball team, economic 
development incentives can be accompanied by “shared appreciation” 
agreements. If the recipient firm prospers, and later sells a major asset (such as 
a stadium) that the government has subsidized, then the governmental donor 
should share in that prosperity in the form of receiving a proportion of the sales 
price when those assets eventually change hands. Cities and counties also can 
negotiate specific requirements to accompany their investments, for example, 
that a certain amount of low-income housing be constructed, or even that a 
specific percentage of any operating profits be devoted to designated charities.  
MONITOR WHAT THE RECIPIENTS DO WITH THEIR INCENTIVES
Given the many potential pitfalls connected to tax incentives, even a 
comparatively well-designed incentive program may yield disappointing 
results. Because of this, it is important to monitor the effects of all incentives on 
an ongoing basis. The city of Newport News provides an example of how not 
to do it when it gave the developers of the convention facility attached to the 
Marriott at City Center $26 million in support, but amazingly did not require 
any public accounting of the subsequent operation and use of that facility. 
Public funds must not be invested without subsequent public 
inspection. 
In April 2014, Gov. McAuliffe announced that Virginia would participate in the 
Business Incentives Initiative, a joint project of The Pew Charitable Trusts, the 
Center for Regional Economic Competitiveness and six other states (Indiana, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Oklahoma and Tennessee), to “reform 
economic development incentive reporting policies and practices.”
The news release announcing Virginia’s involvement stated that “teams of 
economic development policymakers and practitioners from seven states 
will improve those states’ ability to collect and report results from incentive 
investments and, as a result, develop national standards and best practices 
that can become road maps for other states.” Eleven different state agencies 
are listed as participants. If this comes to fruition, it will be an important step 
forward.
Cities and counties in Hampton Roads should take to heart 
this commitment to transparency. Whether it is the convention 
center in Newport News, the prospective new arena in Virginia 
Beach or the conference/hotel complex in Norfolk, cities and 
counties should require recipients of their financial largesse to 
open their books to public inspection. Only then will citizens be 
able to ascertain if their tax dollars are being spent wisely.
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Final Words
In another chapter in this report, “The Answer Is Always Yes,” we note the 
perilous tendency of cities and counties to fund large, flashy convention center/
arena/hotel facilities in their communities even though there is abundant 
evidence both that these investments typically don’t pay off and that this is 
an especially bad time to move in this direction. Cities and counties do so, 
however, because they believe this is a sound economic development strategy 
(despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary).
In this chapter, we cast substantial doubt on another cornerstone of city and 
county economic developers – the dispensing of economic development 
incentive payments to businesses. While the evidence on the effectiveness of 
such payments is not as negative as is true for public funding of convention 
centers/arenas/hotels, it is nonetheless mixed at best and frankly discouraging 
for those who mistakenly view this as the royal road to economic development. 
What, then, is the appropriate approach for us to take in 
terms of economic development? We must take a long-
term approach and improve our overall economic and 
social environment. This means improving our K-12 schools, 
stimulating workforce development in community colleges 
and universities, promoting research and development 
activities at our medical school and universities, enhancing our 
transportation infrastructure, stimulating the development of 
cultural amenities and reducing crime, even while we ensure 
that our tax structure remains competitive.  
Too often, our economic development agencies and elected 
officials persist in looking for quick fixes that somehow will 
catapult our region forward to fame and fortune. Absent the 
next Microsoft fortuitously being invented by an enterprising 
student in the Frank Batten College of Engineering at Old 
Dominion University, it isn’t going to happen. Instead, we must 
develop and implement a plan for the long run – one that may not begin to yield 
benefits until the next decade, but will slowly transform our region and enable it 
to realize its potential.   
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The Answer Is Always “Yes” 
How Our Cities Repeatedly Ignore The 
Evidence And Choose To Construct 
Unprofitable And Unneeded New Convention 
And Hotel Capacity
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THE ANSWER IS ALWAYS “YES”: HOW OUR CITIES 
REPEATEDLY IGNORE THE EVIDENCE AND CHOOSE 
TO CONSTRUCT UNPROFITABLE AND UNNEEDED NEW 
CONVENTION AND HOTEL FACILITIES
– “The Answer Is Always Yes” description comes from Forbes magazine, Feb. 28, 2005
A
las, the 2005 Forbes magazine observation remains largely on target in 2014. Virtually every one of Hampton Roads’ major cities and tourist 
destinations either has constructed, or is planning to construct, new convention space, usually to be accompanied by increased hotel capacity. This 
is despite the reality that: (1) both nationally and regionally, convention business has been struggling with declining attendance for well more than a 
decade;1 and (2) by nearly every measure, our region’s hotel/motel sector prosperity and performance stand below where they were in 2007.  
Whether serious analysis of these issues comes from the political right 
(Manhattan Institute), or the political left (Brookings Institution), they are 
unanimous in concluding that investments in additional convention/conference/
hotel capacity hardly ever break even, much less generate a respectable, 
positive rate of return on the funds the public invests.1  
Here is a sample of their conclusions:
•  “The overall convention marketplace is declining in a manner that suggests 
that a recovery or turnaround is unlikely to yield much increased business for 
any given community, contrary to industry projections.” (Brookings Institution, 
2005)2
•  “Many of these expansions appear to have been based on feasibility 
studies that failed to present rigorous reviews and examinations regarding 
1  Convention center attendance nationally fell by almost 32 percent from 126 million to 86 million between 2000 
and 2010. Joe Lawlor, “City officials suffer from conference center Fever,” Daily Press (April 11, 2013), 
www.dailypress.com.
2  Heywood Sanders, “Space Available: The Realities of Convention Centers as Economic Development Strategy,” 
Brookings Institution (January 2005).
alleged claims of positive impacts and over-optimistic operational pro-forma 
statements.” (Gerald Kock, University of Central Florida, 2007)3
• “The whole thing is a racket.” (Boston Globe, 2011)4
•  “Convention Center Expansion: Build It and They Won’t Come.” (Baltimore 
Sun, 2011)5
•  “From Boston to Austin, politicians spend money on fancy white elephants.” 
(Manhattan Institute, 2011)6
•  “The Dubious Economics of Convention Centers” (ThinkProgress, 2011)7
3  Gerald Kock, “Proposing an Alternative Framework for Feasibility Studies for Large Public Tourism Investments: 
A Quantitative Analysis of the Orange County Convention Center,” Master of Science thesis, Rosen College of 
Hospitality Management, University of Central Florida, 2007.
4  Steven Malanga, “Have We Got a Convention Center to Sell You!,” The Wall Street Journal (Dec. 31, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204720204577126603702369654
5  Marta H. Mossberg, “Convention Center Expansion: Build It and They Won’t Come.” Baltimore Sun (June 7, 
2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-06-07/news/bs-ed-mossburg-20110607_1_heywood-sanders-
attendance-hilton-baltimore
6  Steven Malanga, “Have We Got a Convention Center to Sell You!,” Manhattan Institute (Dec. 31, 2011), 
www.manhattan-institute.org/html/miarticle.htm?id=7759
7  Matthew Yglesias, “The Dubious Economics of Convention Centers,” ThinkProgress (March 18, 2011), 
http://thinkprogress.org/yglesisas/2011/03/18/200256/the-dubious-economics-of-convention-centers
•  “Yet they have continued to pour money into the convention business, even in 
the face of a national glut of meeting space and Charlotte’s inability to fill its 
building.” (Charlotte Observer, 2012)8
• “City officials suffer from conference center fever.” (Daily Press, 2013)9
•  “The heyday of conventions is over. More meetings are being held online.” 
(The Daily Page, 2013)10
The truth is that it is difficult to generate any reliable evidence in favor of the 
public subsidization of the construction of new convention/conference/hotel/
motel facilities in Hampton Roads (or hardly anywhere else in the United States). 
As the foremost national expert on the economics of convention centers has 
put it, the studies that cities have presented in favor of their convention centers 
“have been consistently flawed and misleading.”11 We’ll present persuasive 
data in this chapter that clearly call into question any publicly financed project 
that would add to what already is a glut of convention/conference/hotel/
motel space in Hampton Roads. Such investments constitute a distinctly inferior 
economic development strategy either for individual cities, or for the region as a 
whole.
Where Does Real Economic 
Development Come From?
Barring the discovery of a huge vein of gold during the construction of a new 
highway or building, or a wildly successful, but unexpected, new invention or 
business, reality is that economic growth is a very long-term process. A city or 
region grows faster than its neighbors either because: (1) it has found attractive 
8  Steve Harrison, “Selling Charlotte: Convention Business Requires Millions From Taxpayers,” The Charlotte 
Observer (Aug. 20, 2012), www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/08/20/v-print/3464298/cost-of-convention.
html
9  Joe Lawlor, “City officials suffer from conference center fever,” Daily Press (April 11, 2013), www.dailypress.com
10  Joe Tarr, “Convention Center Researcher Heywood Sanders Warns Against Building New Monona Terrace 
Hotel,” The Daily Page (Nov. 15, 2013), www.thedailypage.com/daily/article.php?article=41421
11  Heywood T. Sanders, “Convention Myths and Markets: A Critical Review of Convention Center Feasibility 
Studies,” Economic Development Quarterly, 16 (2002), 195-209, p. 195. Sanders also noted, “The errors 
and failings of these studies are not limited to the case of convention centers. Other equally flawed market 
analyses and forecasts have been employed to support light rail projects, stadiums, arenas, cultural attractions, 
and aquariums.” p. 208.
ways to sell its goods and services to those outside that city or region; or (2) it 
has become a more powerful magnet that keeps increasingly large proportions 
of its citizens’ expenditures within its boundaries.  
FINDING WAYS TO SELL TO OR ATTRACT OUTSIDERS
With respect to (1), unless we unexpectedly discover oil in Pungo or Poquoson, 
smart, well-educated, ambitious, entrepreneurial citizens are the key to our 
being able to sell more goods and services to those outside the region. Such 
individuals are an important part of what economists refer to as our “human 
capital.” Non-economists shorthand this by saying “great schools” and they 
should be referring to kindergarten through Ph.D.  
Our experience in Hampton Roads is mixed. We have pockets of excellence 
in our schools and colleges, but if we pay attention to measures such as SOL 
performance and school rankings, we must acknowledge that we often fall 
short of the nation’s leadership regions. In the business sector, we’ve prospered 
from more than a few firms in our region that have met the market test and 
have found ways to sell their attractive wares outside of Hampton Roads. These 
firms range in size from large, highly visible enterprises, such as Amerigroup, 
Ferguson Enterprises, Newport News Shipbuilding and Sentara, to small and 
medium-sized firms, such as Measurement Specialties, Paramount Sleep and 
Stihl.  
Real economic growth – the kind that does not involve transferring money from 
one pocket to another inside our region – also can be generated by universities 
and medical schools. These institutions not only can draw students from outside 
our region, but also can attract significant research grant money. When they 
succeed in doing so, they provide us with a readily understandable model of 
selling goods and services to outsiders: we produce something that others want 
to use or purchase.  
Some Virginians may take umbrage when the College of William & Mary grants 
admission to out-of-state residents, but this is a positive source of economic 
development that must not be forgotten. Analogously, when Old Dominion 
University logs approximately $100 million in annual research and development 
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funding, this too fuels the engine of economic development because the great 
proportion of these dollars comes to the university from outside Hampton Roads. 
Contrast the examples of Paramount Sleep and Old Dominion University to the 
“economic development” that allegedly occurs when a city chooses to subsidize 
a local business that is not capable of attracting outside expenditures because 
it has little or no magnetic power. A quintessential illustration is an approximate 
$250,000 subsidy that one Hampton Roads city once provided a fast food 
outlet. The city claimed additional jobs and tax revenues would be generated 
from the expanded/renovated business. However, this dubious claim evaded 
the critical question: Where are the customers for this fast food outlet going to 
come from? Are customers going to drive in from Richmond to patronize it? Not 
likely. Will local customers stay in Hampton Roads to spend their food money 
because of this restaurant? Again, it’s not likely.  
Virtually all additional sales, jobs and tax revenues emanating from the fast food 
restaurant will come from existing fast food restaurants. One restaurant’s gain is 
another’s loss. This illustrates the economic phenomenon known 
as displacement – one restaurant’s increasing sales come from 
another restaurant’s decreasing sales. In net terms, there is no 
new economic development from such “investments.”  
Those interested in actual rather than imaginary economic development must 
be wary of the displacement of existing expenditures, which does not constitute 
net, new economic development. Instead, such redistribution disappointingly 
often also involves crony capitalism, whereby a few favored businesses are 
subsidized at the expense of all the others. In fairness, however, we must note 
that expenditure displacement certainly is not limited to fast food restaurants. It 
also often afflicts new or expanded arenas, convention centers and hotels.
Consider the case of a new or renovated hotel. If a new hotel or motel can only 
be made viable by means of a public subsidy, then one should ask whether 
that new hotel or motel actually will add to total hotel/motel patronage in our 
region, or instead simply redistribute expenditures, jobs and tax collections from 
one place to another. Will it effectively impoverish existing hotels and motels? 
To be sure, existing hotels must be renovated or improved periodically (and we 
are pleased when this occurs), but it is not clear why other hotels and businesses 
should be asked to pay for such improvements. 
All too often, elected officials and regional economic development personnel 
ignore displaced expenditures. They revel in trumpeting the additional jobs and 
tax payments connected to a subsidized project without acknowledging that 
some or all of those jobs and tax payments will be realized only because the 
subsidized business will take those jobs and tax payments away from existing 
competitors.
INCREASING REGIONAL MAGNETISM
But, it is legitimate to ask: Shouldn’t we endeavor to improve our region and 
make it more attractive to ourselves and to others? And, doesn’t that take 
investment? The answer to both questions is “yes,” but we must be careful 
how we go about this. We are capable of making our region more attractive 
– increasing its magnetism – by well-chosen investments in infrastructure and 
amenities. Attractions such as the Norfolk Tides, The Mariners’ Museum and 
the Virginia Aquarium not only entice outside guests, but also keep our own 
Paramount Sleep, headquartered in Norfolk, provides an ex-
cellent example of real economic development in action. In 
2008, Paramount, which manufactures and sells mattresses 
to a wide variety of customers, including the government, 
sold more than 52 percent of its mattresses inside Virginia 
on annual sales of about $18 million. By 2014, the company 
had expanded its revenues to more than $30 million through 
four manufacturing/licensing partnerships with out-of-state 
firms. Paramount’s out-of-Virginia sales constitute about 70 
percent of its business. Paramount now sells in U.S. Navy 
Exchange stores around the world, and its products appear 
in Bloomingdale’s and Costco stores throughout the country. 
This is genuine economic growth that did not come at the 
expense of other companies in our region.   
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expenditures within Hampton Roads. The entire Virginia Beach oceanfront acts 
as a magnet that attracts visitors and retains expenditures inside the region.  
A well-devised, efficient transportation system pays dividends by reducing 
travel costs even while it pleases guests and makes our region a more 
attractive place to live. We improve our quality of life and reduce travel costs 
when we make cost-efficient investments in our transportation system. (Route 
460, however, was the opposite kind of public investment -- one in which the 
costs exceeded the benefits.)
If, however, the only customers that a conventional business or attraction ever 
attracts are local and regional citizens, then even though we should praise 
those businesses and attractions for serving local citizens well, it is difficult to 
fashion a respectable economic argument why either should be subsidized by 
the public. This is particularly true when displaced expenditures are involved 
– for example, when the construction of a new hotel would simply take 
patronage away from existing local hotels.  
Even so, let’s be clear – public policy should not discourage the construction 
of a new, nonsubsidized hotel (or any other business) unless doing so would 
unleash noticeable spinoff costs on other citizens. Entrepreneurs sensing 
opportunities and taking advantage of them is intrinsic to a market-based 
economy. We usually end up better off when entrepreneurs leap to meet 
our needs. Only a brief look at the massive oppression of consumers in the 
former Soviet Union is necessary to understand this principle. Nevertheless, 
providing entrepreneurs with the freedom to innovate and invest does not 
justify subsidizing such ventures with public funds.
It’s not clear why taxpayers should subsidize a new hotel or conference 
center at the expense of existing hotels and centers unless the new hotel 
demonstrably would be able to attract incremental new visitors from outside 
the region. Or, alternatively, perhaps the new hotel would provide the 
critical amenities and capacity that would complement existing facilities and 
amenities and complete a package capable of attracting incremental new 
visitors and customers. (Unfortunately, while decision makers often make the 
argument, it seldom holds water.)
We should not limit our analysis to hotels. Athletic facilities, convention 
centers, fine and performing arts venues and recreational facilities such as 
golf courses also should be in our purview. In each case, we need to ask 
three critical questions:
(1)  Will this public investment attract incremental new visitors and customers 
from outside our region and, if so, how many will come and how much 
money will they spend?
(2)  Will this public investment act as a magnet and induce local and regional 
citizens to spend their time and money in Hampton Roads rather than 
somewhere else? And, if so, in how many cases will this be true and how 
much money is involved?
(3)  When we add up the benefits we have calculated in (1) and (2) – most of 
which will spread out over future years and therefore must be discounted 
appropriately12 – are they at least as large as the cost of the public 
investment?  
The problem is that numerous studies of public investments 
in hotel and convention center complexes reveal that the 
answer to question (3) often is not simply “no,” but a 
resounding “NO!” Put simply, the benefits often do not 
exceed the costs despite the rosy forecasts of those investing 
the public funds. While those advocating such investments usually point 
to increased tax revenues and incremental jobs, they consistently ignore 
displacement in their calculations. It does our region no good if a public 
investment adds $10 million of tax revenues from a new source, even while 
it reduces tax revenues from existing sources by $10 million. This is not 
economic development; it is an exercise in crony capitalism.
None of this should be taken to mean that our region should not invest in 
new buildings, new plants and equipment, new roads, new and improved 
homes, etc. Such investments can improve the quality of our lives and some 
will make us more productive. Nevertheless, such investments do not generate 
the economic development jolt we receive from regional economic activities that 
enable us to sell to those outside our region.
12   This means we must find the “present value” of the future benefits and requires us to “discount” the future benefits 
in order to reduce them to current dollars so that we can compare these future benefits to the current investment 
costs. Present value is an absolutely fundamental concept in economics and finance and underpins analysis and 
decision making both on Wall Street and Main Street. 
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 2014136
Convention Facilities In 
Hampton Roads
Let’s take a look at the convention/conference/meeting facilities (hereafter 
shortened to “convention facilities”) currently available in Hampton Roads.
THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE MARKET
Table 1 reports the major convention and meeting facilities in Hampton Roads 
along with the number of guest rooms attached to these locations. It is important 
to note that these facilities differ significantly in terms of their characteristics. The 
largest facility in our region is the Virginia Beach Convention Center, which 
provides 516,000 square feet of potential space for conventions or meetings, 
followed by the Hampton Roads Convention Center in Hampton (344,000 
square feet) and the Boo Williams Sportsplex in Hampton, a successful, 
specialized, sports-oriented venue (135,000 square feet).  
The Virginia Beach Convention Center also is capable of hosting the largest 
banquets (2,000 capacity), followed by the Hampton Roads Convention Center 
(1,800), and the Norfolk Waterside Marriott (1,000) and Norfolk Sheraton 
(1,000). While many national conventions involve banquets much larger than 
these capacity limits, it is not clear that our region is capable of attracting such 
events because of hotel room and transportation constraints.
Where hotel rooms are concerned, our largest regional facility is Kingsmill 
Resort in Williamsburg (605 rooms), but several cities are capable of exceeding 
this number by combining the room capacities of existing, nearby facilities. 
In the case of Norfolk, for example, the Waterside Marriott and Sheraton 
Waterside together field 873 hotel rooms. Similarly, both Virginia Beach and 
Williamsburg are capable of fielding much larger combinations of hotel rooms 
by piggybacking multiple hotel locations, but these possibilities usually involve 
transporting some guests from hotels to meeting facilities.  
All things considered, Hampton Roads fields a rather wide, though often 
duplicative, variety of convention, meeting and hotel facilities. The region is 
capable of hosting many different types of conventions and meetings, though 
not the largest meetings, which often are trade and business shows, political 
conventions and some academic meetings. The 2012 Consumer Electronics 
Show in Las Vegas, for example, reportedly attracted 156,000 visitors. Even if 
this number is exaggerated by a factor of five, such numbers vastly exceed the 
hosting abilities of Hampton Roads.13  
UTILIZATION OF OUR CURRENT SUPPLY
“If they don’t want to tell you how often their facilities are being used, then 
that usually means that the numbers are bad,” a well-placed national meetings 
official told us. If this observation holds water with respect to Hampton Roads, 
then the underlying event and attendance data for our region’s convention 
and hotel facilities must be sour indeed. Even public convention and tourism 
agencies routinely decline to supply data on events hosted and attendance, 
though they have a legal obligation to do so.     
Only six of the 24 facilities listed in Table 1 were willing to supply information 
that would allow one to infer how intensively these facilities are used. 
Nevertheless, one can sneak a peek at reality by inspecting city budgets (though 
convention center numbers often are well disguised) and by listening to the 
periodic debates that occur in city councils when a council member discovers 
or rediscovers the fact that their convention center is losing money. For example, 
the $106 million Hampton Roads Convention Center in Hampton, which 
opened in 2005, has been losing millions of dollars every year, but city officials 
nevertheless argue that the facility attracts sufficient business from the outside that 
it overcomes these losses.14 This evidence, however, has not been shared with 
anyone.
Hampton, however, is more forthcoming than Newport News, which supplied 
$26 million of public funds to construct the Conference Center at the Marriott 
Hotel in City Center. The investment dollars may have been public, but the 
financial books of the conference center are not. Newport News signed an 
agreement with the Marriott that does not require the Marriott to make public 
any financial information concerning the taxpayer-subsidized conference center. 
This is an unusual arrangement.
13 www.vegasinc.com/business/public-record/2013/jan/07/list-2012-largest-conventions.
14  Joe Lawlor and Robert Brauchle, “Taxpayer Money for Conference/Convention Centers Scrutinized,” Daily Press 
(June 25, 2012), www.dailypress.com
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TABLE 1










Boo Williams Sportsplex Hampton 135,000 N/A N/A N/A
Cavalier Hotel Virginia Beach 50,000 16,320 1,500 400
Chesapeake Conference Center Chesapeake 22,700 20,000 1,100 N/A
Doubletree 
(now The Williamsburg Hotel & Conference Center)
Williamsburg 45,000 13,303 1,030 281
Fort Magruder Hotel & Conference Center Williamsburg 26,000 5,680 500 303
Founders Inn and Spa Virginia Beach 25,000 12,876 1,000 240
Great Wolf Lodge Williamsburg 14,500 4,524 350 406
Hampton Coliseum Hampton 88,599 26,263 500 N/A






Hampton University Hampton 14, 916 14,000 N/A N/A
Hilton Garden Inn Suffolk Riverfront Suffolk 14,000 7,260 500 150
Hilton Virginia Beach Oceanfront Virginia Beach 12,196 7,100 1,000 289
Holiday Inn Virginia Beach/Norfolk Hotel Virginia Beach 22,000 5,220 450 307
Holiday Inn & Suites North Beach Virginia Beach 8,000 2,100 350 321
Kingsmill Resort Williamsburg 17,101 6,050 500 605
Newport News Marriott at City Center Newport News 25,000 12,032 880 250
Norfolk Waterside Marriott Norfolk 60,000 14,400 1,400 405
Renaissance Hotel and Conference Center Portsmouth 24,355 11,858 1,000* 249
Sheraton Norfolk Waterside Norfolk 35,000 12,685 1,000 468
Sheraton Virginia Beach Oceanfront Hotel Virginia Beach 13,138 5,700 500 214
Smithfield Center Smithfield 16,000 8,000 340 N/A
Virginia Beach Convention Center Virginia Beach 516,000 31,029 1,800 N/A
Williamsburg Lodge Williamsburg 45,000 11,190 1,000 323
Wyndham Hotel Oceanfront Virginia Beach 16,000 5,218 550 244
*Per Sales and Service - Renaissance 
**Arena space can be configured for banquets. The 14,000 square foot space is considered the largest meeting space other than arena.
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 2014138
In 2012, when Virginia Beach rejected a proposal to supply $67 million in 
taxpayer funds to spur the construction of a $109 million four-star Hyatt Regency 
hotel near its $207 million convention center (which opened in 2007), some 
council members and many taxpayers grumbled that the convention center had 
yet to fulfill its promise. Instead, the convention center appeared to specialize in 
local and regional events rather than attracting larger, national events.  
The relevant point of these examples is that convention/conference centers 
virtually never make money; they nearly always require subsidies. In an 
attempt to make them profitable, elected officials frequently propose public 
investments in complementary facilities, such as hotels. One losing proposition 
frequently leads to another for taxpayers. Virginia Beach is one of the few cities 
that has resisted what one external industry observer termed “second-stage 
developments.”     
The Founders Inn and Spa (at Regent University) did tell us that it hosted more 
than 500 events in 2013, while the Smithfield Center, a public endeavor, 
indicated it hosted 480. The Chesapeake Conference Center, while losing 
money, reported hosting 440 events between June 2012 and July 2013. The 
Wyndham Hotel in Virginia Beach reported that it hosted more than 300 events 
in 2013. Nearly every other facility declined to supply any data concerning 
events, usage or profitability.
NATIONAL UTILIZATION DATA
While those that operate our region’s convention facilities are very close to 
the vest with their data, we do have access to national data on convention 
attendance, convention revenues and space utilization. Graph 1, which is 
derived from Center for Exhibition Industry Research (CEIR) data, reveals that 
times have been very tough for conventions, meetings and exhibitions since 
2000. We’ll refer to these collectively as “events.” Graph 1 discloses that:
•  Total attendance at events in 2013 remained below that in 2007 and was 
only about 2 percent higher than in 2000.
•  Revenues derived from these events were about 15 percent below those in 
2007 and about 2 percent below those in 2000.
•  The number of exhibitors at events was about 8 percent below that in 2007 
and about 7 percent below that in 2000.
•  Space utilization at events was about 8 percent below that in 2007, but 
about 2 percent higher than that in 2000.  
At the very least, the data and trends illustrated in Graph 1 
are very discouraging to any city contemplating the subsidized 
construction of additional convention space. The problem is 
exacerbated by the new event-hosting capacity that has been coming on line. 
Graph 2 reveals that event-hosting capacity has grown by about one-third since 
2000, even while attendance has barely budged above 2000 levels.  
Further, as Graphs 3 and 4 demonstrate, the adverse trends observed in Graph 
2 apply both to large and small venues. The convention market is in the 
midst of a long-term slump that applies to virtually all types of 
venues.  
Optimists blame the Great Recession that began in 2008 for the demise of the 
convention market. While there is no doubt that the recession has contributed 
to the attendance and revenue challenges facing convention venues, it would 
be a mistake to assume that convention problems will disappear if economic 
conditions improve. First, the industry suffers from overcapacity. The blunt truth 
is there are far too many convention venues available relative to even the most 
generous estimates of future demand. Graph 2 drives this point home.
Second, the funk into which the convention market has descended already 
preceded the Great Recession. Convention attendance and revenues have been 
stagnant or falling since the end of the 1990s. An increasingly important reason 
for this is the ability that individuals now have to see and talk with each other 
in high definition over the Internet. This has put a serious dent in the need for 
employees and individuals to attend a convention in a distant city.   
Even Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss (in “Candide”) would have difficulty pulling an 
optimistic interpretation from the data and trends found in Graphs 1 through 4. 
Is it possible that Hampton Roads could constitute an exception to these adverse 
national trends? This is unlikely. Our region is highly dependent upon federal 
expenditures (especially those involving defense) and there is little prospect that 
federal expenditures on travel and meetings are going to climb.  
In fact, our region has been unable to make headway in the face of the strong 
national winds that have buffeted convention venues and hotels. The next section 
provides data that demonstrate this point.    
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GRAPH 1
HISTORIC AND FORECAST CONDITIONS INDEX — MEETINGS AND EXHIBITION INDUSTRY
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GRAPH 2
CEIR ATTENDANCE INDEX AND EXHIBIT SPACE SUPPLY BY YEAR
Note: CEIR stands for the Center for Exhibition Industry Research. 
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GRAPH 3
PWC LARGE CONVENTION CENTERS AVERAGE CONV/TS ATTENDANCE BY YEAR
Note: PwC stands for PricewaterhouseCoopers. CONV/TS stands for conventions/trade shows. 
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GRAPH 4
PWC SMALL CONVENTION CENTERS AVERAGE CONV/TS ATTENDANCE BY YEAR
Note: PwC stands for PricewaterhouseCoopers. CONV/TS stands for conventions/trade shows. 
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Hotel Facilities In 
Hampton Roads
While our region’s cities jealously guard data concerning the utilization of their 
convention centers, a variety of trade groups collect data concerning hotel/
motel (we’ll henceforth abbreviate this to “hotel”) utilization and prosperity.  
Simply put, the Hampton Roads hotel industry is smaller now than it was in 2007 
and room utilization fell during that time as well. One can see in Graph 
5 that total hotel revenues in our region peaked in 2007 and 
still are expected to be 4.6 percent below that level in 2014. In 
real, inflation-adjusted terms, total hotel revenues in Hampton 
Roads in 2013 were 18.1 percent below those in 2007. 
The coin of the realm in the hotel business is REVPAR – revenue per available 
room – because REVPAR takes into account how many rooms are being utilized 
to generate revenue. Implicitly, it reflects the costs attached to generating 
revenue. One can see in Table 2 that REVPAR in 2013 lagged the 2007 high-
water mark by 10.7 percent.     
The most easily understood statistic for those not closely connected to the hotel 
industry is the hotel vacancy rate – the average percentage of rooms that are 
occupied by guests. Vacancy rates in 2013 also were below those in 2007 
and, in contrast to the hopes of some, continued to decline in 2013. Graph 6 
reveals that the Historic Triangle (Williamsburg) was the sole exception to this 
trend.
In May 2014, Norfolk announced an approximate $90 million public 
investment in a conference center/hotel/parking complex on Main Street. 
Norfolk decision makers say they are aware of the seriously adverse market 
conditions they will confront as they move ahead with this project, but for public 
consumption have argued that: (1) the “conference center” they contemplate 
differs from a typical convention center and therefore will attract upscale, 
technologically savvy guests capable of paying perhaps a $30 per night 
premium at a new, upscale hotel made more attractive by high-quality dining 
opportunities; (2) the project will attract new conferences and meetings that 
heretofore have skipped by Norfolk and therefore will not diminish the number 
of guests served by nearby hotels, such as the Waterside Marriott and Sheraton 
Waterside; and (3) combined with other downtown improvements, the project 
will enable Norfolk to assemble a highly attractive overall package that would 
make the city competitive for many additional conventions and meetings.  
These are strong assertions that are inconsistent with the national and regional 
trends delineated in Graphs 1 through 7 and therefore are an uncertain basis 
for an investment of $90 million of public funds. This is especially true since 
during the project’s development the city declined to share any relevant data 
that would illuminate why it believes this particular project constitutes the best 
available use of its scarce funds.  
Both Norfolk’s new downtown project and the renovation of 
Virginia Beach’s historic Cavalier Hotel are being spearheaded 
by Bruce Thompson, an experienced and savvy developer.  Ac-
cording to Inside Business (May 12-18, 2014), Mr. Thompson 
will receive an $18 million subsidy from Virginia Beach in 
addition to an approximate $90 million subsidy from Nor-
folk.  Inside Business quotes Mr. Thompson: “Another hotel 
in downtown Norfolk would be a disaster.”  Mr. Thompson 
will earn the title of wizard if he can simultaneously: (1) buck 
the adverse patronage trends that have afflicted national and 
regional hotels and conference centers for many years; (2) 
successfully position the new Norfolk development so that it 
is not regarded as just “another hotel;” and, (3) not harm the 
existing Marriott and Sheraton hotels as he does so.
“Providing more hotel space to attract more convention business has been the philosophy behind cities across the country that 
have publicly financed and built convention center hotels. But too often, the convention groups and visitors that are supposed 
to fill those new rooms never show.” Baltimore Business Journal (March 1-7, 2013), www.baltimorebusinessjournal.com
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GRAPH 5
TOTAL ANNUAL HOTEL REVENUE IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1996-2013
Sources: Smith Travel Research Trend Report, January 7, 2014 and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project.
Hotel Revenue in Hampton Roads, 1996-2013 




































































































































Hotel revenues in 2013 were 6.8 percent below the peak observed in 
2007 and are expected to increase by only 2.4 percent in 2014
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TABLE 2
REVPAR IN SELECTED MARKETS, 2007-2013
2007 2013 Percentage Change
U.S. $65.58 $68.69 +4.7%
Virginia $61.95 $55.69 -10.1%
Hampton Roads $52.90 $47.25 -10.7%
Myrtle Beach $54.03 $56.40 +4.4%
Coastal Carolina $55.83 $56.26 +0.8%
Ocean City $71.74 $68.81 -4.1%
Virginia Beach $64.73 $64.64 -0.1%
Newport News/Hampton $41.49 $36.12 -12.9%
Norfolk/Portsmouth $54.05 $45.35 -16.1%
Williamsburg $47.48 $39.08 -17.7%
Chesapeake/Suffolk $52.90 $41.11 -22.3%
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GRAPH 6
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Final Thoughts 
There is real economic development and then there is alleged economic 
development. Real economic development occurs when a city or region 
becomes increasingly capable of producing goods and services that those 
outside the region want to purchase, or when it becomes increasingly capable 
of retaining the expenditures of its own citizens rather than watching those 
expenditures go elsewhere.  
“Smarter, better” is the time-honored way cities and regions increase their 
external sales capabilities, or enhance their own magnetism. This requires 
well-devised, cost-efficient investments in education and health, strategic 
infrastructure, well-chosen amenities, and both basic and applied research and 
development.  
Antithetical to real economic development are activities that merely redistribute 
sales within a city or region, or that blatantly redistribute income by favoring 
one firm or organization over another without any sound economic rationale for 
doing so. On closer inspection, it becomes apparent that this is a form of crony 
capitalism and in the long run this actually discourages real economic growth. 
Unfortunately, most (though not all) investments governments 
make in convention venues, arenas and attached hotel 
capacity fall into this latter, suspect category. Such investments 
usually do little more than redistribute existing sales and do 
not actually produce any incremental tax revenue. Further, 
they favor some firms and entrepreneurs over others, and 
therefore often do not pass the proverbial smell test.  
All of this occurs in city after city, year after year, despite 
the accumulated negative empirical evidence. Some elected 
officials in our region appear to be seduced by their own 
flashy announcements of large projects that falsely promise 
economic growth. “Our city is on the move!” Unfortunately, in 
the wrong direction.   
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